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INTRODUCTION
Choosing college and major is important decision as it shapes individuals’ earnings, working
conditions, and lifestyles. Economists are interested in knowing determinants of college admis-
sions and how various mechanisms and admissions policies affect students behaviors for a long
time because understanding underlying factors, motivations, and strategies are crucial to design
better mechanisms and education policies. The aim of this dissertation is understanding students’
choice behavior in college admissions and major choices by providing new empirical methods. In
this line, I develop empirical methods to understand students’ college preferences from their appli-
cations, the effects of their preferences on their college admissions preparation strategies, and to
tests the effects of students’ marriage expectations on their college major choices.
In my first chapter, I propose a practical and data-driven approach for estimating students’ col-
lege preferences from reported lists in centralized admissions mechanisms based on the Deferred
Acceptance Algorithm. The Deferred Acceptance (DA) is one of the popular admissions mecha-
nisms, however, it is applied with restricted rank-order lists (ROL) in many real world examples,
which is different than its advocated version. Under restriction, reporting truthfully is no longer
one of the best strategies. Moreover, there are many evidences of strategic behavior in students’
college rankings even among the students that do not use all listing in their ROLs. In order to incor-
porate strategic behavior in the estimation strategy, I model students’ ROL preparation strategies.
Combining the prediction of this model with the observed stylized facts in the data, I develop an
estimation method based on students’ predicted ranking behavior where students are making their
lists within the sets of colleges that are expected to be considered and found to be accessible. This
setting enables to make comparisons by excluding colleges that are eliminated from students’ lists
because of their assignment beliefs. In addition, I can estimate students’ college preferences using
complete information in the reported ROLs. Finally, with the predicted preference orders, I docu-
ment the magnitude of welfare changes of using long-term versus short-term student performance
measures by income categories, high school types, gender, and age groups.
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The second chapter analyses the effects of students’ colleges preferences on their college ad-
missions preparation strategies and provides empirical methods to test its significance and magni-
tude in the data. I focus on centralized college admissions, where colleges sort students according
to their scores from a national entrance exam. The outcomes of the college admissions with en-
trance exams can be represented with cutoff scores, which are the minimum scores of the matched
students. The distributions of cutoff scores are good approximations for matching outcomes in
large matching games rather than complicated models and students’ behavior can be characterized
in individual level using these distributions. In this environment, I show that students’ exam prepa-
ration strategies depend on their abilities, personal college valuations, and the distribution of cutoff
scores, where students approximate it using cutoff scores from the past years. This setting allows
me to examine the effects of students’ college preferences on their exam preparation strategies in
the data. To identify the effects of students’ preference on the preparation strategies and resulting
exam scores, I partition colleges according to observable college characteristics and competition
levels. These partitions also enable to estimate the effects of preferences on exam scores. Using
Turkey’s college admissions data, I show that students’ college preferences are significant factors
in the exam preparation strategies and they account for up to 40 percent of the total variation in
exam scores. This finding suggests that disregarding the effects of students’ college preferences on
the exam preparation strategies causes misleading interpretations of students’ behavior in college
admissions. In addition, admission policies (e.g., Affirmative Action and Financial Aid) need to
be reconsidered according to the effects of preferences.
In the third chapter, co-authored with Tong Li, we test the effects of marriage expectations
on college major choices. The data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLYS97)
show that there are significant differences in marriage realizations of college graduates from dif-
ferent majors. Selection of a major with different marriage expectations can present one potential
explanation for why there are observed differences in the marriage outcomes. To test this hypoth-
esis, we develop a copula-based econometric framework that incorporates multinomial regressors
(major choice) in binary outcome response (marriage realization) models. Our test results show
2
that the effects of marriage expectations can not be rejected, even after individual characteristics
and expected earnings are controlled for.
These three chapters provide new methods for understanding students’ behavior in college
admissions and empirical evidence of students’ preferences, and motivations’ effects on their ap-
plication strategies, and their preparation strategies. These results show that students with different
preferences and motivations prepare and choose education paths accordingly. Moreover, admis-
sions criteria, admissions policies (e.g., Affirmative Action and Financial Aid) affect the welfare
of students from different backgrounds differently and they need to be reconsidered according to
policy makers’ objectives.
3
CHAPTER 1
Preference Estimation in Centralized College Admissions from Reported Lists
1.1 Introduction
Understanding students’ college preferences is crucial for evaluating performance of admis-
sion mechanisms and measuring the effects of admission policies on students’ welfare. In this line,
centralized college admissions provide rich administrative datasets for estimating students’ col-
lege preferences. In these mechanisms, students and colleges are matched according to students’
reported rank-order lists (ROL) and admissions criteria (e.g., exam score, high school GPA) that
sort students. Even though there is rich information about students’ college choices coming from
reported lists, recovering preferences from these lists is not immediate. Reporting college lists
truthfully is not one of the best strategies in many real world admissions mechanisms, and there-
fore estimating preference by treating the colleges in the submitted lists as if they are the most
preferred colleges is not supported by theoretical findings.1
In this paper, we propose a practical and data-driven preference estimation method from re-
ported ROLs in a centralized college admissions based on the Deferred Acceptance (DA) without
assuming truthful revelation of preferences. The Deferred Acceptance is one of the popular ad-
mission mechanisms, however, it is applied with restricted ROLs in many real world examples,
which is different than its advocated setting.2 If there are restrictions on the number of reported
colleges, reporting truthfully is no longer one of the best strategies (Haeringer and Klijn (2009),
Calsamiglia et al. (2010)). Moreover, there are many evidences of strategic behavior in students’
college rankings even among the students that do not complete their ROLs.3 Therefore, in order
1In addition, we observe that students omit popular colleges if they expect a low chance of being accepted in our
data. Omission of popular colleges is a supporting evidence that truth-telling is not a good assumption to rely on for
estimating preferences.
2Mechanism design literature examines centralized admissions mechanisms extensively (So¨nmez and U¨nver
(2011), Abdulkadiroglu (2013)) and advocates mechanisms that incentivize truthfully reported lists (Pathak and
So¨nmez (2008)). The DA is one of the advocated mechanisms because reporting rank-order lists (ROL) truthfully
is the one of the best strategies if students are allowed to rank all colleges.
3Majority of students do not report complete lists in college admissions in Turkey, see figure A.5. Students’ scores
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to incorporate expected strategic college ranking behavior in our estimation strategy, we start by
modeling students’ college ranking strategies in ROLs. Combining the prediction of our model
with the observed stylized facts in the data, we develop an estimation method according to per-
sonal choice sets where students are making their lists among the colleges that are expected to be
considered and found to be accessible.4 This setting enables us to make comparisons by excluding
colleges that are eliminated from students’ lists because of their assignment probability beliefs. In
addition, it allows us to estimate students’ college preferences using complete information in the
reported ROLs.
We use a large college admissions model to analyze students’ college ranking strategies. Large
admissions models allow us to characterize students’ optimal college ranking strategies in individ-
ual level according to expected matching outcomes. In many national level admissions, matching
outcomes, which are cutoff scores of colleges in score-based admissions, are publicly available and
highly correlated throughout years. Since expected outcomes can be predicted from the past years’
outcomes, adopting a model that incorporates public information makes our method data-driven
compare to other approaches that depend on theoretical results. Moreover, this characterization is
a better representation of students’ ROL preparation behavior in national level college admissions
because students are also benefiting from the past years’ cutoff scores.
Implementing the proposed students’ college preference estimation method requires to con-
struct a personal consideration set for each student. In centralized college admissions, students
may not include all their preferred colleges because they may believe that they have no chances
for some of those colleges.5 Therefore, there is high chance of reaching misleading conclusions
by treating all colleges that are not listed in the ROLs as if they are not preferred by students.
This is the major concern for estimating students’ college preferences by adopting truth-telling as-
sumption. Our method, however, is designed to exclude the colleges that are not included in ROLs
and listed cutoff scores of colleges are highly correlated, see the table A.11
4An analogous approach is developed using browse sets of users in the estimation of mate preferences in online
dating by Hitsch et al. (2010).
5These cases can be also occurred in a centralized admissions with unrestricted lists because of students may not
include colleges if students have information about assignment probabilities and they believe they have no chances to
be assigned.
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because of students’ assignment probability beliefs. In this setting, all colleges in the considera-
tion sets could be selected and ranked in students’ ROLs, however, students rank them according to
their true college preference orders. As a result, the proposed method do not suffer from inaccurate
comparisons in the estimation.
There are equilibrium-based estimation methods also proposed to overcome problems resulting
from truthful revelation of preferences assumption (Among others, Fack et al. (2017), Akyol and
Krishna (2017), Burgess et al. (2015)). Stability/justified-envy-free is an well accepted equilibrium
notion in the two-sided matching games and its implications are used in students’ preference es-
timation methods.6 Even though these methods provide elegant solutions for estimating students’
preferences, robustness of stability-based estimation depends on whether students play equilibrium
strategies or not. If students do not play equilibrium strategies, the matching outcome is less likely
to be stable. Estimating students’ college preferences based on stability assumption is rather re-
strictive because this approach does not incorporate individual mistakes and unobservable choice
heterogeneities (e.g., understanding of admission mechanism) among students. In addition, re-
sulting estimation methods use only matched colleges, which causes loss of valuable information
in the reported lists. Finally, it is observed that around 20% of students who submit lists do not
matched with any colleges. Estimating preferences based on stability has to exclude these students,
which causes another under utilization of available data.
The proposed estimation method extends and improves stability-based estimation frameworks
by using information from past years’ matching outcomes. Outcomes from large matching markets
include valuable information if agents benefit from this information when they are planning their
strategies. Specifically for national level admissions, it is observed that past years’ matching out-
comes are stable throughout years.7 In this setting, students’ college preferences and exam scores
are private information, however, past years’ outcomes are generally publicly available and provide
6Stability implies that students are assigned to their favorite feasible colleges and a college is feasible in a exam-
based centralized college admissions for a student if the minimum score of all admitted students (cutoff score) of the
college is lower than the student’s score.
7Data from Turkish college admissions shows that the stability of cutoff scores throughout the years. Table A.18
presents the correlation of cutoff scores throughout years and figure A.6 shows the distribution of demeaned cutoff
scores. Ajayi (2015) also documents that the stability of matching outcomes in Ghana.
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information for the forthcoming matching outcomes. Under these conditions, it is expected that
candidates prepare their ROLs using available information from the realized matchings. We use
past years’ matching outcomes as the main information source to construct personal consideration
sets, which are the crucial part of our estimation strategy. In addition, we personalize constructed
consideration sets by allowing individual heterogeneities (e.g., understanding of mechanism) in
ranking behavior. Therefore, the proposed estimation method not only relaxes strong symmetric
equilibrium-play assumptions but also provides a framework to include complete information in
the reported ROLs.
We apply our estimation strategy to centralized college admissions data from Turkey. In
Turkey, the national admissions center assigns students to colleges based on students’ reported
ROLs, college entrance exam scores, and high school GPAs using DA. The number of available
college-majors slots are more than 7500.8 Students are allowed to rank up to 24 colleges. Our
data-set consists of 12829 students, however, for the estimation we restrict analysis with students
who have reported their rank order lists after learning their scores.9 This data-set is a combination
of a questionnaire that includes students socioeconomic background information and their perfor-
mances in the college entrance exam and high school. We also collect cutoff scores of colleges
from the national admissions center website in order to benefit from public information.
To compare our consideration set based estimation method with other methods in the literature,
we use two methods. First one is the Hausman-type specification test. As in Fack et al. (2017),
truth-telling vs stability comparison test, we implement a test for stability assumption vs considera-
tion set approach. Our test rejects truth-telling and stability in a favor of consideration set approach.
The second method is comparing predictive power of the estimators. We use college-major slots
from the private colleges that requires different scholarships, however, provide the same education
in order to create prediction power measure. The comparisons of estimated rankings show that
consideration set approach has higher predictive power such that it has better performance in the
8Major and college choice are simultaneous.
9We exclude students, who have two year programs in their ROLs. Two-year programs have special admissions
rules and it is hard generate a uniqued framework for their priorities.
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prediction of students’ college-major preference orders. Finally, we can summarize estimation re-
sults according to our preferred estimation results. The results show that colleges in the same cities
and private colleges that provide scholarship are more preferred. College programs that are offered
in evening hours are less preferred. Moreover, these preferences are changing with gender, income
levels, and parents’ education levels.
Finally, preference estimates provide an opportunity to perform counterfactual analysis. There
are many rules for admissions criterion in college and public school admissions. Since these cri-
teria are one of the main policy instruments for the admissions mechanisms, it is important to see
their welfare effects. By predicted complete preference orders, we evaluate only college exam
score-based versus only high school GPA-based admissions criteria’s effects on students’ welfare.
We find that the magnitude of welfare changes by income categories, high school types, gender,
and age groups. These results suggest that policymakers should take differentiated effects of ad-
missions criteria when they are designing college admissions.
The structure of this paper as follows: We conclude this section with a discussion of the re-
lated literature. In section 1.2, we describe a centralized college admissions mechanism. In the
1.3 section, we present the proposed estimation strategy that is based on personal consideration
sets. Next, we describe our econometric specification. Section 1.5 presents the college admissions
mechanism in Turkey, data, and estimation results. In section 1.6, the counterfactual analysis of
different admissions criteria is presented. Then, we conclude.
1.1.1 Related literature
From the influential papers by Balinski and So¨nmez (1999), Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez
(2003), the design of college/school admissions mechanisms has been an important research path,
and many admissions mechanisms are changed after these and following studies. Even though
in some special cases depending on truthful revelation assumption is supported from data and the
mechanism (Drewes and Michael (2006), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2017)), it is not applicable in most
of the real world examples.
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Our paper not only develops an estimation method based on large matching models such that
it utilizes all choices in ROLs and all students who report lists but also relaxes dependence of
equilibrium play assumptions by allowing individual heterogeneities and benefiting from available
public information. Even though Fack et al. (2017) deals with truth-telling assumption rigorously
by estimating preferences based on asymptotic stability, they only utilize matching outcomes and
feasible sets10 of colleges to estimate students’ preferences. Kirkebøen et al. (2012) and Burgess
et al. (2015) also use the same discrete choice framework to understand the effects of educational
choices. These approaches do not utilize all available information in the reported ROLs. However,
we are incorporating all listed colleges in ROLs by extending estimating framework based on
students’ behavior in large college admissions model and constructed personal consideration sets.
Among other papers that are proposing estimation of students’ preferences from reported
ROLs, Ajayi (2015) is the closest one to our paper. She also creates sets of schools to estimate
preferences according to public information and selectivity criteria. Different than the proposed
estimation framework in this paper, she adopts stronger choice assumptions and set restrictions in
the construction of choice sets.11 Our consideration set-based estimation, however, are supported
by large college admissions model’s predictions.
Large matching markets, which are used to characterize students’ college ranking behavior, is
another related literature. Azevedo and Leshno (2016) develop a supply and demand framework
to analyze stable matchings by assuming a continuum of students. The continuum version of the
model typically has a unique matching and is a good approximation for real markets. Menzel
(2015b) works on two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the number of
market participants grows large and show identification conditions in the large markets. Azevedo
and Budish (2017) examines strategy-proofness in the large, and argue that it is a useful second-
best to exact strategy-proofness for market design. The large market framework is also studied in
other game theoretical models to characterize agents’ behavior. Bodoh-Creed and Hickman (2016)
10All colleges that have lower cutoff than a students’ priority are defines as feasible colleges.
11These set restrictions are not supported in our data and ranking of schools according to assignment probabilities
is not supported by data also it does not represent underlying valuation of schools.
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analyze affirmative action policies by modeling college admissions as a large contest. Menzel
(2015a) proposes inference framework, the limiting distribution of players’ choices and character-
istics is equivalent to a single-agent discrete choice problem. These papers are the recent examples
of using large market framework to overcome complicated analysis in choice and game-theoretical
settings.
Apart from preference estimation in the mechanisms using DA, there is also growing litera-
ture on students’ preference estimation under different admissions mechanisms. Among others,
He (2012), Calsamiglia et al. (2014), Hwang (2015), and Agarwal and Somaini (2016) examines
agents’ behavior in admissions using Boston Mechanism. Since agents can benefit from changing
their true preference orders in Boston Mechanism (Immediate Acceptance), estimating their pref-
erences also requires to understand underlying students’ college/school ranking behavior. In these
papers, reported ROLs are considered the one that maximizes expected utility of agents. Then by
using calculated assignment probabilities, they apply discrete choice methods. Different than these
papers, we propose our estimation method by constructing personal choice sets based on subjective
assignment probabilities.
Researches with data from decentralized college admissions are another related literature. Av-
ery et al. (2012) propose a ranking of U.S. undergraduate programs based on students’ revealed
preferences. Long (2004) examines how students choose colleges in U.S. and answer decisions
determinants changes over time.
Theoretical studies on choice and considerations sets are also related to our paper. Manzini and
Mariotti (2012) propose a boundedly rational model of choice where agents categorize alternatives
before choosing. Kimya (2018) analyzes choices of decision makers that use relative ranking of the
alternatives on each attribute to reduce the size of the choice set. The same reduction principle can
also be thought in college choice case, where students face many options and they filter their choice
sets using expected college cutoff scores. Similarly, Demuynck and Seel (2018) derives revealed
preference tests for models where individuals use consideration sets to simplify their consumption
problem. Different than these papers, our paper characterizes students’ college ranking problem
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within their consideration sets and propose an estimation methodology.
Finally, college admissions data from Turkey are also studied in other related papers. Krishna
et al. (2017) study central college admissions and analyze the effects of retaking exams. They
develop and estimate a structural model of exam retaking using data from Turkey’s college admis-
sions. Caner and Okten (2013) examine how the benefits of publicly financed higher education in
Turkey are distributed among students with different socioeconomic status. Saygin (2013) finds
that gender has significant effects on college choice in Turkey such that female students prefer
lower ranked colleges. However, none of these papers investigates the estimation methodology
under DA with truncated ROLs.
1.2 Model
College admission is a classical example of matching markets and matching theory provides a
structure to analyze students’ college ranking behavior. In this section, we start by summarizing
a centralized college admission setup. We first analyze students’ college ranking behavior when
the number of students are finite, and then show convergence to the limit game. The limit game is
defined with the continuum of students and with the same proportions of college capacities as in the
finite game. Students’ college ranking strategies are analyzed using the result from the limit game
approximations and we also assume that students use past years’ outcomes as the main source of
information when they are forming their expectation for the forthcoming matchings.
1.2.1 Centralized college admissions
We consider a student-college matching with a set of students (S), which is indexed by i ∈
{1, . . . ,n}, and set of colleges (C), which is indexed by j ∈ {0, . . . ,J}. College 0 denotes being
unmatched. Each college j has q j > 0 seats and these are announced before the students’ exam
scores12 are known. C0 has unlimited seats. We assume that student i derives ui, j utility from
12In college admissions model where colleges are passive in the matching, colleges’ student preferences are formed
from admissions criterion and they are called priorities. We normalized priorities using the [0,1] interval.
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assignment into college j. Utility of being matched with each college is assumed to have support
[u j,u j] ∈ [0,1] for all j ∈C. Colleges rank students according to entrance exam scores, which are
transformed into priorities pi, j. A college j prefers student i over student k if and only if pi, j > pk, j.
After announcement of entrance exam scores, each student has an option to submit a rank order
list (ROL) of Li = (l1i , . . . , l
K
i ). K denotes the length of the ROL and it is smaller than the number
of colleges in the mechanism (K < J). lki is student i’s k
th choice and it is assumed that ulai > ulbi if
a < b. Finally, we assume that there is a positive cost of including a college in ROL and denoted
with κ > 0.13
The centralized student-college matching is solved by a mechanism that takes students’ ROLs
and exam scores that determine students’ priorities. In this paper, we focus on a student-proposing
Deferred Acceptance algorithm that is aligned with our data. The algorithm works as follows:
• Round 1: Every student applies to her first choice. Each college rejects the lowest-ranked
students in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the other students.
• Round N: Every student who is rejected in Round N-1 applies to the next choice on her
list. Each college, pooling together new students and those who were held from Round N-1,
rejects the lowest-ranked students in excess of its capacity.
The process terminates after any Round N when no rejections are issued. Then each college
is matched with the students that it is currently holding. A matching is defined as in Balinski and
So¨nmez (1999) such that it is an allocation of colleges to students such that no student occupies
more than one position. Formally;
Definition 1.1 A matching is a function µ : S→ C such that |µ−1(C j)| ≤ q j for all j ∈ C. If
µ(i) =C0, student i is not assigned any college.
If a student is rejected in all rounds of the algorithm, she is assigned to C0 in the model, which
means she is not assigned to any college.
13The cost of adding a college can be considered as a search cost. Students’ search for colleges and majors is not
only choosing form available set that is provided from placement center but also it is inquiry for college qualities,
facilities, and major related opportunities and projections.
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1.2.2 Students’ college ranking strategies in the finite economy
In student-college matching, students have assignment probabilities to be matched with each
college. These probabilities depend on their priorities and reported ROLs as well as their rivals’
priorities and ROLs. If one expresses students’ assignment probabilities according to priorities and
ROLs, students’ behavior can be analyzed according to expected utilities. Following Fack et al.
(2017), Agarwal and Somaini (2016), assignment probabilities are expressed by;
Ωi, j(Li, pi;L−i, p−i)≡

Pr(i is rejected by l1i , . . . , l
k−1
i and accepted by l
k
i = j|Li, pi;L−i, p−i) if j ∈ Li
0 if j 6∈ Li
Given the matching algorithm, Ωi, j(Li, pi;L−i, p−i) is either one for some college in C or zero
if there is no ties in priorities.14 Since priorities and preferences are private information, students
form their strategies according to joint preference and priority distribution G(u|p)×H(p).
Student i’s strategy for ROL is a function of her utilities and priority, σ(ui, pi) : [0,1]J× [0,1]→
∆(L). In the symmetric equilibrium, σ∗ solves the following problem for every student:
σ∗(ui, pi) ∈ arg max
σ
{
∑Kij=1 ui, j
∫ ∫
Ωi, j(σ , pi;σ∗(u−i, p−i), p−i)dG(u−i|p−i)dH(p−i)−κKi
}
(1.1)
Existence of pure and mixed strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium are established by Milgrom and
Weber (1985), while uniqueness is not generally true.15
Given an equilibrium σ∗, a matching µσ∗ is observed such that the outcome of matching is
summarized with the ex-post cutoff of each college:
14We assume strict priority orders based on exam scores. In priority rules with ties, characterizing assignment
probabilities requires special format, which is not considered in this paper.
15Multiple equilibria and multiplicity of stable outcomes also increase the chance of students play non equilibrium
strategies or play different equilibria strategies. Consequently, the chance of stable outcome decreases.
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t j(µσ∗) =

min {pi, j|i ∈ µ( j)} if j /∈ µ( j)
0 if j ∈ µ( j)
(1.2)
where t j(µσ∗) denotes the cutoff of college j. Equation 2.2 shows that if there is no remaining slot
after the matching, cutoff is the minimum priority level of the matched students. Zero cutoff means
that particular college does not receive sufficient application to meet its capacity. Then, assignment
probabilities can be redefined with the cutoffs such that;
Ωi, j(Li, pi;L−i, p−i) =

Pr(t j′ > pi, j for j′ = l1i , . . . , l
k−1
i and t j ≤ pi, j for j = lki |Li, pi) if j ∈ Li
0 if j /∈ Li
(1.3)
Equation 2.3 shows that students’ ranking behavior can be characterized by cutoffs of the match-
ings. Therefore, expected cutoffs can be used in the examinations of students’ behavior.
1.2.3 Stability
Stability/Justified-envy is the most commonly used equilibrium notion in non-transferable util-
ity matching markets and also used in preference estimation methods to characterize students’
behavior. Since we compare our method with the methods based on stability, we define it in our
setting.
Definition 1.2 Given a matching µ , (i, j) blocks the matching if student i prefers college j to her
match and either (1) college j does not fill its quota or (2) college j is matched to another student
who has strictly lower priority than student’s i. A matching µ is stable if there is no student-college
blocking pair.
Stability can also be defined with college cutoffs. Given a matching µ , a college j is feasible
for student i if t j(µ)≤ pi, j. Feasible colleges for student i is denoted by ϕ(pi,T (µ)), where T (µ)
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represents vector of cutoffs16 in matching µ . Then,
Lemma 1.1 µ is stable if and only if µ(i) = arg max j∈ϕ(pi,T (µ))ui, j for all i ∈ S.
This lemma is a basic feature of the college admissions model with finite number of students
investigated in many papers (Balinski and So¨nmez (1999), So¨nmez and U¨nver (2011)). Azevedo
and Leshno (2016) depart from a finite number of students on one side of the matching and analyze
the college admissions game with a continuum of students. We adopt the continuum number of
students approach to analyze the college admissions model, which is a more suitable representation
of national level college admissions.
1.2.4 Convergence of discrete economies to continuum economies
This section presents the convergence of economies with finite number of students to economies
with infinite number of students. With this result, we can analyze students’ college ranking behav-
ior as individual choice problems.
Following Azevedo and Leshno (2016) and Fack et al. (2017), we consider sequences of finite
size economies denoted by {FS}S∈N such that
FS = {(ui, j, pi, j){i∈Ss, j∈C},{qSj} j∈C};
1. There are S students in FS, whose types are i.i.d. draws from G×H.
2. Each college’s capacity relative to S remains constant, i.e. qSj/S = q¯ j for all j, where q¯ j is a
positive constant.
The continuum economy, E, is defined as follows:
1. A mass of students, S, have type space [0,1]J× [0,1] associated with probability measure of
G×H.
16Since there is one to one relation between scores and priorities in a no ties environment, we are using these concept
interchangeably. We continue to use score after we define large matching market structure.
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2. College j has a positive capacity q¯ j for all j ∈C.
Azevedo and Leshno (2016) show that discrete economies converge to a continuum economy
when there is a unique stable matching. Fack et al. (2017) modify this finding according to the DA
setting and show that for cases where students have ordinal preferences. The convergence results
can be seen from the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1 (Azevedo and Leshno (2016), Fack et al. (2017)) Fix σ ∈ {σS}S∈N , where σ is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of FS, and apply it to the sequence of finite economies {FS}S∈N . Then,
we have:
1. The cutoffs of finite matching game converges to cutoffs of the continuum game,
2. The fraction of blocking pairs in the finite economy converges to zero,
3. The asymptotic distribution of cutoffs are normally distributed.
The proof of this proposition can be found in Azevedo and Leshno (2016).17 The convergence
of finite economies to continuum economies result provides a good approximation to large college
admissions. In addition, the resulting distribution of cutoff scores allow us to characterize students’
college ranking behavior in a simpler setting. Under the continuum economy, students’ behavior
can be reinterpreted with the expected outcomes of the matching, which are the cutoff scores in
our setting. With a known distribution of cutoff scores, we do not have to consider students’ be-
havior in a game theoretical structure. Instead, students’ college ranking strategies can be written
according to the distribution of college cutoff scores in addition to personal valuations over col-
leges. Moreover, this is a better representation of students’ behavior in large admissions settings
because it is expected that past years’ information is utilized by students in their strategies. There-
fore, we make the following assumption to utilize large admissions approximation in the analysis
of students’ behavior.
17Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2015b) also consider similar framework and they note that outcomes of the mechanism can
be described with cutoffs.
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Assumption 1.1 Students are assumed to generate distributions of cutoff scores for the forthcom-
ing matching realizations using available information from past years’ matching outcomes.
Assuming that generating a distribution of cutoff scores for colleges is a weaker assumption
than assuming perfect information about preferences or the distribution of preferences. Since cut-
off scores are observables and there are public records from previous matchings, students can
approximate the distribution of cutoff scores by using this information. However, preferences are
unobservable and making assumption about them is not easily justified. Assumption 1 is justifiable
in many centralized college admissions mechanisms18 where past years’ matching outcomes are
public information and there is a strong correlation between the cutoff scores throughout years.19
In these cases, publicly known cutoff scores are public signals for all students and matching out-
comes from the past years play benchmark roles in the formation of students’ expectation for the
forthcoming matching outcomes.
1.2.5 Students’ optimal college ranking strategies in the continuum economy
In this section, we characterize students’ optimal college ranking strategies in the continuum
economy by allowing individual choice heterogeneities. This characterization is a result of the
large market setting, where students primarily use public information of past years cutoff scores to
generate assignment beliefs.
In the continuum economy, student i’s ROL preparation strategy is a function of her personal
valuations for colleges, exam score, past years’ matching outcomes, and her idiosyncratic charac-
teristics (ξi), σ(ui, p˜i,ξi,T−1) : [0,1]J× [0,1]→ L ∈L . In this context, student i maximizes her
expected utility using her subjective assignment probabilities (assignment beliefs). We allow each
student to generate a distribution of cutoff scores according to their understanding of mechanism
18It includes the college admissions mechanism in Turkey, where all realized matching outcome are publicly avail-
able and distributed to college candidates in the submission guidance booklet.
19The correlation of cutoff scores of college admissions’ outcomes in Turkey across years are presented in Appendix.
The correlation of cutoff scores are found more that 90% in Ghana for postsecondary admissions Ajayi (2015). In
addition, the estimated density of demeaned cutoff percentiles presented in figure A.6.
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and last year’s matching information (T−1 i.e. past year’s cutoff score).20 Consequently, students
solve their optimization problems with the following strategy;
σ∗i (ui, p˜i,ξi,T
−1) = arg max
σ
Ki
∑
j=1
ui j
∫
Ωi, j(p˜i,σ ;T )dF(T |T−1,ξi)−κ (1.4)
where Ωi, j(p˜i,σ ;T ) is the assignment probability that takes student i’s score and cutoff scores of
matching.21 Assignment of students to colleges according to ex-post cutoff scores is explained
in equation 2.3.22 ξi, which is student i’s idiosyncratic characteristic, changes assignment proba-
bilities through student i’s generated distribution of cutoff scores. This factor relaxes symmetric
equilibrium play assumption for the students’ college ranking strategies.
The presented framework in equation 1.4 provides valuable understanding of students’ college
ranking behavior. First, students are maximizing their expected utilities according to their valu-
ations over colleges and their subjective assignment probabilities. Second, with some regularity
conditions, we can use students’ ranking strategies and propose an empirical strategy accordingly.
We provide one more assumption to impose a condition on subjective assignment probabilities of
students such that the most important input for generating distribution of cutoff scores is the last
year’s cutoff scores.
Assumption 1.2
∫
Ωi j(p˜i,σ ;T )dF(T |t−1j′ ,ξi) ≤
∫
Ωi j′(p˜i,σ ′;T )dF(T |t−1j ,ξi) if t−1j > t−1j′ for all
i ∈ N.
where t−1j denotes cutoff score of college year in the last year’s matching. Assumption 1.2 says
that student i’s subjective assignment probability for a college that has a higher cutoff score in
the last realized matching is lower or equal than a college that has lower cutoff score in the last
matching. These 2 assumptions in the large college admissions model allows us to present the
following lemma.
20Using subjective probabilities in educational choice context is not new after seminal work Manski (2004). Among
others, Zafar (2011), and Attanasio et al. (2011) implement subjective expectations in educational choices.
21 p˜i denotes the scores of students rather than their priorities. Since priorities depend on the other students’ perfor-
mance, using entrance exam scores is better way of characterizing students’ behavior in the continuum economy
22The existence of the maximum is a result of the bounded utilities, but the uniqueness of maximum requires some
conditions that make the expected utility vector smooth and concave.
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Lemma 1.2 For each student with a given exam score, if there is a college that a student’s subjec-
tive assignment probability is zero, then all colleges that have higher cutoff score in the previous
year have zero subjective assignment probability.
Lemma 1.2 provides an environment to narrow down college options according to predicted
ranking behavior. According to lemma 1.2, each student has a limit score (P¯) that her subjective
assignment probabilities are positive until that limit. Then, we two more assumptions to present
our main result.
Assumption 1.3 For all i ∈ N, 0 < κ < ui j Ei[Ωi j] if Ei[Ωi j]> 0.
Assumption 1.3 says that the cost of including any colleges are not bigger than expected gain
if there is a positive belief.
Assumption 1.4 F(T |T−1,ξi) has continuous and strictly positive density f (T |T−1,ξi), on a sup-
port [T i,T i].
Assumption 1.4 is a regularity condition on subjective expectations with the support conditions
of the distribution of cutoff scores. According to this condition, some colleges’ assignment beliefs
are zero for students because their scores are not part of the cutoff domain. In addition, ξi is a
competent of the distribution for student i and it includes idiosyncratic differences in the generated
distributions.
Theorem 1.1 Under Assumptions 1-4, a student ranks colleges according to her true preference
order in her accessible region to maximize her expected utility unless she have restriction to in the
list.
This is the key prediction of our model and we build our empirical strategy on this finding.
Even though this seems restrictive in a setting where students are allowed to rank until a limited
number, it is a good representation of observed students’ behavior in the data that we applied our
method. More than 80% of college applications report rank order lists strictly less than allowed
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number in Turkey. Therefore, we produce estimation strategy according to our data in our empirical
framework.23
1.3 Empirical Framework
In this section, we first present challenges in students’ preference estimation with a data from
centralized college admissions that uses Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. Then, we propose our
estimation method based on personal consideration sets, which is developed based on predicted
students’ college rankings in section 1.2.
In a college admissions where students submit restricted lists, the main challenge is estimat-
ing students’ preferences without treating a preferred but unranked college in ROL as if it is less
preferred. Since making comparisons is the main principle for estimating preferences in choice
environments, making invalid comparisons are detrimental for reliable estimates. Possible invalid
comparisons emerge under truth-telling assumption because students may not include their pre-
ferred colleges if they believe that there is no chance for them to matched with these colleges even
though these colleges are more preferred than the listed colleges in their ROLs. This is a serious
concern for estimation and there is no ideal solution to identify which colleges are not included
because of strategic concerns.24 Moreover, finding the colleges that are not included because of
strategic reasons is one of the objective of estimating preferences from reported ROLs.
Our empirical strategy is estimating students’ college preferences using collections of colleges
that are expected to considered and found to be accessible to be matched by students. In this
way, we do not treat colleges that are not included in ROLs because of underlying true preference
or strategic concerns as the same way and do not make invalid comparisons. In addition, this
strategy allows us to use all listed colleges in ROLs, which is not utilized by the previous estimation
methods (Fack et al. (2017), Kirkebøen et al. (2012), and Burgess et al. (2015)).25 Therefore, we
23If students have more colleges that they may want to include their list than limited number, they can only report a
subset of colleges that they want to report. These cases create another possibility for making mistaken comparison for
estimating preferences and we excluded these cases in our estimation.
24Except some very strong preference assumptions (e.g., homogenous preferences) that has no reason to analyze,
we cannot make claim for students’ true preference orders.
25Asymptotic stability based estimation methods develop estimation assuming that matched choice is the favorite
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can utilize complete information in students’ reported ROLs and eliminate problems related with
strategic reported lists.
Implementing our estimation strategy requires to construct the set of colleges that are expected
to be considered and found to be accessible by students. We call them consideration sets. To fix
ideas for consideration sets, let us consider student i with score pi. For student i there is a score
limit (P¯i) as in the section 1.2 such that all colleges that are lower expected cutoff scores than this
limit are considered to be accessible for her. In other words, her subjective assignment probabilities
are positive for all colleges that have expected cutoff score less than P¯i and she believes that she
has no chance for all colleges that have higher expected score than P¯i. In our setting, P¯i depends
on student i’s score in the exam, her risk attitude, and understanding of the matching mechanism.
Therefore, using P¯i is our strategy to construct a consideration set for student i, which is a collection
of colleges that have lower expected cutoff score than P¯i.
Using consideration sets approach enables us to deal with problems result of the truth-telling
and equilibrium-play assumptions because it proposes a data-driven method to estimate students’
preference without making invalid comparisons. However, there is no direct way to construct con-
sideration sets in empirical setting. Researchers cannot observe students’ subjective assignment
probabilities and their personal limit scores. Therefore, Implementing consideration set approach
requires to generate a procedure to approximate students’ limit scores using past years’ matching
information and students’ predicted ranking behavior in section 1.2. In this paper, we are con-
sidering the case, where past years’ matching outcomes are publicly available and play the most
important role in the students’ ranking behavior as in our model. By combining past years’ cutoff
scores information with a revealed choice framework, we can propose a data-driven procedure for
constructing consideration sets. As a result, given that students use the last year’s cutoff scores as
the primary source of information for preparing their ROLs, we can approximate their limit cutoff
scores from their reported ROLs. Since it is assumed that students prepare their ROLs based on
our model’s prediction, students do not include any college which has higher expected cutoff score
choice among the feasible colleges.
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than their score limits. In our notation,
∀i ∈ S @ t−1j ∈ Li s.t. t−1j > P¯i
where t−1j is the last year’s cutoff score of college j. Recall that Li denotes ROL of candidate i.
The statement above says that there is no student that includes a college j in her ROL if expected
cutoff is higher than her upper limit cutoff score P¯. Since last year’s cutoff scores are the main
determinants of students’ expectations (Assumption 1.2), all colleges have higher cutoff score than
P¯ in the last year are expected to be higher than limit score. As a consequence, we can construct
consideration sets based on last year’s cutoff scores and write that all ranked colleges in ROLs
should be smaller than students’ limit scores.
max{t−1j } ≤ P¯i ∀ j ∈ Li (1.5)
Equation 1.5 shows us to how can we approximate limit scores (P¯) using last year’s cutoffs and
ROLs. Using this inequality, we can construct consideration sets for each student with the colleges
that are lower cutoff scores in the last matching than max{t−1j } ∀ j ∈ Li. This construction is
also compatible with expected utility maximization problem. A student includes college j in her
list if it is in her consideration set and the value of assignment is higher than outside option.26
Under a positive cost (κ) of adding a college in the ROL, the colleges with have same utility with
the outside option and zero assignment beliefs are excluded from the ROLs. Since including an
additional college decreases expected utility because of the cost, it is not rational to include in
ROL.
A comparable approach of creating personal choice sets is also applied by Fack et al. (2017) and
Akyol and Krishna (2017). They develop discrete choice estimation framework by using feasible
colleges (i.e., colleges have lower cutoff scores than students’ scores.) that are created by ex-post
cutoff scores. Apart from dependence of a (asymptotic) stability assumption, one disadvantage
26In this analysis we only consider students who report ROL with less than allowed number. This is realistic in our
data because majority of students do not submit full lists.
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of their method is lack of using compete information in ROLs. Since estimation can be done
only in feasible regions, colleges that are not in the feasible region cannot be incorporated to
estimation, while they are in the reported ROLs. Constructed personalized choice sets, however,
contain feasible regions, hence we can say that comparisons in our consideration sets are more
general than feasible regions and incorporates complete information from ROLs.
Finally, a drawback of consideration set approach, even students’ assignment beliefs are as-
sumed to be known perfectly, is the impossibility of making an analysis with all colleges in the
mechanism. Since personal consideration sets exclude some colleges in the estimation process in
order not to make invalid comparisons, a complete analysis can not be done by researchers. Lack-
ing of making complete comparisons across colleges is the cost that is paid for reaching reliable
results and it is inevitable in these models.
1.4 Model Specification, Identification, and Estimation
We assume that student i’s utility from attending college j can be represented by the following
random utility model:
ui, j = θ j−di, j +Xi, jβ + εi, j (1.6)
Vi, j = θ j +Xi, jβ − di,c is defined as the deterministic part of the utility. Xi, j are student college
specific attributes, e.g., interactions of students characteristics and college characteristics. di, j is
the distance from student i’s city to college j’s city. We normalize the effect of distance to be -1,
so the magnitude of other coefficients can be easily interpreted in terms of willingness to travel. In
addition, for location normalization, θ1 = 0.
An crucial aspect in our consideration-based estimation, which is similar with stability-based
estimation proposed in the literature, is that students make choice/ranking within their personalized
choice sets. This may create problems if the choice sets are determined endogenously. However,
we assume that student priorities, risk attitudes, and other factor that influence their consideration
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sets are independent of students’ college valuations. In our model this corresponds to ξi ⊥ εi, j for
all j. Under this condition, personal consideration sets are determined exogenously and identifica-
tion goes throughly.
After construction of individual consideration sets (CR), students’ college preference estima-
tion from their rank order lists becomes a standard ranked order response analysis. In this setting,
student i has right to rank K colleges but she does not have to fulfill her list. We do not restrict the
number of options in individual consideration sets, however, they have to be bigger or equal than
the number of colleges in the ROL i.e. ∀ |CRi| ≥ |Li|, because of their constructions.
If each student ranks their options truthfully in their corresponding consideration sets and sub-
mits Li, then we can apply ordered choice model to our data. By following the literature (Hastings
et al. (2009), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2017)), we consider a conditional choice probability structure
in logistic distribution27 form such that;
Pr(Li = (l1i , . . . , l
K
i )|Xi;Θ) = Pr(ui,l1i > .. . > ui,lKii > ui, j′ ∀ j
′ ∈CR/Li|Xi;Θ)
=Π j∈Li =
( exp(Vi, j)
Σ j′ 6Li jexp(Vi, j′)
)
where j′ 6Li j indicates that j′ is not ranked before j in Li, which includes j itself and the colleges
are not ranked in Li. This rank-ordered logit model can be seen as series of conditional logit
models: one for top-ranked college-major (l1i ) being the most preferred; another for the second-
ranked college-major (l2i ) being preferred to all college-major except the one ranked first, and so
on.
The model is point identified under standard assumptions for rank-order choice models and can
be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation with the log-likelihood function:
ln L(Θ| Z, |L|) = ΣSi Σ j∈LiVi, j−ΣSi Σ j∈Liln
(
Σ j′ 6Li jexp(Vi, j′)
)
27The idiosyncratic error term in εi, j is assumed to be i.i.d type-I extreme value.
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1.5 Application: College Admissions in Turkey
There is a centralized college admissions system in Turkey. Students who wish to pursue higher
education take a nationwide college entrance exam (CEE), which is conducted by the Student
Selection and Placement Center (CSSP). The sum of students’ college entrance exam scores and
scaled and weighted high school GPAs determines students’ priorities in admissions. After the
announcement of the exam score and scaled GPA, a student, who wants to continue student-college
matching stage, submits a ROL of up to 24 college-majors to the CSSP.28 CSSP matches students
and colleges using the student proposing Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, developed
by Gale and Shapley (1962).29
College and major choices are simultaneous in the admissions. Majors are divided into 4 main
categories according to high school education tracks, which are quantitative, verbal, composite,
and foreign languages. Each major belongs to a track and students are prioritized according to
their exam scores in the corresponding track.30 The college entrance exam is held once a year
and candidates are asked multiple-choice questions from 5 main topics, which are Mathematics,
Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, Turkish Language, and Foreign Languages. These parts gener-
ate 4 different scores and form the main part of the admissions criterion. High school GPA is the
other part of the college admissions criterion. Students’ high school GPAs enter into total score
after it is normalized according high school’s overall success in college entrance exam. Students
from successful high schools have higher high school GPA scores in the total score calculation.
Another important admissions rules is the effect of GPAs on total score. It depends on students’
education track choice in high school and college. High school GPA score is multiplied by 0.8 if
students choose the same educational track for their college majors, while it is multiplied by 0.3 for
28Students who do not submit a list either wait for the next years or utilize outside options that can be universities
in abroad or labor market.
29In our application, we treat the mechanism and data as if students are proposing DA, which is the how procedure
works in Turkey. However, Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) show that the outcome is college proposing DA in Turkish
college admissions under unrestricted lists. Even though the mechanism which we are using for estimation is college
proposing DA, under large matching market assumption, it is very hard for students to find beneficial deviations from
true partial order of preferences.
30Detailed information for Turkish high school institutional structure can be found in Akyol and Krishna (2017).
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majors out of their track. Selecting majors from different education tracks lowers students scores
compared to students staying in the same track.31
1.5.1 Data
For the empirical analysis, we use three data sets. The first data set is obtained from CSSP. It
provides students college entrance exam scores, GPAs, and their ROLs if they have submitted. The
second data set is a survey study which is conducted in 2005.32 The survey sample is randomly
selected from senior high school students who would take the CEE in 2005. This survey includes
questions about socioeconomic, politic, demographic and educational background. The last data
set is a list of cutoff scores for college-majors across years and publicly available on the CSSP
website.
There are 12829 senior high school students participants in the survey study, but almost half of
them do not submit rank ordered lists after the exam. Students do not submit a list either they find
their score lower than their expectations and prefer to wait a year to try again or they prefer not to
pursue college education after they learn their scores. Since we are interested in students’ college
preferences, we exclude students who do not submit ROL.33
Table 1.1 reports students’ characteristics, choices, and outcomes’ statistics. 45 percent of the
sample do not submit a ROL after they learn their priorities. The average number of choices in
ROL is close to 7. After the matching, 44 percent of the sample is assigned to a college and 12
percent of the sample is assigned to their first choices. Table 1.1 also reports summary statistics
students’ parent education levels, size of living areas, and income levels.
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics of college-majors. Almost half of the college-majors
offer two-year degree to their students. Even though admissions of these college majors are through
the same mechanism, there are many specific rules that apply graduates from different high schools.
31The total score calculated as follows: Totalscorei = CEEi + 0.8× shsGPAi if the choice in the same track,
Totalscorei = CEEi + 0.3× shsGPAi otherwise. The fraction of out of track choices in the reported ROLs is pre-
sented in the figure A.1
32For detailed information and descriptive analysis see Alkan et al. (2008).
33Since priorities are independent of utilities, these exclusions do not create problem.
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Table 1.1: College applicants sample in Turkey: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Observation Min Max
Section 1. Basic Characteristics
Female 0.46 0.50 12828 0 1
Birth Year 1987.19 0.87 12413 1976 1991
Section 2. College Entrance Exam Scores
Quantitative 165.85 63.36 12829 0 298.57
Verbal 184.85 64.42 12829 0 294.45
Equal-Weight 179.15 63.59 12829 0 297.42
Foreign Language 13.41 57.72 12829 0 297.13
High school GPA 80.69 13.08 9874 30.67 100.00
Section 3. High School Fields
Natural Science 0.35 0.48 12677 0 1
Social Science 0.12 0.32 12677 0 1
Turkish Math 0.30 0.46 12677 0 1
Foreign Language 0.05 0.22 12677 0 1
Others 0.18 0.38 12677 0 1
Section 4. Choices and Outcomes
Submit a ROL 0.55 0.49 12828 0 1
Number of choices 6.99 8.30 12828 0 24
Assigned to a college 0.44 0.49 12828 0 1
Assigned to first choice 0.12 0.32 12828 0 1
Section 5. Parents Education Levels
M. higher educ 0.11 0.31 12578 0 1
M. high school 0.19 0.39 12578 0 1
M. middle school 0.12 0.32 12578 0 1
M. elementary 0.47 0.50 12578 0 1
M. illiterate 0.11 0.32 12578 0 1
F. higher educ 0.25 0.43 12518 0 1
F. high school 0.25 0.43 12518 0 1
F. middle school 0.15 0.36 12518 0 1
F. elementary 0.32 0.47 12518 0 1
F. illiterate 0.03 0.16 12518 0 1
Section 6. Living Area
Village 0.14 0.35 12412 0 1
Town 0.26 0.44 12412 0 1
City 0.60 0.49 12412 0 1
Income 6.89 2.64 11946 1 12
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for survey study conducted in 2005 by Alkan et al. (2008). College
exam scores and high school GPA’s are matched with unique identifiers based on 2005 data from the Student
Selection and Placement Center.
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Table 1.2: Colleges in Turkey: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Sd Obs Min Max
Section 1. College and major attributes
New Department 0.03 0.18 7564 0 1
Two Year 0.47 0.50 7564 0 1
Night Education 0.25 0.44 7564 0 1
Distance Education 0.00 0.06 7564 0 1
Private 0.17 0.38 7564 0 1
Full Scholarship 0.01 0.10 7564 0 1
Partial Scholarship 0.05 0.22 7564 0 1
Section 2. Minimum entrance scores
Quantitative 210.42 107.34 3672 50.00 381.18
Verbal 266.38 78.04 967 50.00 369.97
Equal-Weight 214.70 92.37 2412 50.00 370.84
Foreign Language 324.74 42.45 262 178.97 393.53
Section 3. Maximum entrance scores
Quantitative 226.81 109.56 3672 50.00 399.03
Verbal 284.46 74.50 967 50.00 389.30
Equal-Weight 235.09 93.30 2412 50.00 386.15
Foreign Language 347.69 28.36 262 219.47 400.57
Notes: This table provides summary statistics on attributes of college and majors in the college admissions
system of Turkey. These data obtained from Student Selection and Placement Center’s web site from the
2005 college entrance system guidance booklet.
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We exclude these college-majors from our estimation. Private colleges offer 17 percent of all
college-majors. Among private colleges, there are majors provide tuition scholarships which are
awarded through college admissions mechanism. 1 and 5 percent of college majors provide full or
partial tuition scholarship respectively. Night education is a program that offer education in night
times. This program aim to increase capacity of colleges by utilizing off time of campuses. Quarter
of all college majors are in night education program.
Table 1.2 also provides average cutoff scores of college-majors for the 2004 matching outcome
by education track. College-majors are in quantitative track are engineering, medical education
and natural sciences. Equal-weight track includes social sciences, and law school is the second
in terms of number of college majors. Verbal track includes theology and literature and foreign
language track includes foreign literatures and translation studies.
1.5.2 Estimation results
In Table 1.3, we present estimation results based on three identifying assumptions. The first
column presents estimates students’ college preference estimates where students are assumed to
rank truthfully. Under truthful-revelation assumption, we treat the listed colleges as the students’
most preferred choices. Second column presents estimates under the stability assumption. The
third column presents estimates that are obtained with our proposed method; consideration sets
approach.34
In order to make consistent comparisons between estimates, we reduce our sample to students
who are assigned after matching, only report 4 year degree majors, and do not use all spots in the
ROLs. These restrictions reduce our sample to 2863. We exclude students who were assigned
to any college because stability-based approach cannot include them into estimation. We prefer
to use students who only report 4 year degree majors because two-year program admissions have
34In Fack et al. (2017), similar preference estimation with endogenous school cutoff scores are also considered in
the secondary school choice context in Paris, but there is no significant difference is founded. By comparing the size
of the matching games, there are 1.8 millions of students are in college admissions in Turkey, it is expected to reach
similar conclusion.
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Table 1.3: Estimation Results
(ΘT ) (ΘS) (ΘP)
(Truth−Telling) (Stability) (Cons−Sets)
Panel A. College and students’ characteristics
Same City 0.7 0.85 0.77
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Partial Sch. -0.64 -0.17 -0.07
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
Full Sch. -0.83 0.94 0.52
(0.08) (0.15) (0.10)
Distance Education 0.88 -0.93 -0.56
(0.11) (0.17) (0.13)
Night Education -0.82 -0.97 -0.87
(0.26) (0.38) (0.26)
Private College -2.98 -1.70 0.45
(0.79) (1.17) (1.12)
Panel B. Selected college fixed effects
Bogazici 0.34 1.70 1.56
(0.09) (0.12) (0.10)
Galatasaray -0.78 81 0.59
(0.14) (0.23) (0.17)
Hacettepe 0.32 0.25 0.33
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08)
Istanbul 0.55 0.64 0.61
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
ITU 0.62 1.14 0.96
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
ODTU -0.13 -0.21 -0.11
(0.08) (0.12) (0.10)
Bilkent -0.65. 2.28 0.89
(0.52) (0.97) (0.89)
Koc -0.06 3.37 1.56
(0.53) (0.97) (0.89)
Bilgi -0.06 3.26 1.33
(0.53) (0.98) (0.90)
Sabanci -0.39 2.90 1.04
(0.53) (0.98) (0.89)
Observation 2863 2863 2863
Notes: This table reports the estimates for the college admissions in Turkey, with coefficients on distance
being normalized to -1. All estimates are based on maximum likelihood. Estimation results for the remain-
ing college and students’ characteristics are presented in table A.12 in Appendix. Estimation results for all
college fixed effects are also presented in Appendix. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
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additional criteria on top of the general admissions and cannot be generalized to population. Fi-
nally, because behavioral assumption of our econometric framework is for non-complete ROLs
submission, we restrict sample with these students.35
The results show clear differences between three different estimations which are based on dif-
ferent assumptions. The difference between truthful-ranking with the other two estimates specifi-
cally observed from the college fixed effect estimates. Many elite colleges that are highly selected
from students with high priority have smaller or negative fixed effects with the truth-telling as-
sumption. For example, the coefficients for Bogazici University is smaller than many other uni-
versities’ fixed effects under truth-telling assumption. However, students with highest scores in
college entrance exam are listed it frequently.36 Many students who does not have high priorities
do not include it in their ROLs, which leads to a low estimates of its fixed effect under truth-telling
assumption.
Another interesting result is the effects of universities capacities on the universities fixed ef-
fects’ estimates under truth-telling assumption. Universities that have larger capacities have larger
fixed effects under truth-telling assumption, however these results do not preserved on the other
specifications. This result is another significant finding for assuming truth-telling is creating mis-
leading conclusions. Since universities with larger capacities are selected more in ROLs compare
to smaller elite universities, their fixed effects estimates are bigger because of truth-telling assump-
tion.
The estimation based on stability assumption is a modified version of the proposed method by
Fack et al. (2017) according to our data. We construct feasible colleges according to cutoff scores
which are result of the year 2004 matching.37 We apply ordered data methods to obtain estimates
from constructed feasible sets and reordered feasible ranks.38
35Estimation results with students who complete ROLs is presented in the tables A.15, A.16, and A.17. These
results also point out that the estimates are different than each other in a similar way as in the estimation results with
students who do not complete their lists.
36Bogazici is the one of the most popular colleges among students who has the highest priorities. In Appendix, we
prepare a chart for first 100 students’ first college choices in each education track.
37Since some of students do not submit a ROL with no feasible college, they are not assigned and we can not include
them in our estimation.
38The proposed method by Fack et al. (2017) do not include ranking information and only consider the selected
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As we explained in our empirical framework, we construct students’ consideration sets using
cutoff scores from 2004 which are public information. These cutoff scores help us to understand
each student’s range of colleges that they considered and found to be accessible when they are
preparing their ROLs. After construction of personal consideration sets, we apply ordered response
models within these sets.
The difference between estimates based on stability and personal consideration sets approach
can be also easily seen from the estimated coefficients and college fixed effects. Especially, the
estimated private college coefficient is different from each other substantially. The differences
between college fixed effects estimates are also remarkable. Even though these differences are
suggestive for the differences in estimates as the result of identifying assumptions, we need statis-
tical tests to reach conclusive comparisons.
1.5.3 Testing stability against personal consideration sets approach
Under different identifying assumptions, we have distinct estimates for the parameters for stu-
dents’ college preferences. This setting provides an opportunity to test stability assumption against
to personalized consideration sets by adopting a Hausman-Type specification test.
We know that if every student play equilibrium strategies, the matching outcome is stable.
However, if students play non-equilibrium strategies, the matching outcome do not have to be sta-
ble. Personalized consideration set approach is less restrictive than stability assumption because it
does not require a stable outcome. Consequently, under null hypothesis that students play equilib-
rium strategies and outcome is stable, both ΘˆP and ΘˆS are consistent but only ΘˆS is asymptotically
efficient. Under the alternative, when students do not play equilibrium strategies, the outcome is
not stable but they ranked colleges from their personalized consideration sets. Then, only ΘˆP is
consistent.
In this setting, we can offer a general specification test developed by Hausman (1978) such that
college as in the binary choice framework.
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(ΘˆP− ΘˆS)′(VˆP−VˆS)−1(ΘˆP− ΘˆS)
where (VˆP− VˆS)−1 is the inverse of the difference between the asymptotic covariance matrices of
ΘˆS and ΘˆP.
The test rejects stability in the favor of personalized consideration sets (p-value < 0.01). The
tests based on truth-telling against to both stability and personalized consideration sets are also
rejected strongly.
The second way to test stability assumption against to personalized consideration sets is com-
paring their predictive power. Even though in most of the cases it is not obvious to make pre-
diction about true preference orders of students, there are some specific scholarship cases which
are awarded in the matching allows us to generate a prediction power comparisons.39 In Turkish
college admissions, private colleges provide different tuition and scholarship options for their de-
partments and these options are considered to be different slots in the matching. The preference
orders are obvious among the college-major slots, everybody prefers slots which have less tuition
over slots which have more tuition. This observation helps us to compare predictive power of
different estimation methods.
In order to see the fraction of correctly predictions between stability vs personal consideration
set approaches, we focus on students who report a college-major department which they need to
pay full tuition if they are matched with them, however, they do not report tuition-free versions. For
these students tuition-free version of reported college-majors should have been preferred over the
ones reported in their lists. Therefore, if we use our estimates to see their predicted valuations, we
can compare predictive power of preference estimation methods. According to stability assumption
based 41% of the total cases in our sample are correctly predicted such that they are preferred to
the highest predictive valuation for the reported list. This rate is 48% for the estimation result
based on personal consideration set approach.40
39A similar approach is first considered in Hassidim et al. (2016). Then, Artemov et al. (2017) develop a robust
equilibrium idea.
40We also compare the prediction rates in compare to the highest ranked college-major in the reported lists. The
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These tests’ results show that personal consideration set approach has better performances,
even though it requires weaker assumptions. In the following section of this paper, we focus on
the results obtained with personalized consideration sets assumption to conduct welfare analysis
under different admission criteria.
1.6 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we use our preferred preference estimates to evaluate the effects of different
admissions criteria on students’ welfare. Admissions criteria determine students’ priorities in the
matching, consequently they affect not only students’ matching outcomes but also students’ rank-
ing strategies in the restricted ROL mechanisms. Therefore, comparing different admissions crite-
ria is an important step in the evaluation of centralized college admissions mechanisms. We study
the effects of two admissions criteria which are the two separate scores of the college admissions
criteria that form the current priority rule:
1. College exam score. College exam score is the only determinant of priority indices. A similar
admissions criterion is also used in the high school admissions mechanism in Turkey, Akyol
and Krishna (2017).
2. High School GPA. Priority indices are based on scaled high school GPAs.
The applied admissions criterion in our data is a weighted sum of scores from a national level
exam and a scaled high school GPA.41 We are interested in these two criteria because of differences
of their formation periods. High school GPA is the average of many courses that is taken across
3 or 4 years depends on the high school. However, college entrance exam is only one time exam
and the scores are subject to include exam day shocks compare with the scaled GPAs. In addition,
rates are closer (50%, 52%) but still personal consideration sets approach’s predictive rate is higher. In addition, we
compare result prediction power among the students who report complete lists after estimating their preferences. The
predictive power of two methods are the same, 36%.
41The implementation of this admissions rule can be considered a unique rule except particular cases. For example,
a student goes to high school which is specialized for teacher education, takes additional score based on her scaled
high school GPA for teacher majors in college.
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students may have different strategies to prepare for college entrance exam and high school courses.
Comparison of these two version of measurements shed lights on heterogeneity among college
applicants’ matching outcomes as well as resulting welfare. Therefore, a policy maker may use
any possible differences to design admissions rules to create an equitable college admissions.
Since we are working with a sample, simulating matching outcomes are not possible with the
estimated college rankings and counterfactual admissions rules. Instead, we use cutoff scores of
colleges to determine assignments with different admissions criteria. We have presented that in
large matching mechanisms, outcomes can be represented with cutoff scores due to Azevedo and
Leshno (2016) in section 1.2. Therefore, welfare analysis with different admissions criteria by
using same cutoff scores is reasonable way of creating counterfactual outcomes without complete
matching data in large national admissions. However, this can be thought as a partial equilibrium
analysis since the change in reporting ROL strategies and their effects on matching outcomes
cannot be evaluated under this method.
Table 1.4 shows welfare changes between their original matches with their counterfactual
matches with only scaled high school GPAs is used for admissions. Since applied admissions
policy is a weighted sum of two admissions criteria that we are interested, comparing results with
original criteria and scaled high school GPAs also provide information about matching with only
exam scores.
We present welfare changes in 4 categories i.e., gender, age, income categories, and high school
types. Even though results are changing in between groups and students, there is a common pattern
in the welfare of students if they are matched according to their scaled high school GPAs. This
pattern is a result of the difference of score distributions between national level exam and high
school GPA. Scaled high school scores are higher on average, which leads to higher welfare gains
if we consider that everything is assumed to be constant.
According to the Table 1.4, Panel 1, female students gain less if the admissions criteria only
depends scaled high school compare with males. In panel 2, we observe the opposite case for the
older college applicants. Their welfare gains from only high school GPA based admissions criteria
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Table 1.4: Welfare Analysis
Variables Mean Std Deviation Max Min
Panel 1. Gender
Male -0.22 1.29 5.40 -7.39
Female -0.18 1.17 5.61 -7.07
Panel 2. Age
1987/08 > -0.18 1.22 5.61 -7.39
1987/08 <= -0.24 1.22 5.03 -6.43
Panel 3. Income categories
1 -0.50 1.58 3.52 -5.64
2 -0.21 1.32 1.67 -4.12
3 -0.43 1.85 4.90 -4.91
4 -0.10 1.42 3.81 -3.08
5 0.05 1.51 4.31 -4.83
6 -0.04 1.33 5.24 -6.03
7 -0.27 1.23 4.33 -7.39
8 -0.16 1.25 5.40 -5.02
9 -0.35 1.30 5.61 -7.38
10 -0.12 1.23 4.80 -7.07
11 -0.28 1.14 3.17 -6.29
12 -0.15 0.78 3.86 -3.65
Panel 4. High school types
Anatolian (S) -0.23 1.22 5.40 -5.02
Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.08 0.91 1.67 -1.97
Teacher Vocational (S) 0.07 1.27 5.03 -7.39
Regional High School -0.11 0.25 0.00 -0.55
Science (S) -0.23 1.20 2.78 -6.43
Islamic -0.25 1.53 5.61 -6.11
Vocational -1.19 1.59 0.00 -3.50
Private Science (S) -0.24 1.24 4.80 -7.38
Private -0.27 1.05 2.78 -4.44
Regional -0.36 0.74 1.48 -2.82
Regional (S) -0.28 1.35 5.24 -7.07
Total -0.20 1.23 5.62 -7.39
Notes: This table presents their indirect utility differences of original matched colleges with their
counterfactual matches in admissions rule that only uses their scaled high school GPAs. Indirect
utility is presented in terms of willingness to travel.
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is lower than older applicants. The welfare effects are also changing among different income
levels. According to Panel 3, the main welfare gains are low income groups. However, the welfare
changes are not monotonically decreasing with income levels.
Panel 4 presents the welfare effects of changing admissions rules across to high school types.
High schools in Turkey differentiated in terms of curriculum and student selection mechanisms.42
At the end of the middle school, students who are willing to continue their education in selective
high school have to take national level exam and students and school are matched according the
exam score and students’ high school rankings. We indicate selective high school types with (S) in
the table 1.4. Results in Panel 4 show that there are differences in terms of welfare effects among
high schools. Students from regional and private high schools are benefited the most switch from
current criterion to scaled high school GPA criterion. For students from selective vocational high
schools have the effects are small even opposite for teacher vocational high school. These results
suggest that admissions criteria and high school grading policies as well as curriculum should be
taken into account for an equitable college admissions.
To sum up, the results suggest that using different performance measure for admissions crite-
rion has differentiated effects on various income categories, students from different high schools,
male vs female, and age groups. Therefore, policymakers may use these effects as an additional
tool in their hands in order to affect distribution of matching outcomes across different groups apart
from affirmative action policies.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a novel, practical, and data-driven method to estimate students’ college
preferences from rank order lists in college admissions data under the popular Deferred Acceptance
mechanism. This mechanism is applied in many secondary school and college admissions mecha-
nisms around the world and our method can be readily applied in any of these cases. The proposed
method incorporates strategic behavior in students’ college rankings with the help of the large ad-
42For more detailed information admissions mechanisms of high schools in Turkey, Akyol and Krishna (2017)
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missions model and uses public information from past years’ matching outcomes to implement
the estimation strategy. Since it utilizes available public data, it is more robust than theory-based
estimation approaches which depend on equilibrium conditions. Moreover, this method provides
a framework to utilize complete information form rank order lists, which is not possible for the
proposed methods in the literature.
We apply our method to college admissions data from Turkey. In order to compare our estima-
tion strategy with the proposed methods in the literature, we test our results in different identifying
assumptions; truth-telling and stability. Our tests strongly reject truth-telling and stability hy-
potheses. In addition, personal consideration approach has better performance in the prediction of
students’ college-major preference orders.
Finally, we use our preferred estimates in the welfare analysis to understand the effects of
different admission criteria. The results show that winners and losers differentiate according to
admission criteria and students’ characteristics. Consequently, policy makers should consider the
effects of performance measures in the determination of admission criterion for school and college
admissions.
A further structural analysis of the college admissions data to estimate students’ college pref-
erences from rank order lists taking endogenous score formation into account would be a our
direction of future research. This extension would allow us to benefit from students’ college ad-
missions preparation strategies to improve preference estimation methods rather than depending
on only reported rank order lists. This is also important in policy design perspective such that
estimation results provide insights about the relationship between college admissions preparation
and college choice strategies.
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CHAPTER 2
An Empirical Analysis of College Admissions with Endogenous Entrance Exam Scores
2.1 Introduction
College admissions are centralized in many countries and a national level entrance exam is a
common practice for sorting students.1 In these mechanisms, the competitiveness of colleges are
typically known from the past years outcomes and students have an idea of the minimum thresh-
old scores (cutoffs) they would need to get to be matched with a particular college. Since getting
student-college matching depends on exam scores, students with heterogeneous preferences over
colleges may pick different strategies, i.e., levels of time and effort to put into the preparation for
the exam, according to the competitiveness of their desired/targeted colleges. Therefore, char-
acterizing how students’ college preferences affect exam preparation strategies becomes critical
for understanding student behavior during the college admissions process. Moreover, the extent
to which students’ college preferences affect exam preparation strategies has immediate implica-
tions for designing better admissions policies (e.g. Affirmative Action and Financial Aid) and the
improvements of students’ college preferences estimation methods from reported rank order lists.2
The existing college admissions literature does not provide a framework to analyze how stu-
dents’ college preferences affect their exam preparation strategies. Currently, researchers either
assume that all students have the same preferences and then analyze student score competition to
be assigned to better colleges (Hafalir et al. (2016), Bodoh-Creed and Hickman (2016)) or focus
on students’ rank order lists (ROL) over colleges and analyze the admissions outcomes disregard-
ing how they prepare for the entrance exams (Balinski and So¨nmez (1999), Azevedo and Leshno
(2016)). Assuming, however, that students are heterogeneous in their personal valuations over col-
1China, Greece, Taiwan, and Turkey are the examples of the countries that use an exam-based centralized college
admissions. There are also centralized secondary school admissions examples including Amsterdam, Boston, Paris,
and New York.
2In the centralized admissions students prepare rank order lists to submit to the national center for the student-
college matching. These lists show not only their preferred colleges to be admitted but also the preference order
among the chosen colleges.
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leges3, then their optimal preparation strategies will depend on both their heterogeneous abilities
and the competitiveness of their targeted colleges.4 As a consequence, students have score forma-
tion (exam preparation) strategies in addition to the strategies for submitting ROL of colleges for
the student-college matching stage in a college admissions process.
In this paper, I first analyze the effects of students’ college preferences on the entrance exam
preparation strategies by providing a new model that encompasses strategies over both score forma-
tion and the submission of ROLs of colleges. This model predicts that each student has an optimal
exam score according to her personal valuations over colleges, ability, and the competitiveness of
targeted colleges. Second, I provide an identification framework based on partitioning colleges into
sets to understand the effects of students’ college preferences on their score formation strategies.
In this framework, if there is a competitiveness difference among colleges according to their ob-
servable characteristics (e.g. private colleges are less competitive than public colleges), the effect
of students’ college preferences on exam scores is identified. Since students are optimized accord-
ing to their personal valuations, abilities and the competitiveness of targeted colleges, their score
formation strategies depend on college characteristics, which create differences in the personal
valuations, and the competitiveness of colleges when their abilities are controlled for. Following
this rationale, I propose a simple empirical procedure with a single college characteristic to test
the implications of the partitioning framework. Then, I apply this procedure to data from Turkey’s
college admissions. The results show that student exam scores are lower if they prefer colleges
with have lower cutoff scores.
The large matching market structure allows me to combine the score formation and submission
of ROLs of colleges strategies together. I adopt a supply and demand framework for the student-
college matching based on the submitted ROLs of colleges and exam scores, which is developed
by Azevedo and Leshno (2016). In this framework, student-college matching outcomes can be
3A representative case can be seen from students’ college rankings in Turkey. Figures A.4 presents students’ first
ranked choices of first, median and last 100 students in the college admissions.
4College entrance exams that I am considering are not designed for IQ measurements. In addition, the effects of
different motivations and incentives on test scores are documented in various context by Fryer Jr (2011), Bettinger
(2012), Metcalfe et al. (2011), among others.
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approximated with a distribution of cutoff scores. Therefore, under a known distribution of cutoff
scores, students optimize and submit their ROLs according to this information. Moreover, with
the distribution of cutoff scores information, students further optimize their exam preparations by
predicting expected utility that corresponds to each score and the cost of obtaining those scores.
As a consequence, a college exam preparation period turns to an individual investment decision
problem with risky returns.
Examining the effects of students’ college preferences on the score formation strategies re-
quires the use of preference information from the ROLs and public information on college com-
petitiveness levels. The partitioned colleges (which are named as college contest sets) according
to an observable college characteristic allow me to calculate the fraction of selected colleges in the
students’ ROLs from a particular college contest set. By this way, analyzing the corresponding ob-
servable college characteristic’s effect on the score formation strategies is feasible. Since college
characteristics are influential factors in the students’ valuation differences for colleges, I can test
the effect of one dimension of students’ college preferences on the score formation strategies. Es-
timating of these effects on the score formation strategies requires exogenous test results to control
abilities. After student characteristics and exogenous test scores are controlled for, the sign and
magnitude of the correlation of college choice and the score formation equations’ residuals show
the relationship between score formation and ROL preparation strategies because the unobservable
preference effects are included in the residuals.
I apply the partition-based estimation produce to estimate the effects of students’ college pref-
erences on entrance exam scores to data from Turkey’s college admissions. In Turkey, there is a
centralized and exam-based college admissions.5 In this mechanism, students first take the college
entrance exam and submit their ROLs after they learn their scores. Even though submission of
ROLs is after the announcement, the relationship between exam preparation and ROL submission
strategies can be estimated. In the application of the contest sets framework, I use basic college
characteristic variations like college types, locations and college-majors as the observable differ-
5The details of the college admissions in Turkey are described in section 5.
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ences between the colleges in order to partition them into sets. The competitiveness variations
of these colleges allow me to analyze the preference effects on the score formation strategies. In
particular, private colleges have lower cutoff scores than public colleges, majors are differentiated
in terms of their cutoffs, and the colleges in big cities have higher cutoff scores than the colleges
in smaller cities.
Estimation results for the private college choices show that there is a significantly negative
correlation between the fraction of private colleges in the ROLs and the score formation equa-
tions’ residuals after the high school entrance exam scores, which are exogenous to the college
admissions process are controlled for. This result suggests that students who are inclined to choose
private colleges put lower effort into the exam preparation since the admissions requirements for
the private colleges are lower than the public colleges. Moreover, these effects remain robust even
after family income, parent education and accumulated wealth are controlled for. Following the
same practice, I find that students who choose competitive college-majors such as medical school
or mathematics have significantly positive preference effect to obtain higher scores. On the other
hand, this relationship cannot be generalized to all competitive majors. Finally, I estimate that at
least 16% of the variation in the college exam scores can be explained by the students’ college
preferences.
The significant relationship between the score formation strategies and students’ college pref-
erences are important for the evaluation of the effectiveness of admissions policies. In particular,
affirmative action policies for increasing racial or socioeconomic diversity in the selective col-
leges are traditionally based on admissions criteria. I discuss preference driven effects on the score
formation strategies in the score-based admissions policies. I argue that traditional methods are rel-
atively less effective if there is considerable preference difference between socioeconomic groups
and minorities. These discussions suggest that admission policies that are aiming to change col-
lege admissions outcomes can be implemented through new policies that change students’ college
preferences such as financial aid policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The remainder of the introduction discusses
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related literature. Section 2 presents the college admissions model in a discrete setting and its
convergence to the limit case. In section 3, I introduce the college contest sets. Section 4 presents
the empirical framework for the college admissions with entrance exams based on the college
contest sets. Description of the college admissions in Turkey, and the results on estimation with
the Turkish data are shown in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.1.1 Related literature
This paper is related to several active lines of research. First, it is related to college admissions
which have been extensively studied in the economic literature. From the seminal paper by Gale
and Shapley (1962), two-sided matching theory investigates the properties of college admissions
mechanisms. Research motivated by centralized mechanisms such as student placements in college
and public school admissions are pioneered by Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) and Abdulkadiroglu
and So¨nmez (2003). Recent works on college admissions based on student performances include
Hafalir et al. (2016), Hickman (2013), Bodoh-Creed and Hickman (2016), and Myong (2016). One
main difference between my model and these papers is that I allow for heterogeneous valuations
over colleges. In this paper, students have personal valuations that affect their college admissions
preparation strategies, while in the existing literature personal valuations for colleges are typically
assumed to be homogenous in the exam-based college admissions models. Heo (2017) is one
notable exception in this literature. She models student behavior with effort competition among
students who have differentiated valuations for colleges and abilities in a small decentralized ad-
missions setting. In her model, there are two colleges and effort is a binary decision.
Large matching markets is another related literature because college admissions can be easily
described as large matching markets. Azevedo and Leshno (2016) develop a supply and demand
framework to analyze stable matchings by assuming a continuum of students. They show that
stable matchings have a simple structure and for every stable matching there exists a vector of
cutoffs such that each student demands the college she is matched to. The continuum version of
the model typically has a unique matching and is a good approximation for real markets. Menzel
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(2015b) works on two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the number of
market participants grows large and show identification conditions in the large markets. Specifi-
cally, Azevedo and Leshno (2016) and Fack et al. (2015) prepare the base large matching market
structure of this paper. They do not, however, consider the competition feature among students in
the college admissions which is the main focus of this paper.
The large market assumption is also studied in the contest literature. Olszewski and Siegel
(2016) con- sider a contest model with heterogenous players and prizes and they show that the
equilibrium outcomes of such contests are approximated by the outcomes of mechanisms. Bodoh-
Creed and Hickman (2016) analyze affirmative action policies by modeling college admissions as a
large contest. Then, Hickman and Bodoh-Creed (2015) identify and estimate structural parameters
of the large college admissions contest model. Similarly, large number of students can be consid-
ered in aligned with students’ college ranking stage but the large matching market with continuum
of students assumption for the ROL submission stage provides a sufficient structure for combining
the exam preparation with the submission of ROLs.
Empirical research for college admissions and public school choice followed the theoretical
studies. In the context of college admissions and school choice, ROLs provide rich data for econo-
metric investigation. Dealing with strategic interactions in the preparation of ROLs is the main
identification challenge and requires structural methods. There are recent studies of student pref-
erence estimation in the Boston Mechanism (He (2012), Agarwal and Somaini (2016), Hwang
(2015) and Casalmiglia et al. (2014)) and in the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (Fack et al.
(2015), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2015a), Akyol and Krishna (2017) and Arslan (2018)). The main
difference of this paper from these empirical studies is the endogenous score formation strategies.
My model and significant results for the relationship between score formation and college ranking
strategies show that disregarding the relationship between college choice and preparation strategies
causes biased conclusions from estimation results that do not take endogeneity into account.
Motivational differences and incentive effects on student test performance are also examined
in the literature under different conditions. Fryer Jr (2011), Bettinger (2012) and Carpena et al.
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(2017) find that financial incentives improve test performance and change student behaviors. Met-
calfe et al. (2011) and Jalava et al. (2015) show non-financial incentives’ effects on student perfor-
mance and effort. In this paper, I provide additional evidence that motivational differences, which
result from heterogeneity in the student preferences for colleges, have impacts on student exam
performances.
Other related research focuses on the preference impacts on college admissions policies. Avery
and Levin (2010) analyze early admissions in decentralized college admissions and they show that
students use early admissions to signal their enthusiasm to colleges. Wu and Zhong (2014), Lien
et al. (2016), and Lien et al. (2017) investigate preference submission timing effects on student-
college matching outcomes.6 In this paper, I consider affirmative action (AA) policies which pre-
dominantly focuses on admissions procedures of students from different racial or socioeconomic
backgrounds. There are recent papers by Hoxby and Turner (2015), Goodman (2016), Hoxby
and Avery (2013), and Dillon and Smith (2017) on decentralized college admissions which docu-
ment that high-achieving and low-income student applications diverge from those of their higher-
income counterparts. These findings provide evidence for the heterogeneity in college choice is
not only originates from the heterogeneous abilities but also information differences among ap-
plicants. Contrary to decentralized admissions, competition information is common knowledge in
the centralized admissions mechanisms. Under these conditions, one may expect to see differences
in college choices originate from preference heterogeneity which is a result of informational dif-
ferences of different social groups about the college opportunities. In this setting, I discuss AA
policies that aim to affect college and major preferences in addition to traditional policies which
are designed with admission criteria. Financial aid programs are good candidates to influence
students’ college preferences.
Finally, Turkey college admissions data are also studied in other related papers. Krishna et al.
(2017) study the central college admissions and analyze the effects of retaking exams. They de-
6They find that ex-ante ranking submission increases fairness in terms of ability, college aptitude and also increases
match quality between student and colleges. I estimate a preliminary analysis using submission timing policy change
in 2000 in Appendix C.
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velop and estimate a structural model of exam retaking using data from Turkey’s college admis-
sions. Caner and Okten (2010) investigate risk taking behavior in submission of ROLs according to
socioeconomic status by looking at students’ major preferences at college entry. Caner and Okten
(2013) examine how the benefits of publicly financed higher education in Turkey are distributed
among students with different socioeconomic status. Saygin (2013) find that gender has significant
effects on college choice in Turkey such that female students prefer lower ranked colleges. How-
ever, none of these papers investigates the effects of heterogeneity in students’ colleges preferences
on the exam preparation strategies.
2.2 Model
I model the college admissions process in two stages; score formation and submitting ROL
stages. In the score formation stage, students obtain college entrance scores, which determine
their priorities. Cost of obtaining a score is assumed to be a decreasing function of ability. In
the submission of ROL stage students prepare ROLs knowing their priorities, which is commonly
investigated in the college admissions literature.
In the following subsections, I summarize the centralized college admissions setup, student
ranking behavior when the number of students are finite and show convergence to the limit game.
The limit game is defined with the continuum of students and with the same proportions of college
capacities as in the finite game. Students’ college ranking and score formation strategies as well as
the relationship of these strategies are analyzed using the result from the limit game.
2.2.1 Centralized student-college matching
College admissions is a classical example of matching markets and matching theory provides
a structure to analyze student behaviors. In this section, I consider a student-college matching
in which set of students (S) is indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and set of colleges (C) is indexed by
j ∈ {0, . . . ,J}. College 0 denotes being unmatched. Each college j has q j > 0 seats and these are
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announced before the student scores7 are announced. C0 has unlimited seats. I assume that student
i derives ui, j utility from assignment into college j. Each personal valuation of college is assumed
to have support [u j,u j] ∈ [0,1] for all j ∈ C. Colleges rank students according to entrance exam
scores which transformed into priorities pi, j. A college j prefers student i over student j if and
only if pi, j > pk, j.
After announcement of priorities, each student has an option to submit a rank order list (ROL)
of Li = (l1i , . . . , l
K
i ). K denotes the length of the ROL and it is assumed to be smaller than the
number of colleges in the mechanism i.e K < J. lki is student i’s k
th choice.8
The centralized student-college matching is solved by a mechanism that takes students’ ROLs
and entrance exam scores that determine student priorities. In this paper, I focus on a truncated
student-proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm that is aligned with my data. The algorithm
works as follows:
• Round 1: Every candidate applies to her first choice. Each college rejects the lowest-ranked
students in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the other students.
• Round R: Every student who is rejected in Round R-1 applies to the next choice on her
list. Each college, pooling together new students and those who were held from Round R-1,
rejects the lowest-ranked students in excess of its capacity.
The process terminates after any Round N when no rejections are issued. Then, each college
is matched with the students that it is currently holding. A matching can be defined as in Balinski
and So¨nmez (1999); it is an allocation of colleges to students such that no student occupies more
than one position. Formally;
Definition 2.1 A matching is a function µ : S → C such that |µ−1(C j)| ≤ q j for all j ∈ C. If
µ(i) =C0, student i is not assigned any college.
7In college admissions model, college preferences for students are formed by admission criterion and they are
called priorities. I normalized priorities using the [0,1] interval.
8Fack et al. (2015) analyze the cost of submitting of a ROL according to the number of colleges in ROLs in many
cases. In my model, the cost of submitting ROL corresponds to infinity if |L| greater than K.
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If a student is rejected in all rounds of the algorithm, she is assigned to C0 in this model that
means she is not assigned to any college.
2.2.2 Student’s college ranking behavior
In this student-college matching students have assignment probabilities to be admitted from
each college. These probabilities depend on their priorities and submitted ROLs as well as their
rivals’ priorities and ROLs. If one expresses student assignment probabilities according to priori-
ties and ROLs, their behaviors can be analyzed according to the expected utilities. Following Fack
et al. (2015) and Agarwal and Somaini (2016), assignment probabilities are expressed by;
Ωi, j(Li, pi;L−i, p−i)≡

Pr(i is rejected by l1i , . . . , l
k−1
i and accepted by l
k
i = j|Li, pi;L−i, p−i) if j ∈ Li
0 if j 6∈ Li
Given the matching algorithm, Ωi, j(Li, pi;L−i, p−i) is either one for some college in C or zero
if there is no ties in priorities. Since priorities and preferences are private information, students
form their strategies according to joint preference and priority distribution G(u|p)×H(p), which
is common knowledge.
Student i’s college ranking strategy is σR(ui, pi) : [0,1]J × [0,1]→ ∆(L). In the symmetric
equilibrium, σ∗R solves the following problem for every student:
σ∗R(ui, pi) ∈ arg max
σ
{
∑Kj=1 ui, j
∫ ∫
Ωi, j(σ , pi;σ∗(u−i, p−i), p−i)dG(u−i|p−i)dH(p−i)
}
(2.1)
Existence of pure and mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium are established by Milgrom and
Weber (1985) while uniqueness is not generally true.
Given an equilibrium σ∗ from the realization of preferences and priorities, a matching µσ∗ is
observed such that the outcome of matching is summarized with the ex-post cutoff of each college:
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t j(µσ∗) =

min {pi, j|i ∈ µ( j)} if j /∈ µ( j)
0 if j ∈ µ( j)
(2.2)
where t j(µσ∗) denotes the cutoff of college j. Equation 2.2 shows that if there is no remaining slot
after the matching, cutoff is the minimum priority level of the matched students. Zero cutoff means
that particular college does not receive sufficient application to meet its capacity. Assignment
probabilities can be redefined with cutoffs such that;
Ωi, j(Li, pi;L−i, p−i) =

Pr(t j′ > pi, j for j′ = l1i , . . . , l
k−1
i and t j ≤ pi, j for j = lki |L,L−i, pi) if j ∈ Li
0 if j /∈ Li
(2.3)
Stability is the standard equilibrium notion in the non-transferable utility matching markets.
Stability is a commonly used concept in two-sided matching, is defined in this setting as follows:
Definition 2.2 Given a matching µ , (i, j) blocks the matching if student i prefers college j to her
match and either (1) college j does not fill its quota or (2) college j is matched to another student
who has strictly lower priority than student’s i. A matching µ is stable if there is no student-college
blocking pair.
Stability can also be defined with college cutoffs. Given a matching µ , a college j is feasible
for student i if t j(µ)≤ pi, j. Feasible colleges for student i is denoted by ϕ(pi,T (µ)), where T (µ)
represents vector of cutoffs in matching µ . Then,
Lemma 2.1 µ is stable if and only if µ(i) = arg max j∈ϕ(pi,T (µ))ui, j for all i ∈ S.
This lemma is a basic feature of the college admissions model with finite number of students
investigated in many papers (among others, Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) and So¨nmez and U¨nver
(2011)). Azevedo and Leshno (2016) depart from a finite number of students on one side of the
matching and analyze the college admissions game with a continuum of students. I adopt the
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continuum number of students approach to analyze the college admissions model, which is more
suitable representation of national level college admissions. In addition, it allows to track students’
exam score formation strategies and ranking behavior in a unified framework.
2.2.3 Convergence of discrete economies to continuum economies
This section presents the convergence of economies with finite number of students which is
called discrete economies to economies with infinite number of students which is called continuum
economies. With this result, I can analyze students’ score formation and college ranking strategies
in a unified settings because it allows me to characterize these behaviors as individual optimization
problems.
Following Azevedo and Leshno (2016), I consider sequences of finite size economies denoted
by {FN} such that
FN = {(ui, j, pi, j){i∈SN , j∈C},{qNj } j∈C};
1. There are N students in FN , whose types are i.i.d. draws from G×H.
2. Each college’s capacity relative to N remains constant, i.e. qNj /N = q¯ j for all j, where q¯ j is
a positive constant.
The continuum economy, E, is defined as follows:
1. A mass of students, S, have type space [0,1]J× [0,1] associated with probability measure of
G×H.
2. College j has a positive capacity q¯ j for all j ∈C.
Azevedo and Leshno (2016) show that discrete economies converge to a continuum economy
when there is a unique stable matching. Fack et al. (2015) modify this finding according to the
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DA setting and show that for ordinal economies9, which is the economy where the cardinal prefer-
ences are replaced with ordinal preferences, converges to the continuum economy. In the ordinal
economy, the demand for each college in Eσ˜ as a function of the cutoff is:
D j(T, σ˜) =
∫ ∫
1(u j = max j′∈ϕ(pi,T )∩σ˜R(ui,pi) u j′)dG(ui|pi)dH(pi)
where σ˜R(ui, pi) denotes the set of schools ranked by student i as in the cardinal economy. Then,
convergence results can be seen from the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 (Azevedo and Leshno (2016), Fack et al. (2015)) Fix σ˜R ∈ {σNR }N∈N , where σ˜R
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of FN , and apply it to the sequence of finite economies {FN}N∈N .
Then, I have:
1. supJ∈N ||T (µ(FN ,σ˜R))−T∞|| → 0,
2. The fraction of blocking pairs in the finite economy converges to zero,
3. If Eσ˜R has a C
1 demand function and ∂D(T∞, σ˜R)/∂T∞ is non-singular, the asymptotic dis-
tribution of cutoffs in FS is
√
N(T (µ(FN ,σ˜R))−T∞)→ Normal(0,V (σ˜R))
where T∞ is the cutoff vector in E, V (σ˜R) = ∂D(T∞, σ˜R)−1Σ(∂D(T∞, σ˜R)−1)′ and
Σ=

q¯1(1− q¯1) −q¯1q¯2 . . . −q¯1q¯J
−q¯2q¯1 q¯2(1− q¯2) . . . ...
...
... . . .
...
−q¯J q¯1 . . . . . . q¯J(1− q¯J)

9I define ordinal economies as economies where students have ordinal preferences. Cardinal economies are also
defined analogously, they are economies where students have cardinal valuations and they are representing their pref-
erences.
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The proof of this proposition can be found in Azevedo and Leshno (2016).10 The convergence
of finite economies to continuum economies provides a good approximation to real markets. Under
this framework, whenever the continuum economy has a unique stable matching, all stable match-
ings of the discrete economies converge to a unique stable matching of the continuum economy.
Hence, all stable matchings of the large economies becomes similar.11
The large matching market with a continuum of students allows me to consider student behav-
ior in the college admissions game in a simple setting. Under the continuum economy, student
behaviors can be reinterpreted with the distribution of cutoff scores. With a known distribution of
cutoff scores, students do not have to consider rivals’ strategies in a college admissions process.
Instead, they optimize according to the distribution of college cutoff scores in addition to their abil-
ities and personal valuations over colleges. Therefore, to utilize this result in analyzing students’
behavior in a college admissions process I make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1 Students are assumed to know the distribution of college cutoff scores, F(T).
Even though the theoretic result and my assumption simplifies the analysis, it does not have
to represent real life applications. On the other hand, Assumption 2.1 is justifiable in many cen-
tralized college admissions mechanisms12 where past matching outcomes are public information
and there is a strong correlation between the cutoff scores across years.13 Publicly known cutoff
scores is decisive information because cutoff scores from the past years play benchmark role for
the forthcoming matching outcomes. This assumption is crucial for students’ preparation period
optimizations in this analysis. Since a student-college matching with a large number of students is
approximated with a distribution of cutoff scores, I can use this information to analyze students’
entrance exam preparation strategies.
10Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2015b) also consider similar framework and they note that outcomes of the mechanism can
be described with cutoffs.
11I assume that there is a unique stable matching in the empirical part.
12It includes the college admission mechanism in Turkey, where all realized matching outcome are publicly available
and distributed to college candidates in the submission guidance booklet.
13The correlation of cutoff scores of college admission in Turkey across years are presented in Appendix. In addition
the estimated density of demeaned cutoff percentiles presented in figure A.6
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2.2.4 Optimal college rankings in the continuum economy
Under the continuum economy with a known distribution of cutoff scores, students’ college
ranking behaviors are characterized as individual optimization problems. Note that priorities in the
continuum model are replaced with scores (p˜) because priorities depend on rivals’ performances.
Student i’s strategy to prepare her rank order list, which is a function her personal valuations
over colleges, exam score and the distribution of cutoff scores, σR(ui, p˜i;T) : [0,1]J× [0,1]→ L ∈
L . Consequently, students with their valuations over colleges and scores solve the maximization
problem with the following strategy;
σ∗R(ui, p˜i;T) = arg max
σ
K
∑
j=1
ui j
∫
Ωi, j(p˜i,σ ;T) dF(T)
where Ωi, j(p˜i,σ ;T) shows the assignment probability of student i’s for college j according to
her score, rank order list, and cutoff scores. Assignment of students to colleges with cutoff score
explained in equation 2.3.14
The other advantage of the large market approximation is making characterization of students’
preparation period strategies possible. Since the matching outcomes of the continuum economies
can be represented with the distribution of cutoff scores and the distribution information is con-
sulted in the students’ college ranking decisions, students additionally optimize their entrance exam
score formation strategies accordingly.
2.2.5 Student score formation behavior in the continuum economy
Students’ score formation strategies can be incorporated into the college admissions process
with the known distribution of cutoff scores. The score formation strategies therefore represent
student preparation behaviors for college entrance exams in the large matching market setting. In
this model, students put costly time and effort to maximize their college admissions outcomes that
14Existence of the maximum follows from bounded utilities, but the uniqueness of maximum comes with regularity
conditions that make the expected utility vector smooth and concave.
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was described in section 2.4. In addition to assumptions in the previous section, heterogenous
abilities among students is assumed. Utilities and abilities are private information and i.i.d. draws
from the joint distribution ξ (u,a).
With the continuum characterization of the matching game, I now consider the college admis-
sions outcomes as a distribution of cutoff scores. Under this framework, the problem of a student i
is to choose her college entrance exam score. The large matching approximation leads that student
i’s college entrance exam score formation decision is independent of her rivals. In this case, student
i’s score formation strategy is a function of her valuations over colleges, ability and the distribution
of cutoff scores σP(ui,ai;T) : [0,1]J× [0,1]→ p˜ ∈ P˜ ,
σ∗P(ui,ai;T) = arg max
p˜
K
∑
j=1
ui j
∫
Ωi, j(p˜i,σ∗R(p˜i,ui);T) dF(T)−κ(p˜i;ai) (2.4)
where Ωi, j(p˜i,σ∗R(p˜i,ui);T) is assignment mapping that is explained above. κ(p˜i;ai) is the cost
function and represents cost of obtaining score p˜i according to a student with ability ai. Since cutoff
scores are not known and the matching outcome can be approximated with a normal distribution
as it is known from the section 2.3, students optimize themselves according to this information.
Therefore, student i chooses her optimal score p˜∗i solving equation 2.4 without considering her
rivals’ strategies.15
The equation 2.4 is interpreted as a prospective student’s score choice in the college admis-
sions process when she knows the distribution of cutoff scores and the disutility that she bears to
obtain scores. As a consequence, agents’ strategies in the large college admissions process like
a national level centralized admissions can be approximated by individual problems rather than
players’ strategies depend on their rivals’ as in contest or all-pay auction models.
15Bodoh-Creed and Hickman (2016) consider also college admission as a large contest and claim that students
college admission preparation effort are decided by following previous years college admission information.
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2.3 Identification by partitioning colleges: College contest sets
The college admissions model in section 2 shows that personal valuations over colleges are
one of the determinants of the optimal scores in the college admissions with entrance exams. In
this section, I develop an identification method for the effects of personal valuations over colleges
on the score formation strategies by partitioning colleges into mutually exclusive sets, which are
named as college contest sets. The college contest set is described as a partition of colleges ac-
cording to an observable common feature of colleges (e.g. private colleges or public colleges).
These sets allow me to characterize competitiveness differences of colleges according to observ-
able college characteristics. Since the distribution of cutoff scores are known by assumption in
my model, the competitiveness differences between colleges are understood from students. With
this structure, I quantify the selected colleges in students’ ROLs from a particular college contest
set and analyze the corresponding observable college characteristic’s effect on the score formation
strategies. Since college characteristics are influential factors in the students’ valuation differences
over colleges, I can test the effects of one dimension of students’ college preferences on their score
formation strategies.
To clarify the college contest set framework and its relationship with the score formation strate-
gies, consider a simple example in a centralized college admissions mechanism where there is si-
multaneous college and major choice. The majors are differentiated in terms of competitiveness
and students have different preferences for each major.
Example 2.1 Assume that there are two students s1 and s2 with equal abilities who differ in terms
of their major preferences. There are two colleges offers two majors m1 and m2. Students are
allowed to rank up to two college-majors in their ROLs. The major is the only factor in the student
valuation differences for colleges. Student personal valuations for college-majors as follows:
Student 1 Student 2
m1 100 60
m2 50 90
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Each college-major has cutoff score in the [0,100] interval and they have the following distri-
bution of cutoff scores:
Mean SD
m11 70 9
m21 71 10
m12 50 10
m22 49 11
Two students have the same cost of obtaining any entrance exam score because they have the
same abilities. Student 1 and 2 may maximize their utilities from the expected matching outcomes
with different scores because their major preferences make them to compete in different levels.
With the given distribution cutoff scores information, there is a higher chance of student 1 max-
imizes her expected utility with a higher score than student 2’s because student 1 prefers major
1 that has higher expected cutoff scores. The cost of obtaining higher score can be compensated
with her personal valuation for the major 1. In this example, student 2 prepares the exam according
to distribution of major 2’s cutoffs and submits (m12,m
2
2) in any case. Student 1, however, needs
to choose her preparation strategy and submits ROLs accordingly. If the cost of obtaining higher
score is compensated by her valuation differences of the two majors, she prepare more and sub-
mit (m11,m
2
1). Therefore, there is a higher chance to observe two different scores with two different
ROLs from the students with same abilities if there is substantial differences in valuations over col-
leges for student 1. Based on this example, if there is a measure to control students abilities that is
exogenous to college admissions process, the effects of preferences on entrance exam preparation
strategies from exam scores and submitted ROLs.
To formalize the contest choice set framework, consider a collection of contest sets Z and which
are indexed by z ∈ {1, . . . ,Z}. College contest sets are mutually exclusive collections of colleges.
Each contest set has competition level (t˜), which are aggregate information level that comes from
the distribution of college cutoff scores. Each college contest set z includes at least one college and
a college is allowed to be in only one college contest, i.e. c j ∈ zk then c j 6∈ z′k ,k 6= k′. This can be
expressed that each college j belongs to one z and ∪ jczj =C, where cz denotes colleges that are in
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the contest set z. For example, there are two college contest sets in terms of college types; private
college and public college contest sets.
In this framework, it is assumed that students have complete information for their personal
valuations over colleges and understand the differences in the competitiveness between college
contest sets which comes from the distribution of cutoff scores differences of the elements of
the contest sets. The competition level t˜ is the expected minimum success level such that if a
student have a score more than the minimum level, she is assigned to a college in admissions
context. In these conditions, students choose contest(s) according to college contest characteristics
in the beginning of college admissions process so that they optimize entrance exam preparation
strategies according to the benefits of obtaining a score. A contest choice of student i under perfect
competition level information is represented as;
z∗i = arg max
z
U i(p˜(z),z)−κ(p˜(z),a) (2.5)
where U i(p˜(z),z) is the utility function of student i that takes score p˜ and contest z as inputs.
The utility represents the value of being assigned with a college in contest z for student i. Note
that students’ score formation strategies depend on the contest choice. A student i may choose
two different scores for two different contests p˜zi 6= p˜z j , i, j ∈ Z, i 6= j because competition and
valuations for colleges differ her optimization strategies.
In the college admissions model, students only know the distribution of college cutoff scores
as competition level information. The distribution of cutoff scores also provides the expected
competitiveness information for the contest sets. For example, if private college cutoff scores are
lower than public college cutoff scores on average, then in the contest level, private college contest
is not as aggressive as public college contest. Hence, contest choices of students depend on the
expected competitiveness as presented in the equation 2.6.
z∗i = arg max
z
Ecz(U
i(p˜(z),z)−κ(p˜(z),a)) (2.6)
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where Ecz denotes the expectation with respect to contest competition levels.
16
2.3.1 Assumptions
I adopt standard assumptions for the contest choice model. There is one main objective of
these assumptions; establishing the existence of individual optimization in the centralized college
admissions process.
Assumption 2.2 For each (u,a) ∈ [u,u]× [a, a¯], κp(p˜,a)> 0, κa(p˜,a)< 0 , and κpp(p˜,a)> 0.
Assumption 2.3 Contest utility function U satisfies vNM utility function properties.
Assumption 2.4 For each i and z, U ip(p˜,z)≥ 0, U ipp(p˜,z)≤ 0.
Assumption 2.2 states that the cost function is strictly increasing in admission score and it is
strictly convex. Moreover, it is decreasing with ability. Assumption 2.3 provides regularization
for the expected utility function. Assumption 2.4 states that the contest utility function is weakly
increasing and weakly concave. These assumptions imply that students within contest decision
problems have global maximums.
Theorem 2.1 In a centralized college admissions with entrance exam where students have per-
sonal valuations over colleges and abilities, under the assumptions 2.1-2.4 each student has an
optimal score for each choice of college contest set.17
Given personal valuations over colleges and abilities, students choose contest set(s) and optimize
college entrance exam preparation strategies according to this choice(s). Therefore, chosen con-
test sets are important in the college entrance exam preparation strategies. Theorem 2.1 can be
translated into the following corollary in terms of contest set choice and the college entrance exam
preparation strategies.
16In my framework, it is aggregation of competition level information from colleges in the contest. Al-Najjar and
Pomatto (2016) study choice under aggregate uncertainty which represents a similar case of the aggregation of colleges
in contests.
17The existence of optimal score in Theorem 1 is standard under the given functional assumptions.
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Corollary 2.1 The competitiveness of the chosen contest sets determine college entrance exam
preparation strategies; i.e. if a student prefers to be matched with colleges in a contest set which
have lower expected cutoff scores than other contest sets, the incentive for obtaining a higher score
is lower because of time and effort cost.
The Corollary 1 allows me to construct a testable implication in the centralized college admis-
sions with entrance exam. Under the large matching market structure, the distribution of cutoff
scores provides the competition information. In addition, students are atomistic in terms of their
effects on the competition structure of colleges under large markets. Thus, I can generate an empir-
ical framework based on Corollary 2.1 using public level competition information, students’ exam
scores, submitted ROLs and exogenous test scores.
2.4 Econometric Framework
This section develops an econometric method based on students’ college choices from college
contest sets. The data that I am considering in this paper consist of rank order lists (ROL), student
college entrance scores, and other test scores that are exogenous to college admissions process. I
first present construction of contest choice variables which are either the fraction of college choices
in the students’ ROLs from the college contest sets or an indicator variable according to majority
of colleges. Second, I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of contest set framework in the
analysis. Then, econometric specification to estimate the relationship between score formation
strategies and ROL submission strategies is presented.
2.4.1 Contest choice variable
The main objective in the construction of contest choice variable is quantifying student college
choices from different contest sets. ROLs are observable elements for student preferences for
colleges to work on. They are sets of ordered choices of each student’s decision for student-college
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matching and submitted to the national admission center.18 Since college choice and ranking in
this setting is not one choice, I offer three type of contest choice indicators and denote them with
f , f˜ , and b˜. With these variables, I can quantify the fraction or the majority of colleges from
different contest sets in one variable. In addition, I can take the order information into account.
The construction of the contest choice indicators as follows;
f iz =
∑Kij=1 1{l ji ∈ z}
Ki
f˜ iz =
∑Kij=1 w j j 1{l ji ∈ z}
Ki
b˜iz = 1
{
∑Kij=1 w j j 1{l ji ∈ z}
∑Kij=1 w j j
≥ 0.5
}
where f iz denotes the fraction of student i’s ROLs that is filled with colleges in the contest set z.
Recall that, l ji denotes student i’s ROLs j
th choice and Ki denotes that number of listed colleges in
the ROL. f˜ iz is the weighted fraction of student i’s ROLs filled with colleges that is in the contest
set z according to the order of colleges in the ROL.19 bzi is a binary choice variable which becomes
1 if the weighted fraction of selected colleges from contest set z is bigger or equal than 0.5. With
these formulations of contest choices, I can construct various choice fractions and binary choices
from the ROLs.20
2.4.2 Discussion: Advantages and disadvantages of contest sets method
Before presenting the econometric specification with contest choice variables, there are few
issues to discuss with the selection of the econometric methodology. First, the estimation of stu-
18One feature of rank order list is the property of lowering the exam shock effects. Even though ROLs are truncated
by assignment mechanisms, they can cover some of the colleges those cutoff scores are around the targeted score.
Thus, likelihood of observing targeted colleges increase from researchers.
19Even though order of ROLs show preference relations in the list, in f ’s formulation I do not consider these
relations. This approach is supported if selected colleges in ROLs are similar enough in terms of preference. In f˜
formulation, I weight the order with Borda count method and generate weighted fraction.
20An example for the constructing contest choice variable is presented in the Appendix D.
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dent preferences for colleges can be estimated with ordered choice (OC) responses in principle.
However, implementation in OC methods with endogenous regressors and high number of choices
is computationally very hard problems.21 The second issue is the interpreting student’s preference
effect on college entrance exam preparation strategies under OC framework. Because the hetero-
geneity in the choices and the complexity of the preference effects, it is hard to reach conclusive
results. On the other hand, contest sets allows me to separate the effects of students’ preferences
on preparations strategies in a simple setting. Consequently, a simple estimation and cleaner in-
terpretation for the effects of students’ preferences over colleges on preparation strategies are the
main advantage of contest sets framework over ordered choice responses.
Contest sets framework does not provide a general identification and estimation methodology
for students’ college preferences. The preference estimation is an important step for counterfactual
analysis and policy design. Lack of a general method is the main disadvantage of contest sets
framework. On the other hand, contest sets provide a simpler methodology to test for the existence
of the effects of students’ preferences on admissions preparation strategies. This provides a crucial
evidence to generate estimation methods for student preferences in the college admissions with
endogenous scores.
2.4.3 Model specification
As the fraction of colleges22 from the contest set z in the ROL is the key quantity of interest for
indicating contest choice, I investigate the relationship between college entrance exam preparation
strategies and contest choice from college admissions data. According to Theorem 1, students
choose colleges that are elements of different contest sets to maximize their expected utility of
the admissions outcome minus the cost of preparing for the exam. If I separate colleges into
two contest sets, which are differentiated in terms of competitiveness, the fractions of colleges
21Among others, Jagabathula and Rusmevichientong (2016), Alptekinog˘lu and Semple (2016) discuss that compu-
tational problems in ordered choice data with endogenous regressors that considers assortment and pricing decisions
which is an analogous problem of college admissions with endogenous scores.
22Since I can construct binary and fractional responses in the same specification, it is safe to consider one case.
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from contests sets show students preference intensities for colleges from two different contest sets.
Therefore, the aim of this section is proposing an inference procedure to evaluate how fractions of
chosen colleges affect the college entrance exam preparation strategies when student characteristics
are controlled for.
Note that timing of the events in the college admissions mechanism is crucial to choose the
correct econometric specification. In the college admissions model that is considered in this paper,
submission of ROLs occurs after the announcement of examination scores.23 Learning college
entrance exam scores is im- portant for two reasons. First, exogenous exam day shocks can be
seen after score announcement and ranking strategies can be updated with the new information.
Second, even though ability plays an important role in score formation, after announcement of
examination scores, students optimize their ROLs independent of their abilities. In other words,
a student prepares herself for the exam by optimizing over her ability, personal valuations over
colleges to obtain a score. After score announcement, realized scores, student college preferences
and distribution of cutoff scores are the determinants of the submission of ROL strategies.
High School
Entry
College Entrance
Examination
Score
Announcement
Submission of
ROLs Matching Results
Matching
Time
Preparation time
Figure 2.1: College admission process timeline
To model the contest choice indicator f , which is a fractional response variable, I use the
following specification, in which the conditional expectation rate is given by
E( f |x1, p˜,η) =Φ(α+ x1β1+β2 p˜+η) (2.7)
23Bond et al. (2016) study the effects of positive and negative shocks on human capital investment using data from
SAT test realizations. They find that positive shocks cause students to choose more selective colleges that charge
higher tuition and have higher graduation rates.
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where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution. x1
captures observable student characteristics and p˜ denotes normalized college entrance exam score.
η represents student preference factor. To estimate the parameters θ = {α,β1,β2} in an hypo-
thetical world where the student preference factor is part of the idiosyncratic error, I can use the
quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). Gourier-
oux et al. (1984) shows that the resulting QML is robust as it yields a consistent estimator whenever
the conditional mean is correctly specified, and is efficient for a class of generalized linear mod-
els (GLM). However, η in the equation 2.7 is an unobservable element which corresponds to one
component of the student preference in my framework. It has been shown in the choices from
the contest sets that preferences play a notable role in the determination of college exam score, p˜.
Under this condition, I need to deal with the endogeneity in the college exam score formation. To
model college entrance score (p˜) formation, I use the following reduced form specification:
p˜ = δ + xγ+ ε (2.8)
The set of regressors x1 in the equation 2.7 is strict subset of the regressors x in the equation
2.8 which says that there is at least one exogenous regressor in the score formation equation. I
follow Wooldridge (2010) and Wooldridge (2014) for a fractional response model with an endoge-
nous explanatory variable (EEV). There are two models are suggested for consistent estimation;
control function approach based on Rivers and Vuong (1988) and joint QML estimation (QMLE)
framework. Note that the construction of fractional response variables is designed to indicate the
effect of one dimension of the students’ college preferences. Students’ preference components
are assumed to be independent of each others. Therefore, I am assuming the other preference
components are the part of the idiosyncratic error term.
In the control function (CF) approach, the first step is to obtain OLS residuals εˆ from regression
college entrance exam score (p˜) on student characteristics (x1) and high school entrance exam score
(x2). Then, I can use fractional response model based on Papke and Wooldridge (1996) of college
choice from a contest set f on p˜, x1, and estimated residuals εˆ to estimate scaled coefficients. I
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denote the coefficient of εˆ with ω .
To implement joint QMLE specification, I follow the fractional response model by Wooldridge
(2014). The fractional response with EEV leads the same log likelihood as the probit model spec-
ification of f , even though f is a fractional response.24 Then, under the distributional assumption,
I can estimate college entrance exam score formation and choice equations using joint QMLE
methods with log-likelihood function25:
max
θ1,θ2
N
∑
i=1
[q1( fi, p˜i,zi,θ1,θ2)+q2(p˜i,zi,θ2)]
where θ1 = (αη ,β ′1η ,β2η ,ρ)
′ and θ2 = (δ ,γ ′,τ2)′ 26
q1( f , p,x,θ1,θ2) = f
{
log Φ[
αη + x1β1η + p˜β2η +(ρ/τ)(p˜−δ − zγ)
(1−ρ2)1/2 ]
}
+(1− f ) log {1−Φ[αη + x1β1η + p˜β2η +(ρ/τ)(p˜−δ − xγ)
(1−ρ2)1/2 ]
}
q2(p,x,θ2) =− log(τ2)/2− (p˜−δ − xγ)2/(2τ2)
where τ2 is the variance of college entrance exam score. The main objects of interest are the
parameter ω , ρ and the coefficients of college exam score p˜. ω and ρ represent the correlation of
the unobservable parts from the college contest choice and college entrance exam score formation
equations. Under two econometric specifications, the correlation comes from the one component
of unobserved students’ preference factor. Therefore, any significant result for ω and ρ captures
the relationship between college preference and college entrance exam formation and provides a
test for the relationship.
24I present the derivation of equality in the appendix.
25Obtaining of joint distribution of ( f , p˜|x) is presented in Appendix E.
26The parameters in the fractional response variable equations are identified up to scale. αη ,β ′1η ,β2η represents
scaled versions of α,β ′1,β2. I refer the reader to Wooldridge (2014) for detailed identification and estimation under
these conditions.
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2.5 Application: College Admissions in Turkey
There is a centralized college admissions system in Turkey. Students who wish to pursue higher
education take a nationwide college entrance exam (CEE), which is conducted by the Student
Selection and Placement Center (CSSP). The sum of students’ college entrance exam scores and
scaled and weighted high school GPAs determines student priorities in the admissions. After the
announcement of the exam score and scaled GPA, a student who wants to continue student-college
matching stage submits a ROL of up to 24 college-majors to the CSSP.27 CSSP matches students
and colleges using the student proposing Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, developed
by Gale and Shapley (1962).28
College and major choices are simultaneous in the admissions. Majors are divided into 4 main
categories according to high school education tracks, which are quantitative, verbal, composite,
and foreign languages.29 Each major belongs to a track and students are prioritized according to
their exam scores in the corresponding track.30 The college entrance exam is held once a year
and candidates are asked multiple-choice questions from 5 main topics, which are mathematics,
natural sciences, social sciences, Turkish language, and foreign languages. These parts generate 4
different scores, which are the main part of the admission criterion for each track. High school GPA
is the other part of the college admissions criterion. Students’ high school GPAs enter into total
score after it is normalized according high school’s success in the college entrance exam. Students
from successful high schools have higher high school GPA scores in the total score calculation.
Another important admissions procedure in the GPA criterion is based on students’ education
track choice in the high school. High school GPA score is multiplied by 0.8 if students choose
the same educational track for their college majors, while it is multiplied by 0.3 for majors out of
27Students who do not submit a list either wait for the next years or utilize outside options that can be universities
in abroad or labor market.
28Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) show that the outcome is college proposing DA even though candidates submit
ROLs.
29Most college majors are in quantitative track which includes engineering, medical school, and math. The com-
posite track includes social sciences and law is the second most in terms of number of college majors. The verbal track
includes theology and literature and the foreign language track includes foreign literatures and translation majors.
30Detailed information for Turkish high school institutional structure can be found in Akyol and Krishna (2017).
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their track. Selecting majors from different education tracks lowers students scores compared to
students staying in the same track31 if the choice is in the different track.
2.5.1 Data
For the empirical analysis, I use three data sets. The first data set is obtained from CSSP. It
provides students college entrance exam, high school entrance exam scores and GPAs, as well as
their ROLs if they have submitted. The second data set is from a survey study which is conducted
in 2005.32 The survey sample is randomly selected from senior high school students who would
take the CEE in 2005. This survey includes questions about socioeconomic, politic, demographic
and educational background. The last data set is a list of cutoff scores for college-majors across
years and publicly available on the CSSP website.
There are almost two-million students in the college admissions process but I focus on 172,951
of them in this paper. These students chose quantitative track and submitted ROLs after announce-
ment of the college admissions scores in 2005. In addition, I restrict the focus to students who
are aiming for four-year degree programs to keep my sample consistent according to admissions
requirements that I described in the model section.33
Table 2.1 reports students’ scores from college and high school entrance exams, GPAs, college
choice characteristics and high school types. The number of available high school entrance exam
scores is 112,055 and high school GPA is 53,041 in my data. Student high school type composition
is listed in Panel C in the Table 2.1. N and S represent non-selective and selective types in the high
school admissions. The average number of choices listed in ROLs is 15.63, where the maximum
allowed choice is 24. Students on average submit around 9 colleges, 8 cities and 5 majors in their
ROLs. Students only spare 8 percent of the ROL for the private colleges, and 19 percent for the
31The total score calculated as follows: Totalscorei = CEEi + 0.8× shsGPAi if the choice in the same track,
Totalscorei =CEEi+0.3× shsGPAi otherwise.
32For detailed information and descriptive analysis see Alkan et al. (2008).
332 year degree programs have special admission rules and are allowed to admit students without a college entrance
exam score.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for applicants 4 year degree quantitative track programs
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Panel A. Student Characteristics
Female 0.39 0.49 0.00 1 172951
College Score Quantitative 0.77 0.09 0.62 1 172951
College Score Verbal 0.67 0.11 0.42 1 172951
College Score Composite 0.74 0.09 0.50 1 172951
High School Score Quantitative 0.69 0.10 0.38 1 112055
High School Score Composite 0.70 0.09 0.38 1 112055
GPA 0.75 0.22 0.00 1 53041
Panel B. Choice Variables
# Choice 15.63 7.21 1 24 172951
# College 9.42 5.14 1 24 172951
# City 8.34 5.19 1 24 172951
# Major 4.98 3.11 1 23 172951
Fraction of Private College 0.08 0.22 0 1 172951
Fraction of Evening Education 0.19 0.24 0 1 172951
Fraction of same city 0.19 0.28 0 1 172951
Mean Distance (km) 474.77 338.52 0 2500 172714
Panel C. High Schools
Distance Educ.(N) 0.00 0.05 0 1 172951
Vocational (N) 0.03 0.18 0 1 172951
Regional (N) 0.02 0.15 0 1 172951
Vocational(S) 0.02 0.15 0 1 172951
Regional (N) 0.41 0.49 0 1 172951
Private(N) 0.01 0.11 0 1 172951
Regional(S) 0.18 0.38 0 1 172951
Anatolian(S) 0.23 0.42 0 1 172951
Anatolian Teac.(S) 0.02 0.15 0 1 172951
Private Science (S) 0.05 0.21 0 1 172951
Science (S) 0.02 0.13 0 1 172951
Notes: College entrance exam and high school entrance exam scores in Panel A are normalized according
to their maximum scores to be 1. High school are presented according to their selection criterion in their
admissions. (N) represents non-selective high schools and (S) represents selective high schools.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for college in quantitative track programs
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Cutoff score
305.20
(68.59)
37.23
(26.18)
197.95
(0.01)
381.18
(99.92)
1752
Max entrant score 322.47 29.89 213.11 399.03 1752
Evening Educ. 0.15 0.36 0 1 1879
Private 0.27 0.44 0 1 1879
Full Sch. 0.03 0.16 0 1 1879
Partial Sch. 0.08 0.27 0 1 1879
Notes: Private colleges offer mainly two types of scholarship opportunities. Full scholarship covers all
tuition expenses and includes fellowships in some cases. Partial scholarships only cover a fraction of
tuition, the remaining part has to be paid from students. The numbers in parentheses presents admission
percentiles.
evening education34 and colleges in the same cities.
Table 2.3: Summary statistics for college cutoff scores by college types
College type Threshold type Mean SD Obs
Public
Cutoff score 308.45 (69.49) 32.12 (24.19)
1338
Max. entrant score 323.17 27.48
Private w/o scholarship
Cutoff score 271.40 (48.68) 43.98 (32.85)
251
Max. entrant score 307.35 36.30
Private w. scholarship
Cutoff score 330.58 (83.53) 31.17 (20.66)
163
Max. entrant score 339.99 26.85
Notes: Private w/o scholarship represents all programs that are offered from private colleges and do
not offer any funding opportunity. Admitted students are required to pay their tuition. The numbers in
parentheses presents admission percentiles.
Table 2.2 reports college characteristic and threshold type summaries. There are mainly two
types of colleges in the Turkey, public and private. Private college attendance requires high tuition
payments, while public colleges are mostly funded by the state.35 In the quantitative track, there
are 1,879 4-year degree programs and 27 percent of these programs are offered by private colleges.
Private colleges offer scholarship opportunities which are awarded based on college admissions
outcomes. There are 11 and 30 percent of prog- rams are offered by private colleges provide full
or partial funding, respectively.
34Evening education is a program that offers education at evening time. These programs admit students as in the
same admission procedure but they have different quotas in the system. Hence, a college can offer both normal
program and evening education program for the same major in the same college admission period.
35Except for some administrative fees, there is no tuition at these colleges.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics for college cutoff scores by selected college-majors
Majors Threshold type Mean SD Obs
Medical School
Cutoff score 352.98 (96.32) 7.90 (2.54)
53
Max. entrant score 361.86 9.17
Electronic Eng.
Cutoff score 327.50 (82.73) 34.01 (23.04)
76
Max. entrant score 342.93 21.46
Computer Eng.
Cutoff score 326.05 (81.97) 38.13 (22.49)
82
Max. entrant score 345.09 20.36
Industrial Eng.
Cutoff score 323.84 (81.22) 37.24 (24.35)
62
Max. entrant score 340.65 23.07
Mechanical Eng.
Cutoff score 318.59 (80.02) 23.83 (14.38)
79
Max. entrant score 330.01 18.21
Civil Eng.
Cutoff score 315.65 (76.42) 32.93 (15.56)
75
Max. entrant score 330.32 24.95
Math
Cutoff score 306.86 (66.88) 32.45 (30.02)
132
Max. entrant score 319.27 27.76
Notes: The numbers in parentheses presents admission percentiles.
More detailed summary statistics for private and public college cutoffs are presented in Table
2.3. There are two types of thresholds are presented, cutoff score and maximum entrant score.
These thresholds represent minimum and maximum scores of admitted students in the realized
matchings. According to 2004’s matching outcome, cutoff scores are differentiated according to
funding and scholarship types. Private colleges have high thresholds if they provide scholarship
opportunities while programs that do not offer funding have lower thresholds.
Table 2.4 reports two threshold types from 2004’s matching by selected competitive majors in
the quantitative track. The mean cutoff scores show that there is a high degree of stratification
among majors according to admission levels. Medical school is the highest in terms of average
cutoff scores.
Another important college choice factors can be student location and distance preferences.
In many countries colleges are not distributed evenly over the locations. In Turkey, majority of
colleges are located in the crowded cities.36 Moreover, there are some regions that do not have
any close distance colleges. Heterogeneity in terms of college locations may have impact on stu-
dents’ college choices and college admissions preparation strategies. In table 2.5, I present college
36See Figure A.7 for the number of colleges by cities in Turkey.
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threshold differences between 3 biggest cities of Turkey; Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and the remaining
cities. The mean cutoff scores show that colleges in 3 biggest cities have higher cutoff scores than
the colleges in the other cities.
Table 2.5: Summary statistics for college cutoff scores by college locations
Locations Threshold type Mean SD Obs
Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir
Cutoff score 323.19 (78.60)
33.69
(24.10) 635
Max. entrant score 341.20 23.66
Other cities
Cutoff score 294.98 (62.59)
35.22
(25.59) 1117
Max. entrant score 311.82 27.76
Total
Cutoff score 305.20 (68.59)
37.23
(26.18) 1752
Max. entrant score 322.47 29.89
Notes: Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir are the biggest 3 cities of Turkey and they are hosted majority of colleges
in the country. The numbers in parentheses presents admission percentiles.
Finally, to quantify student time and effort investments for the exam preparations, I use three
measures that show student study times by themselves and amount of time is spent in private
college exam prep-courses and tutoring. These measures are obtained through survey questions.
Table 2.6 presents preliminary estimation results of student time and effort investments in the col-
lege entrance exam preparations according to their college choices two different competitiveness
level contest sets. According to regression results, students who choose private colleges more in
their ROLs have lower self-study and prep-course times, on the other hand students who choose
medical schools more spend higher time for self-study and prep-courses. For private tutoring, the
results are opposite.37 Based on these results, I can claim that there is a significant different in time
and effort investments for college entrance exams in terms of students’ college preferences.
Cutoff score differences across college types, majors and locations are presented in the Tables
2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. In order to see optimization differences in college admissions process, I need to
apply the econometric techniques that have been proposed in the Section 4.
37Private tutoring option is only available for higher income people. Positive and significant higher private tutoring
result is not surprising for students who have sufficient income to go private colleges.
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Table 2.6: Preliminary estimation results of student effort and time investments for college entrance
exam preparations
Not Competitive Competitive
Variables Private College Medical School
Prep Course -0.010 0.008
(0.005) (0.002)
Tutor 0.079 -0.016
(0.004) (0.002)
Self Study -0.041 0.017
(0.005) (0.003)
Constant 0.243 -0.011
(0.023) (0.010)
R2 0.14 0.03
N 4305 4305
Regression results are obtained from OLS estimations. Private colleges and Medical
school fractions are constructed as it is described in the college choice form contest
sets.
2.5.2 Results
This section reports the estimates for the parameters of interest. Since my method requires
focusing on one dimension of students’ college preferences vector, I investigate the effects of
preferences for private college, major, and location separately.
2.5.2.1 Private colleges
The first model in table 2.7 presents private college choice estimation results when endogeneity
is not taken into account. The (2) and (3) models report CF and QML estimation results that are
described in section 4. These two models’ results make evident that taking preparation endogeneity
into account in the estimation creates difference in the interpretation of student preferences for
colleges. In particular, the college exam scores effects on private college choice not only changed
in terms of magnitude but also reversed in sign.
According to private college choice estimation results under exogeneity assumption in the
model (1), I infer that students who have lower scores more likely to choose private colleges.
On the contrary, the model (2) and (3) shows that students that have higher scores more likely
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to choose private colleges. In addition, there is a significantly negative relationship in the col-
lege entrance score formation equation’s and private college choice equation’s residuals. Note that
residuals from the college exam score formation equation and private college choice equation in-
clude an unobserved preference factor in the econometric framework. Hence, the correlation of the
residuals which is reported with ω and ρ represents the relationship between the college choice
from different contest sets and score formation.38 The results in the model (2) and (3) suggest
that a student who has higher inclination to choose private colleges in the college admissions has
lower incentive to obtain higher score on the college entrance exam. This relationship is result of
the difference in the competitiveness between private and public colleges. Recall from the Table
2.3, private colleges without scholarships have lower cutoff scores than public and private colleges
with scholarship programs. As I show in the college contest set framework, students who prefer
colleges with low thresholds have less incentive to obtain higher entrance exam score. In mod-
els (4) and (5) college contest choice indicators are replaced with unweighted fractions and binary
variable which takes one if fraction of private colleges are more than 50 percent and the first choice
in ROL is private college. The results are aligned with the findings in the model (2) and (3).
In order to control for any exam day shock effects, I alternatively estimate preference for pri-
vate college effect on college admissions preparation strategies with the scaled high school GPA
(shsGPA) score. shsGPA is the other score in the admission criterion and has a considerable effect
on it. GPA is an average of many courses from high school, consequently it is less prone to a
single exogenous shock in the formation than college entrance exam score. In addition, since GPA
is scaled according to the average of students’ successes from the same high school in the college
entrance exam, score normalization according to difficulty level between high schools comes im-
mediately. The model (6) in table 2.7 reports estimation results with the shsGPA variable instead of
college entrance exam score. The results are aligned with the findings in the model (3). The main
difference is in the gender effect on score formation. Female students have better performance in
38Since the correlations under CF and QMLE is qualitatively the same and have very close magnitudes, I prefer to
continue to use QMLE results for interpreting the results. The correlation coefficient is simpler way show the direction
and magnitude of the relationship. ω estimate in CF equals ρ/τ in the QMLE.
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high school GPA formation, while the reverse is true for the college entrance exam scores.39
In the all models, I include high school types dummies. High school types do not only differ
in terms of student selection mechanisms. Out of pocket expenses of private high schools can be
considerable amount in the family budget.40 Estimation results show that students from private
high schools tend to choose private colleges more than students from public high schools. These
results suggest that socioeconomic status have significant effects on college type choices.
The model (7) in table 2.7 reports QMLE results obtained from the survey sample. The corre-
lation coefficient between choice and score formation residuals is still significant, while its mag-
nitude is smaller. This specification shows that even financial factors are controlled which can be
considered the most important criteria in the private college choice, score formation strategies and
college choice are still significantly related. This result is a substantial finding for the preference
effect on the score formation strategies.
2.5.2.2 Majors
The competitiveness differences across college majors is presented in Table 2.4. This section
presents student behavior analysis under this information. Table 2.8 presents estimation results
when the endogeneity of score formation is not taken into account. Table 2.9 reports estimation
results of QMLE estimation results for selected major preferences with endogenous entrance exam
score.
In Table 2.8, the major choice is significantly affected from the entrance exam scores of col-
lege applicants. Medical schools are selected by higher scored students in comparison to other
majors. In addition, gender plays a significant role in major choice after scores are controlled for.
Female students prefer medical school and mathematics departments, while male students prefer
engineering departments.41
39Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Buser et al. (2014) analyze competitiveness difference between female and
male students. They find that women shy away from competition. This may be another reason behind the difference
in male and female students performance apart from their differences in preferences for colleges.
40In 2005, the average cost of attending a private high school in Ankara (the capital of Turkey) corresponds 14
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Table 2.8: QMLE result for major choice without endogenous college entrance exam score
Medical School Engineering Math
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
College Exam Score 14.31 0.22 1.39 0.04 4.17 0.05
Female 0.23 0.01 -0.70 0.01 0.10 0.01
Constant -14.91 0.27 -0.97 0.10 -5.26 0.11
High School FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 110,807 110,807 110,807
Notes: Estimation results with full set of regressors is presented in Appendix D in Table A.30.
Table 2.9: QMLE results for major choice with endogenous college entrance exam score
Medical School Engineering Math
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
College Exam Score 13.21 0.24 3.26 0.09 0.09 0.14
Female 0.18 0.01 -0.65 0.01 0.02 0.01
Constant -14.10 0.30 -2.45 0.11 -1.88 0.16
High School FE Yes Yes Yes
ρ 0.11 0.01 -0.17 0.01 0.35 0.01
Obs 110,807 110,807 110,807
Notes: Standard errors are calculated from bootstrap simulations with 100 replications. Estimation
results with full set of regressors is presented in Appendix D in Table A.31.
According to table 2.9, major choice and college entrance exam score formation are signifi-
cantly related. In addition to students who have higher scores on the college exam more likely to
choose medical schools, there is a positive correlation between medical school choice and college
entrance exam score formation equations’ residuals. This result indicates that students who has
higher inclination to choose medical school put more effort into college score formation than the
others. A similar case is also observed in mathematics major choices. On the other hand, the re-
sults for the engineering departments are not representing the similar pattern. Even though students
who have higher scores choose engineering departments, there is a negative correlation between
the choice and score formation equations’ residuals.42
months of minimum monthly wage.
41Gender differences in major choice is documented in many other college-major choice settings in the literature.
Among many others, Wiswall and Zafar (2014) and Zafar (2013) show gender gaps in major choice in the US.
42Table A.32 reports the average cutoff percentiles of engineering majors by private and public colleges. The
difference in the competitiveness levels in the private and public colleges may be the one of the the underlying reasons
for this result. However, Medical schools departments are predominantly offered by public colleges. Therefore, the
competitiveness differences of these majors are less diverse.
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2.5.2.3 College locations
In order to understand location and distance preferences on college admissions preparation
strategies, students’ location choices from their submitted ROLs are analyzed in this section. Table
2.10 presents estimation results of fraction of the same city choices in their ROLs under 3 different
specifications. I restrict the sample with the students from cities that are not from the biggest three
cities and their neighbors. By this way, I can analyze students’ same city preferences where the
competition for these colleges are differentiated from the colleges in the biggest cities.
Table 2.10: QMLE results for the same city choice under different specifications
(1) (2) (3)
(Frac-QMLE) (Frac-QMLE) (Frac-QMLE)
Model Exo. Endo. Endo.
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
College Exam Score -0.67 0.06 1.06 0.38 · ·
Scaled HS GPA · · · · 0.49 0.39
Female 0.13 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.05
Constant 0.03 0.17 -1.37 0.43 -0.49 0.55
High School FE Yes Yes Yes
ρ -0.15 0.03 -0.16 0.08
Obs 37150 37150 13722
Notes: I only consider students from cities that are not from the biggest 3 cities and their neighbor cities.
Standard errors are calculated from bootstrap simulations with 100 replications for models (2) and (3).
According to first specification that presents fractional response QMLE results without en-
dogenous college entrance exam score, students who obtain lower scores from the college entrance
exam choose colleges in the same cities. On the other hand, the second model that presents QMLE
results with endogenous college entrance exam score show the opposite case. There is also an
analogous result in the model (3) where scaled high school GPA replace college entrance score.
In addition, ρ is significant and negative in sign in both model (2) and (3) which indicates that
same city preferences for small cities decrease motivation for obtaining higher scores from college
entrance exam.
Another interesting result from table 2.10 is the heterogeneity between male and female stu-
dents’ same city choices. Female students are choosing colleges in the same cities significantly
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more than male students. This result is another basic evidence for the heterogeneity in college
choice.
2.5.3 Variance decomposition in college entrance exam score formation
The significant effects of college type, major and location preferences on college exam score
formation strategies have been shown in the previous subsections. In this subsection, I decompose
the variation of the college entrance exam scores to quantify the overall effect of preferences in the
score formation strategies.
Measuring variation of the preference effect in the score formation requires a special setup
because these effects are part of the unobservables in the college admissions criteria’s equations.
Consider a college entrance admissions criterion that is the average of at least two scores;
p˜t = hγ+η+ et where t = 1, . . . ,T ≥ 2
where h denotes high school entrance exam scores. η denotes unobservable preference factor
which includes all preference components. et denotes exogenous shock in the admissions criteria
scores. Assume that e ⊥ η ,h and ei ⊥ e j where i 6= j. In addition, (e˜) has normal distribution,
where e˜ = e+η . If there is an consistent estimator for γ43, I can estimate the variance of η using
the residuals of admissions criteria scores.
Σ=
 var(e˜1) cov(e˜1, e˜2)
cov(e˜1, e˜2) var(e˜2)
=
var(e1)+ var(η) var(η)
var(η) var(e2)+ var(η)

where Σ denotes variance-covariance matrix of (e˜). Since these matrix can be estimated by the
residuals from the admissions criteria scores, I reach variances of η ,e1,e2.44
The results show that in the college entrance exam scores; 16%, 41% of the variations come
43I use the most conservative estimates for γ from the econometrics specifications in the subsections above.
44The distribution of η can be estimated with non-parametric method developed by Li and Vuong (1998). This
method is applied in auction setting Li et al. (2000) and earning dynamics Bonhomme and Robin (2010).
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from preference heterogeneity and high school entrance score respectively. The majority of the
variation comes from other independent factors that may include the exam day shock consists of
43%. For the scaled high school GPA score; preference, high school entrance score, and other
factors variations are 41%, 54% and 5% respectively. These results shows that preferences are an
important part of the college admission criteria score formation strategies. In addition, there are
considerable amount other independent factors’ effect on college entrance exam scores.45
2.5.4 Discussion: Affirmative action policies with endogenous entrance scores
I discuss the college admissions model to explore counterfactual questions of interest in the
affirmative ac- tion policies for the college admissions. First, how do affirmative action policies
affect student admissions preparation strategies under the same preference and competition struc-
ture? Second, how should college admissions policies be designed to take preference effects on
admission scores into account?
I first explore how affirmative action (AA) policies affect students’ preparation strategies. The
main rationale behind the affirmative action policies is creating incentives to increase admissions
into selective colleges for students from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds or minorities.
In my setting, these policies can be considered as cost reduction tools of obtaining score by pro-
viding preferential treatment in college entrance score formation. In other words, a student i obtain
a score p˜i but in the matching stage her score is treated as d p˜i where d > 1 under an affirmative ac-
tion policy.46 Thus p˜ replaced with p˜/d in the cost function in equation 2.4 for the treated student’s
optimization. The consequence of AA policies, a treated student’s strategy for college admissions
exam preparation can be affected in two ways. First, the treated student finds the same colleges
optimal but because of new cost structure, she does not need to put the same effort as before. Sec-
45In order to decompose the variation of admission scores and preferences in the submission of ROLs, I run naive
regressions from selected choice variables that are constructed from ROLs. Table A.33 reports the explained variations
of the selected choice variables by admission scores, gender, high school type and city dummies.
46Bodoh-Creed and Hickman (2016) show that under large college admission contests, two common families of
affirmative action policies, admission preference and quota, have the same sets of equilibria. Using this result, I do not
investigate different AA policies.
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ond, under new cost of obtaining structure the treated student starts to find different colleges from
another contest sets are favored and changes her preparation strategy accordingly. Even though
both strategies increase expected utility of the treated students, their matching outcomes can be
fairly different. The existence of the first case is the main reason for the reduction in the admission
score based AA policies’ effectiveness that is aiming to increase a group of students admissions
for targeted colleges, where these colleges are not preferred from some of the students from the
designated group.
Given that student valuations for colleges can substantially affect college entrance exam prepa-
ration strategies, I next turn to explore the preference intervention effects on college admission
process. The importance of preference intervention for different socioeconomic groups is to intro-
duce more information about college and major effects on future labor market outcomes as well
as lifetime earnings. This intervention can be considered as information provision about the col-
lege and majors. As it is observed from college and major choices in Turkey, there is significant
variation in choice patterns of different groups of the society.47 The choice heterogeneity among
different groups in the society is not only originated from preference differences but also infor-
mational difference about the opportunities of selected education paths48 as well as other choice
preferences such as risk. Disparities in college and major choice differences between children from
low- and high-income families and genders underscore the importance of policies that raise the se-
lection and preparation issues among disadvantaged students. Therefore, influencing preferences
or designing college supply by taking students’ preferences into account can be applied as a new
type of admission policies to improve outcomes of students from disadvantaged socioeconomic
and information backgrounds.
Specifically, the estimation results from the empirical application points the heterogeneity be-
tween male and female which is a notable topic in the affirmative action policies in the college
47Major choice difference and college location differences are considerably different between male and female stu-
dents. In addition, heterogeneity in major choice from different socioeconomic backgrounds indicates the preference
heterogeneity among various social groups.
48Among others, Saygin (2013) and Caner and Okten (2010) investigate gender and socioeconomic factor effects
on major choices in Turkey.
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admissions. Female students choose the colleges from their hometowns more likely, while choose
private colleges less likely. Moreover, female and male students major choices are different than
each others on average. I also observe that female students’ college entrance exam scores are lower
than males on average, while high school GPA is the opposite case.49 Since student abilities are
controlled with the exogenous test scores in the empirical application, divergences in college exam
results and choices are expected to be related with different preferences between male and female
students. These findings suggest that preference differences have substantial effects in the college
entrance exam preparation strategies.
To fix ideas, let’s consider an hypothetical affirmative action policy example related with the
female students’ location choices. Female students tend to choose college in their hometowns
more in Turkey. The policymaker wants to increase gender diversity from different regions in the
selective colleges and consider an admission preference rule50 for female students in the distant
locations and only feasible for colleges that are away from their hometowns. If a competent female
student who is far from selective college cities prefers to be assigned with a college in her home-
town, the proposed AA policy does not affect her college admissions’ strategy if the treatment does
not lower her cost sufficiently. Under these conditions, admission preference policies that aim to
redesign college admissions process are not effective to increase diversity in selective colleges if
the majority of female students choose colleges in their hometowns because of the preference rea-
sons. On the other hand, an alternative affirmative action policy that increases female students’
college valuations for targeted by providing opportunity information, better college environment
that decreases concern of families or financial aid incentives may influence female students college
admissions process strategies and increases the likelihood of targeted admissions outcomes.
As it can been seen from the example above, intervening college admissions process by pro-
viding preferential treatment on student priorities does not lead targeted results directly for the
admissions outcomes. Heterogeneity in college preferences among candidates changes the effec-
49Summary statistics of college applicants by gender can be found in the table A.21.
50Admission preference rule is a markup function and students’ score are transformed according to markup. In
other words, students who are benefiting from the policy are repositioned according to markup function.
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tiveness of score oriented AA policies since there is no general consensus of college preferences
among students. Furthermore, distortions which are the results of AA policies would lead worse
outcomes for the untreated students. Consequently, policies that do not take the preference effects
on score formations into account may cause welfare losses rather than targeted improvements,
which is an open question to be answered.
2.6 Conclusion
College admissions have two important stages; preparations for the admissions and the match-
ing between students and colleges. The analysis of college admissions have been focused on only
one part of the process under simplification assumptions for the other part. In this paper, I ana-
lyze college admissions preparations and student-college matching stages together with the help
of large matching market model. My college-student matching model captures student behavior
where they endogenously choose their priorities for the college admissions by obtaining a col-
lege entrance exam score. Under the continuum of students assumption, the matching outcome
is approximated with a distribution of college cutoff scores. Using this result, I model student’s
behavior in the college admissions preparation stage as an individual optimization problem over
risky investment projects.
Characterization of the college admissions process as an individual investment problem allows
me to analyze student preferences effects on college admissions preparations. To capture student
preference information from the submitted ROLs, I introduce college contest sets. In this frame-
work, colleges are partitioned into mutually exclusive sets according to their observable character-
istics. If there is difference in the aggregate competitiveness between the contest sets, I can identify
the effects of students’ college preferences on the entrance exam preparations because getting to
be admitted to colleges in different contest sets can be done with different strategies.
In the econometric framework, I develop a simple econometric method to analyze the effect of
students’ college preferences on college exam performance. With this method, I analyze college
admissions in Turkey in the empirical application. The estimation results show that there are
significant relationships between college choices from different contest sets and college entrance
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exam preparation strategies under different specifications. The differences not only change the
interpretation in terms of magnitude of the effect of score variables on choice, but also change the
direction of the effect. Consequently, disregarding endogenous admission preparation strategies in
the college admissions and public school choice models to estimate students’ preferences is not
innocuous.
The significance of the relationship between choice and score formation suggests the evalu-
ation of affirmative action policies under the endogenous score formation framework. College
admissions data from Turkey show that there are variations in college choices from different so-
cial groups. It has been shown that students’ college preferences change their college admissions
preparation strategies, therefore affirmative action policies that are only designed to influence stu-
dents’ behaviors with the admission score policies lose their effectiveness. This finding supports
researches (among others, Hoxby and Avery (2013), Goodman (2016)) that investigate the differ-
ence in college choice of high-achieving low-income students from high-income counterparts.
A further structural analysis of the college admissions data to estimate students’ college pref-
erences from rank order lists taking endogenous score formation into account would be a natural
direction of future research. This extension would allow for a valid prediction for students’ col-
lege preference estimations rather than depending on results that only from the truncated rank
order lists. This is also important in policy design perspective such that estimation results provide
the relationship between college admissions preparation and college choice. Thus, a policymaker
can design admission policies using preference information rather than only restricting itself with
admissions criteria as the only policy tool.
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CHAPTER 3
Exploring College major Choices:
Does Marriage Matter?
with Tong Li
3.1 Introduction
Considering education as a premarital investment in addition to human capital investment is
not a new phenomenon in the economics literature after the seminal paper Becker (1973). The
relationship between marriage market and education decisions are investigated in many papers
(e.g., Iyigun and Walsh (2007), Chiappori et al. (2009), Gousse´ et al. (2017), among others) and
the effects of marriage expectations on students’ college participation decisions are quantified em-
pirically for young women (Ge (2011)). To this end, one can consider the effects of marriage
expectations on decisions in college education (e.g., major and minor choices, duration of higher
education, activities during the college period) because subsequent household - labor market time
allocation and expected lifestyles are strongly associated with these choices. In this context, it is
also important to examine the effects of marriage expectations on decisions in college education to
design better labor market, education, and marriage interrelated policies.
In this paper, we empirically investigate the effects of marriage expectations on college ma-
jor choices. Differences in marriage expectations have potential impacts on college major choice
because college majors differ in many aspects including expected lifestyle and occupations. Stu-
dents may consider expected “work-life-family” time allocations when they are choosing majors.
Moreover, data drawn from the 2013 survey year of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1997 (NLSY97) cohorts document differences in marriage realizations of college graduates from
different majors.1 Selection of a major with different marriage expectations can present one po-
tential explanation for why there are observed differences in the marriage outcomes. Therefore, an
1At the time of the survey, the mean marriage rate of Education major’s graduates exceeded the overall average
rate (57%) by more than 10%, while Computer and Information Science major graduates’ mean marriage rate was
10% lower than the overall average rate.
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empirical procedure is required to understand motivational differences of college students’ major
choices and test the effects of marriage expectations on major choices. In addition, understanding
motivational differences of college major choice is an important part of the talent allocation within
the economy and composition of skills in the labor market. In particular, apart from the pecuniary
incentives as a solution to shortages in various skills in the market, marriage friendly benefits may
lead to an efficient allocation of skills.
We propose a copula-based econometric framework that incorporates multinomial college ma-
jor choices into marriage realizations to test the effects of marriage market expectations on col-
lege major choices. Since marriage expectations are unobservable in our framework, we adopt a
selection-on-unobservables model to test their effects from data. Econometric models with selec-
tivity have been also used in self selection models with multinomial choice cases (e.g., Lee (1983)
and Dahl (2002)), where outcome variables are continuous. This paper develops a self selection
model with a binary outcome variable, which is marriage realization in our application. The pro-
posed approach could be easily applied in many cases where the outcome variable is a binary
response and there are multiple treatments affect the outcome variable.
The existing empirical literature on education decisions generally considers the effects of ex-
pected earnings. The seminal paper by Willis and Rosen (1979) shows the positive impact of
the expected earnings on college education under the rational expectation assumption. Keane and
Wolpin (1997) and following papers Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), Belzil and Hansen (2002) es-
timate structural dynamic models of schooling decisions and find significant positive impacts of
expected earnings on college participation. More recently, Arcidiacono (2004) and (2005) focus
on the effect of expected earnings on major choice with sequential models of college attendance,
accounting for both the demand and supply sides of schooling.2 As a consequence, it is impor-
tant to control expected earnings’ effects on college major choice to test the effects of marriage
expectations.
More recent studies on college major choice focus on non-pecuniary motivations. Beffy et al.
2Kirkeboen et al. (2016) investigate the payoffs to different types of postsecondary education in a special identifi-
cation framework benefiting from Norwegian education system.
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(2012) examine college major choice and find a small but positive significant effect of expected
earnings in the context of French universities. Their results show that non-pecuniary factors are
the main determinants. Wiswall and Zafar (2015) study the determinants of college major choice
using experimentally generated beliefs and find that heterogeneous tastes are the dominant factors
in the choice. Based on recent findings of the effects of heterogeneous tastes and the anticipated
impact of the marriage expectations on major choice, an empirical procedure can be proposed to
test the significance of the relationship between major choice and marriage outcomes. To the best
of our knowledge, this is one of the first papers in the literature that investigate the relationship
between college major choice and marriage expectations using individuals’ college major choices
and marriage realizations.3
The papers that focus on female labor market outcomes have also related results to our paper.
Keane and Wolpin (2010) examine women’s sequential school attendance, work, marriage, fertil-
ity, and welfare-program participation decisions. They show that marriage market opportunities
change schooling decisions. Flabbi and Moro (2012) analyze the job flexibility effects on female
labor market outcomes and they show that wage and schooling differences between male and fe-
male may be related to flexibility preferences. Bronson (2014) studies the gender differences in
major choices and she finds that women prefer degrees which provide more “work-family flexibil-
ity”. The findings from these papers suggest that differentiation in the “work-life-family” balance
preferences between female and males may be originated from differences in their marriage ex-
pectations (or marriage related preferences) which may also affect their major choices.
Although we focus on US college graduates in this paper, the same method can be readily
applied to data from other countries. Currently, 58% of college graduates are female and the
proportions of the female students across majors vary much.4 Figure A.8 presents the historical
changes in the college participation and proportion of degrees awarded to female across majors
3Bicakova and Jurajda (2016) and Bicˇa´kova´ and Jurajda (2017) are the two closest papers that investigate the
relationship between college majors and marriage, however, their focuses are gender composition in majors, early
fertility, and homogamy within the majors.
4Note that the proportion of full time workers is lower for female graduates. This may be another sign of motiva-
tional differences in college attendance and college major choice. For detailed information, see the National Survey
of College Graduates.
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in the US. Education and Health related majors are dominated by females, while Science, Engi-
neering and Business are male-dominated majors. Motivated by these differences, we also analyze
the gender differences in the effect of marriage expectations on major choices. This is a natu-
ral direction to investigate because male and female are the two sides of the traditional marriage.
We apply our method to the data provided from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth. This
dataset includes detailed information of participants’ demographic backgrounds, marriage realiza-
tions as well as their high school and college related variables. After students’ characteristics are
controlled for, we find that graduates from Education major marry more. Females marry earlier,
while male marry later. In order to investigate the effect of marriage expectations on college major
choices, we compare average treatment effects of chosen majors on marriage realizations with and
without selection-on-unobservable specifications. Our test results show that the effects of mar-
riage expectations cannot be rejected, even after individual characteristics and expected earnings
are controlled for. Moreover, these findings are changing between male and female students.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric framework for college
major choice and marriage realizations. The testing procedure and specification of the model are
discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the data and summary statistics. In Section 5, we present
preliminary estimation results and then apply our proposed test. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Econometric Framework
After graduating from high school, students, who continue to college, are choosing majors
to specialize. There are many determinants in college major choice. The characteristics of the
chosen major are important factors for shaping graduates’ future life outcomes, and therefore they
are expected to be considered in the choice. In our paper, we focus on the effects of marriage
expectations on college major choice. Our model allows that each student has personal marriage
expectations in addition to the other personal heterogeneities. The personal marriage expectations,
which obviously affect the marriage decisions and realizations of college graduates, also enter into
the college major decision problem. Then, the econometric problem turns to test the significance
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of the effects of marriage expectations on college-major choices from observed college majors
choices and marriage realizations.
The main challenge for identification is the possibility of the other unobservable factors’ si-
multaneous effects on marriage realizations and college major choice. Even though marriage ex-
pectations is the underlying component that is considered in this paper, there are other potential
factors, (e.g., ability, pecuniary motivations, and labor market preferences) may have effects on
both college major choice and marriage realization. In our econometric specification, we control
these variations either using well accepted measures5 or adopting standard assumptions6 which
help us to construct control variables from the data.
3.2.1 Major choice
In the US higher education system, each college student must choose an area of concentration
during the early stages of undergraduate education.7 We assume that there are J majors, which
is indexed with j, and a college student must choose one of them. In the model, we consider
that major choice depends on the student’s expectations about graduating from the corresponding
major. These expectations include labor market outcomes, marriage market outcomes, and the
other taste variables. In order to keep the model simple, we only consider undergraduate education
level and exclude decisions for continuation to higher degrees.8
Student i derives Vi j utility from choosing major d j ( j = 1, . . . ,J). We assume this utility is
a composition of two elements, namely, pecuniary value and non-pecuniary value, denoted as vpi j
and vni j, respectively. Pecuniary value, v
p
i j, is the expected labor market earnings conditional on
graduating from major d j. We normalize the effect of the pecuniary motivation to 1. Pecuniary
value of major d j can be written as
5In our estimations, we use first three term of college GPAs of students to capture ability effects.
6With the rational expectation assumption, we construct potential wage and working conditions of selected majors.
7Major selection process differs in many countries in terms of timing. In some countries, students are accepted to
higher education institutions with their major choices in the admissions process.
8There is no duration of education decision made by students. This restriction is compatible with our data since
less than 5 percent of students have graduate degrees. Extension with the further degrees can be easily applied to our
testing procedure.
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vpi j = E(wi j) (3.1)
where wi j denotes the expected average earning associated with major j for student i. By following
the empirical literature, we adopt the rational expectation assumption for characterizing students’
expected earnings. In other words, students are assumed to know their expected earnings for
graduating from each major choice given the labor market conditions.9 Therefore, we can allow
earning heterogeneities with a simple and widely accepted methodology in the literature.
The second part of the utility consists of all other components apart from the pecuniary value
associated with major d j. In other words, it includes student’s expectations about future lifestyles,
tastes for the majors, and their marriage expectations. Therefore, we can write non-pecuniary value
of major j for individual i in a simple additive form as
vni j = ziβ j +ui j (3.2)
where zi represents student i’s characteristics (including gender, school performance variables,
race, and regional characteristics), β j is the corresponding parameter vector associated with the ma-
jor d j. ui j is the unobservable part of the equation and it includes all unobservable non-pecuniary
factors such that marriage expectations, leisure preferences, so and so forth.
Student i chooses major di j∗ which gives the highest expected utility.
di j∗ = arg max j∈{1,...,J}Vi j (3.3)
where Vi j = v
p
i j + v
n
i j.
9In our estimation, we use average earnings to estimate counterfactual the expected earnings for other majors.
Under the assumption of observable characteristics are independent of unobserved ability, we can predict expected
earnings in different majors based on our estimation. In this way, we simply assume that unobserved ability affects
expected earnings in different majors proportionally.
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3.2.2 Marriage
We assume that individuals have marriage expectations and these affect their marriage out-
comes. Specifically, if an individual has higher marriage expectations, one can expect to see that
individual has the higher chance of getting married.
It is expected that marriage outcomes are combination of many other factors, which are not
restricted with the person-specific marriage expectations. We prefer to write a parsimonious mar-
riage outcome equation, instead of modeling it explicitly.10 Therefore, we write college graduate
i’s marriage outcome equation as
mi = 1(xiγ+
J
∑
j=1
di jτ j + εi > 0) (3.4)
where mi is a marriage dummy which takes one if the individual is get married within the sample
period. Marriage dummies capture realized outcomes, and therefore our results can be explained
as revealed preferences rather than stated preferences.
We control observable individual characteristics (age, racial and regional characteristics, . . .),
which is indicated by zi. di j is an indicator for individual i’s major choice j. It becomes 1 if
the individual i chooses major di j in her college education. By construction at least one of the
major dummies has to be one and it must be the only nonzero dummy. These dummies control the
effects of a chosen major on marriage outcomes. They also capture the dynamic effects of chosen
majors. In other words, they include major specific effects in the marriage market.11 γ and τi j are
unknown parameters to be estimated. εi represents the unobservable part of the equation 3.4. It
includes personal marriage expectations as we explained above and idiosyncratic terms in marriage
outcomes.
10The two-sided nature of marriage directs us to choose a simple structure rather than a complicated model. In
addition, partner search models that are used for marriage models have similar structure and assumptions.
11These dummies control differentiated demands in the marriage market in terms of majors (occupations). For
example, if there is a higher demand for Education major graduates to get married, the Education major dummy
absorbs this effect.
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3.3 Setup for Estimation
3.3.1 Model specification
According to our econometric framework, the binary marriage outcome and the college-major
choice equations take the following forms
mi = 1(xiγ+
J
∑
j=1
di jτ j + εi > 0) (3.5)
di j∗ = arg maxk∈{1,...,J}(E(wik)+ ziβk +uik) (3.6)
Let Ii be a polychotomous variable with values 1 to J and Ii = j if major j is chosen. Following
Lee (1983) and Dahl (2002), Ii = j if and only if
E(wi j)+ ziβ j +ui j ≥ maxk∈{{1,...,J}− j}y∗ik
where y∗ik = E(wik)+ ziβk +uik. Then,
ziβ j +E(wi j)≥ ξi j ≡ maxk∈{{1,...,J}− j}y∗ik−ui j (3.7)
We prefer to follow a maximum likelihood estimation framework given that marriage is a bi-
nary response variable and major selection is a multinomial choice. Adopting normal and logis-
tic distributions are standard in the literature, while, our model additionally takes selection-on-
unobservables into account and offer an estimation methodology accordingly.
Constructing the likelihood function in this environment requires to derive Pr(mi = 0, Ii =
j|xi,zi,wi) and Pr(mi = 1, Ii = j|xi,zi,wi). We assume that the marginal distribution of εi denoted
by F1(·) is standard normal Φ(·). The marginal distribution of ξi j, F2(·), is considered under two
specifications. The results are either derived by assuming logistic distribution or approximated
assuming a joint normal for uik, k = 1, . . . ,J. Then for the joint distribution of ε and ξ denoted by
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F(ε,ξ ), by Sklar’s result Sklar (1959), there exits a unique copula function C(·, ·) s.t. F(ε,ξ ) =
C(F1(ε),F2(ξ )).12 Then,
Pr(mi = 0, Ii = j|xi,zi,wi) =Pr(εi ≤−xiγ− τ j,ξi j ≤ ziβ j +E(wi j))
=C(F1(−xiγ− τ j),F2(ziβ j +E(wi j)))
and,
Pr(mi = 1, Ii = j|xi,zi,wi) =Pr(Ii = j|xi,zi,wi)−Pr(mi = 0, Ii = j|xi,zi,wi)
=Pr(Ii = j|xi,zi,wi)−C(F1(−xiγ− τ j),F2(ziβ j +E(wi j)))
=F2(ziβ j)−C(F1(−xiγ− τ j),F2(ziβ j +E(wi j)))
There are two more steps are needed to derive an estimable equation. The first one is the deriva-
tion of F2(ziβ j +E(wi j)). If we assume that uik, k = 1, . . . ,J are distributed with jointly normal,
we can use GHK simulator after Geweke, Hajivassiliou, and Keane, which is found to be the most
reliable method for simulating normal rectangle probability among others (e.g., Hajivassiliou et al.
(1996)). Following Train (2009),
F2(ziβ j +E(wi j)) =Pr(ξi j < ziβ j +E(wi j))
=Pr(ziβ j +E(wi j +ui j ≥ ziβk +E(wik)+uik ∀k 6= j)
=Pr(V˜ik j + u˜ik j ≤ 0 ∀k 6= j)
=
∫
1(V˜ik j + u˜ik j ≤ 0 ∀k 6= j)φ(u˜i j)du˜i j
=
∫
u˜i j∈Ai j
φ(u˜i j)du˜i j
12Lee (1983) uses a Gaussian copula.
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where V˜ik j = zi(βk−β j)+E(wi j)−E(wik) and u˜ik j = uik−ui j. Ai j ≡ {u˜i j s.t. V˜ik j + u˜ik j ≤ 0 ∀k 6=
j}. This probability is a (J-1) dimensional integral over error differences Ai j. This can be approxi-
mated by GHK simulator.
Instead of assuming normal distribution and approximating Pr(ξi j < ziβ j +E(wi j)), we can
derive F2(ziβ j +E(wi j)) by assuming multinomial logistic (MNL) distribution. MNL is the most
common specification in the multinomial choice models. Under MNL distribution, we can write
F2(·) as
F2(ziβ j) =
eziβ j+E(wi j)
1+∑J−1j=1 e
ziβ j+E(wi j)
Second, we need to derive Pr(mi = 0, Ii = j|xi,zi,wi) and Pr(mi = 1, Ii = j|xi,zi,wi) using
copula and F2(ziβ j +E(wi j)). Using Gaussian copula
C(F1(ε),F2(ξ )) = B(Φ−1(F1(ε)),Φ−1(F2(ξ ))|ρ)
where B denotes the bivariate normal distribution. This bivariate distribution assumes that the
transformed variables are jointly normal with zero means, unit variances, and correlation coeffi-
cient ρ . Then,
C(F1(−xiγ− τ j),F2(ziβ j +E(wi j))) = B(Φ−1(F1(−xiγ− τ j)),Φ−1(F2(ziβ j +E(wi j))))
= B(εi ≤−xiγ− τ j,ξi j ≤Φ−1(F2(ziβ j +E(wi j)))|x,z,w)
=Φ(εi ≤−xiγ− τ j|x,z,w)Φ(ξi j ≤Φ−1(F2(ziβ j +E(wi j)))|εi ≤−xiγ− τ j,x,z,w)
=Φ(−xiγ− τ j) 11−Φ(xiγ+ τ j)
∫ −(xiγ+τ j)
−∞
Φ[(Φ−1(F2(ziβ j +E(wi j)))+ρ jεi)/(1−ρ2j )1/2]φ(ε)dε
=
∫ −(xiγ+τ j)
−∞
Φ[(Φ−1(F2(ziβ j +E(wi j)))+ρ jεi)/(1−ρ2j )1/2]φ(ε)dε
Since we assume that F1(·)=Φ(·),Φ−1(F1(ε))= ε . Then, we can write the likelihood function
based on derivations we obtained above such that
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logL(β ,γ,τ,ρ) =
N
∑
i=1
J
∑
j=1
{1(Ii = j) log
∫ −(xiγ+τ j)
−∞
Φ[(Φ−1(F2(ziβ j + w˜i j))+ρ jεi)/(1−ρ2j )1/2]φ(ε)dε}(mi=0)
{1(Ii = j) log[F2(ziβ j + w˜i j)−
∫ −(xiγ+τ j)
−∞
Φ[(Φ−1(F2(ziβ j + w˜i j))+ρ jεi)/(1−ρ2j )1/2]φ(ε)dε]}(mi=1)
where w˜i j is the predicted wage for student i when she graduates from the major j.
Therefore, the model can be estimated by maximum likelihood methods. The parameters θ =
{β ,γ,τ,ρ} estimated by
θˆ = argmaxθ
N
∑
i
logL(β ,γ,τ,ρ)
3.4 Data
We estimate our econometric model using the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 97 cohort
(NLYS97). The NLSY97 Cohort is a longitudinal project that follows the lives of a sample of
American youth born between 1980 and 1984. There are 8,984 respondents in the sample that
were aged 12-17 when they were first interviewed in 1997. This ongoing cohort has been surveyed
15 times until 2013 and is now interviewed biennially.13 The project follows the participants’ life
starting from early ages, and therefore we can observe their schooling information, which includes
college major choices, after school histories, and marriage related information. Furthermore, this
database contains many individual covariates that are used to control observable heterogeneities in
our estimation procedure such as gender, age, race, regional characteristics, school performance,
earned income, and school characteristics.
We restrict our sample to survey participants who are graduated from higher education insti-
tutions. This restriction is compatible with the purpose of our study. Even though there are 8984
survey participants, the number of students that we have full information about the college major
13 The US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.nlsinfo.org
93
choice is only 1193, which is around 17 percent of the whole sample.14 Table 3.1 presents the
characteristics of male and female students in the data. It is important to note that the age structure
of our sample. NLYS97 follows people born between 1980 and 1984, meaning they were 29-33
when the last interview was conducted in 2013.
The female ratio of college graduates is 56% in our sample, which is close to the population
ratio (58%).15 The male participants of the NLYS97 sample is slightly higher than the females,
which may account for some differences in the graduate ratios. In terms of marriage outcomes,
there are observable differences between female and male graduates. The marriage rate is 5%
higher for female graduates and the first marriage for females is almost 10 months earlier. Under
the assumption that marriage is a legal contract between a man and a woman16, we expect to see
similar marriage outcomes between men and women. Heterogeneity in the time of the marriage
can be one explanation for this difference. In other words, male college graduates have higher
tendency to marry later than mid 30’s.17
Students’ performance measures are important in the major choice analysis. Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner (2014) show the differences between the initial beliefs at the time of the college
entrance about their final majors and the realized major choices. They find that the main reason of
this difference is the misperception about students’ own abilities to perform well. Therefore, it is
important to control students’ performances in first semesters in major choice. From the observed
performances in college, there are differences between male and female students. In particular,
female students have higher GPAs in the higher education. Similar pattern can also be observed in
the first three terms of college education.18 Performance measures are not only indicators of ability
for students to understand their capabilities, but also help them to identify their preferences and
talents, which provide directions for their major choices. Therefore, we include these measures in
14Note that the participation rate for higher education is lower than the population rate which is around 25% for the
2000’s. Because we only consider college graduates, the participation rate difference does not create problem in our
setting.
15National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics (2012).
16Data are also consistent with this definition too.
17The fertility concerns of females may lead them to marry earlier Zhang (2014).
18Similar controls also can be done with college admissions exam score like SAT and ACT and high school perfor-
mance measures. We do not include these variables in our analysis because of lack of sufficient data.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for all college graduates
Female(56%) Male(44%) Total =1193
Variables Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean SD Min Max
Marriage Dummy 0.61 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.59 0.49 0 1
Birth Year 2.65 1.36 2.70 1.43 2.67 1.39 0.08 5
Black 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.36 0.19 0.39 0 1
Hispanic 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36 0 1
White 0.62 0.49 0.69 0.46 0.65 0.48 0 1
Second Degree 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 0 1
Second College 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 0 1
Two Year 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0 1
Graduate School 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.11 0 1
Rural 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.68 0.47 0 1
North East 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 0 1
West 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.38 0 1
South 0.37 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.48 0 1
GPA Term 1 2.75 1.11 2.69 1.06 2.72 1.09 0 4
GPA Term 2 2.65 1.15 2.67 0.97 2.66 1.07 0 4
GPA Term 3 2.66 1.17 2.59 1.07 2.63 1.13 0 4
Overall GPA 2.95 0.72 2.83 0.70 2.90 0.72 0 4
Business 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39 0 1
Education 0.10 0.31 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.26 0 1
Computer & Eng. 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.35 0.08 0.27 0 1
Health 0.13 0.34 0.03 0.18 0.09 0.28 0 1
Income 2.08 1.20 2.54 1.51 2.28 1.36 0 13.12
our analysis.
In order to give a picture of the differences between college graduates and the remaining sam-
ple, we present summary statistics of full sample in Table A.43, which can be found in the Ap-
pendix. There are racial differences in terms of college participation. Whites’ college participation
rate is higher than Blacks and Hispanics. Also, students from the North have higher fraction of col-
lege graduates compared to students from the South and the West. Finally, if we look at marriage
outcomes, college graduates marry earlier and more in comparison to the non-college graduate
survey participants.
An important factor in major choice is the pecuniary motivation, which is examined extensively
for both the college participation decision and college major choice. Its significance is documented
in many different contexts. In order to see a general picture for college majors’ earning differences,
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Table 3.2: Earnings, full time working rates and marriage rates by college major
Wage Full time working rates Marriage Rate
Majors Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total
Business 10.85 11.18 11.04 0.83 0.91 0.88 0.60 0.54 0.57
Comp & Eng 11.06 11.31 11.25 0.90 0.95 0.94 0.61 0.59 0.60
Education 10.46 10.72 10.54 0.76 0.84 0.79 0.73 0.76 0.74
Health 10.82 11.16 10.88 0.75 0.88 0.77 0.66 0.56 0.65
Others 10.65 11.02 10.83 0.78 0.88 0.83 0.58 0.54 0.56
Total 10.73 11.14 10.95 0.80 0.91 0.86 0.60 0.56 0.58
we additionally present summary statistics from the National Study of College Graduates (NSCG)
surveys from 2003, 2010, 2013, which give statistics from larger samples. The National Survey of
College Graduates is a longitudinal biennial survey conducted since the 1970s that provides data
on the nation’s college graduates. These surveys sample individuals who are living in the United
States during the survey reference week, have at least a bachelor’s degree, and are under the age
of 76. Table 3.2 presents the log of the average earnings of college majors constructed from the
NSCG data. Computer Science and Engineering graduates have the highest earnings on average.
Education major graduates earnings are the lowest among all majors. Women have lower average
earnings in all majors but gender differences are slightly different between majors.
Table 3.2 also presents full time working rates and marriage rates from the NSGC data. Work-
ing rates are lower in Education and Health major graduates and they are less than 80 percent.
Computer science and Engineering, however, are the college majors that have the highest work-
ing rates. Full time working rate of college graduates from these majors is more than 94 percent.
Women’s full time working rates are lower than men’s independent of their majors. Marriage rates
of survey participants who are younger than 35 are presented in table 3.2. The marriage rates are
similar with the NLYS97 data across majors but the rates are slightly higher in the the NLYS97
than the NSCG.
College majors in the NLYS97 are coded according to 2010 College Course Map.19 We record
students’ majors according to their transcripts. In the case of a student has more than one college
19CCM, http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012162rev.pdf
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transcript, we chase the major which has the highest number credits. Table A.40 presents the
major choices of students in the sample. Business and related studies, Liberal Arts and Humanities,
Health and related programs, Education, Engineering, and Computer sciences are the most popular
majors in our sample. The dispersion of college majors in our sample is similar to the dispersion
in the population of college graduates. In the Appendix, Table A.42 presents fractions of college
majors among the US college graduates are shown for the years between 2001 and 2014.
In college graduate population, the distribution of majors between male and female students
shows divergences. There are many fields dominated by one gender and these patterns have not
changed over years. Similar divergences are also seen in our sample. In Education, Engineering,
Computer and Information Technologies, Health, and Business related programs the percentage
of female and male graduate differences are easily discernible from Table A.40. Business, Engi-
neering and related fields, Computer and Information Technologies are dominated by males, while
female students choose Education, Health and related fields and Liberal Art, Humanities majors
more.20 These ratios are not exactly the same but the differences in distribution of majors across
gender corresponds to population level differences.21
The marital status and the time of the marriage in terms of months are recorded in the NLYS97.
Table A.41 presents marital status of the NLYS97 participants who are graduated from college. Fe-
male graduates have 5 percent higher marriage rate than males.22 However, never married and not
cohabiting ratio is higher for male graduates. As a summary, we can say that male college gradu-
ates have lower marriage and cohabitation rate until their early 30’s and female college graduates
prefer to marry earlier.
Table A.41 shows the average marriage rate and the month of first marriage of college graduates
from different majors. According to Table A.41, graduates from Education major have the highest
marriage rate on average, 71 percent of the graduates have experienced at least one marriage before
20In addition, we find a similar distribution of college-majors in the NSCG data.
21For detailed information about gender differences across majors, see Bronson (2014).
22The NLYS97 keeps cohabitation information too. Males cohabitation rates are higher than females, but we don’t
take cohabitation into account our evaluation because of a lack of legal foundation. Moreover, responsibilities of being
married and having a child is not common in cohabitation which changes our evaluation.
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33. Computer and Information Sciences major graduates have the lowest rate, only 46 percent of
graduates had been married by the time of the survey. Also, some of the majors have considerable
differences in marriage rates between females and males. The marriage rate of female graduates
from Biological sciences is 48 percent, while it is 67 percent for males. An opposite scenario
occurs for Business major graduates; females’ marriage rate is 63 percent, males’ is 50 percent.
In this section, we present the differences in major choice and marriage outcomes of college
graduates. The variation in marriage outcomes combined with the variation in the major choices
motivate us to examine the relationship of these decisions. However, there are many factors that
can affect in both the marriage outcome and college-major choice. In the next section, we will
control other characteristics of participants to reach reliable estimates.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Major choice and marriage realizations under exogeneity
Table 3.3 presents estimation results for college major choice under the multinomial logistic
specification. We focus on 4 majors; Education, Business, Health, and Computer&Engineering
because they are the most popular choices in our sample and also show divergences in terms of
male-female proportions. In order to control pecuniary motivations, we use counterfactual wage
estimates that are predicted using sample data and the additional exogenous variations.23 We nor-
malize the coefficient of expected earning to 1, therefore we can interpret result in terms of earn-
ings. The gender has the most significant and quantitively large impact on major choices. Female
students are significantly less likely to choose Computer Science and Engineering majors, while
they are significantly more likely to choose Education and Health majors. Within the first three
terms’ GPAs, performance measures have only significant effect on Computer Science and Engi-
neering major choice. Students who have higher GPAs prefer Computer Science and Engineering
majors more.
23The estimation result for earnings is presented by table A.39 in the Appendix
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Table 3.3: Multinomial logistic regression results for major choice
Education Business Health Computer & Eng
Est. Std. err Est. Std. err Est. Std. err Est. Std. err
Female 1.19 0.28 -0.08 0.16 1.44 0.28 -1.52 0.27
GPA term 1 -0.13 0.12 -0.02 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.12
GPA term 2 0.16 0.14 -0.01 0.09 -0.14 0.12 0.29 0.15
GPA term 3 0.18 0.13 -0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 -0.09 0.12
Rural -0.51 0.25 -0.14 0.17 -0.40 0.23 0.28 0.26
West -0.40 0.36 -0.99 0.29 -0.56 0.37 -0.76 0.38
South -0.14 0.30 0.00 0.20 -0.07 0.28 0.02 0.29
North East -0.70 0.37 -0.32 0.23 -0.47 0.32 -0.25 0.32
Black -0.29 0.38 -0.10 0.22 0.11 0.30 -0.19 0.34
Hispanic 0.05 0.36 0.12 0.24 -0.41 0.39 0.07 0.34
Birth month 0.18 0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.08
Constant -3.11 0.60 -0.67 0.36 -2.70 0.55 -2.73 0.55
This table presents multinomial logistic regression results of students’ major choices. The coefficient of the
expected wage is normalized to 1, therefore coefficients can be interpreted as earnings.
The results show that regional differences and city characteristics have significant impacts on
college major choice. Students from the rural areas are less likely to choose Education and Health
majors. It is also worth noting that, students from the West are significantly less likely to choose
Business and Computer & Engineering majors.
If we assume that there are no unobservable factors that affect college major choice and mar-
riage outcome simultaneously or independence of any unobservable factors, we can estimate the
marriage outcome equation by using binary response data methods. These results provide a bench-
mark to see the differences of college graduates with various majors. Table 3.4 presents estimation
result under 3 different specifications (LPM, Probit, Logit). There is a significant difference in the
marriage realizations between the graduates from Education major and the other majors’ graduates.
In all specifications, Education major graduates’ marriage rates is higher than others.
There are other significant differences in marriage outcomes. Female graduates marry signif-
icantly more than male graduates, which can also be interpreted as female graduates are married
earlier. Age is another significant determinant of marriage. Marriage realizations is increasing
with age.
The regions of student have also significant impacts on marriage outcomes of college graduates.
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Table 3.4: Estimation results without selection into account
LPM Probit Logit
Estimate Std. err Estimate Std. err Estimate Std. err
Female 0.06 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.27 0.13
Birth month -0.05 0.01 -0.14 0.03 -0.23 0.04
Hispanic -0.07 0.04 -0.20 0.11 -0.32 0.18
Black -0.27 0.04 -0.71 0.10 -1.16 0.17
West -0.03 0.04 -0.09 0.12 -0.14 0.20
South 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.16
North East -0.10 0.04 -0.27 0.11 -0.44 0.18
Education 0.13 0.05 0.38 0.16 0.62 0.26
Business -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.16
Health 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.23
Com& Eng -0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.14 -0.10 0.23
Constant 0.77 0.04 0.73 0.12 1.17 0.19
This table presents regression results for marriage realizations under 3 specifications; Linear Probability
Model, Probit, and Logit
Compared to college graduates from the North Central, college graduates originated from North
East postpone their marriages significantly. In terms of race, Blacks marry less compare to Whites,
but there is no significant differences between Hispanics and Whites.
Table 3.5 presents gender specific results. The left (right) side of the table shows parameter
estimates of marriage realization equation for female (male) college graduates. There is a signifi-
cant impact of graduating from Education major on the marriage realizations for females. Female
college graduates with Education major have significantly higher marriage rates, while there is no
similar effect found for male graduates. Regional differences and city level characteristics have
stronger impacts on marriage realizations for male graduates. College graduates from the North
East postpone their marriages significantly for both genders.
3.5.2 Testing the effect of marriage expectations on college major choice
In this section, we apply our proposed econometric procedure that is explained in Section 3
to NLYS97 sample. In the proposed framework, unobservable marriage expectations factor in the
college major choice and marriage realizations are allowed to be correlated. In this way, we can
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Table 3.5: Regression results of marriage outcome variables separated by gender
Female Male
LPM Probit Logit LPM Probit Logit
Education 0.15 0.46 0.75 0.03 0.08 0.12
(0.06) (0.18) (0.31) (0.12) (0.31) (0.51)
Business 0.04 0.12 0.19 -0.06 -0.17 -0.28
(0.05) (0.14) (0.23) (0.06) (0.15) (0.24)
Health 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.21 0.37
(0.06) (0.16) (0.26) (0.12) (0.33) (0.55)
Com& Eng -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14
(0.11) (0.30) (0.49) (0.06) (0.16) (0.26)
This table presents separate estimation results for each gender. We only report the estimated coefficients
for college majors, however, the same set of regressor that is used in table 3.4 is used.
control the potential effects of marriage expectations on the college major choice and compare
the results with the exogenous case. In other words, after controlling potential channels that are
expected to have impacts on both college major choices and marriage realizations, if there is no
marriage expectations’ effects on major choice, the estimation results from proposed econometric
framework and the results where selection-on-unobservables are not taken into account are not dif-
ferent from each other. However, if there are underlying marriage expectations that affect college
major choices, it is expected to reach different estimates in these models.
Table 3.6 presents the estimation results of the proposed model in Section 3 under 4 different
specifications. In all specifications, we adopt probit model for marriage realizations, however,
we alternate the major choice specifications with multinomial logistics (MNL) and multinomial
probit (MNP). These two models are workhorses of multinomial choice models in the literature.
In addition, we present results for two estimation methods that is proposed to control unobserved
heterogeneity; two-step and joint maximum likelihood estimations.
In order to control exogenous variations in college major choice, we include students’ first
three term college GPAs in the college major choice equations, which are not part of the marriage
outcome equation. The economics literature documents the significant impact of student perfor-
mances on their major choices (among others, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2014)), therefore
first college GPAs from first three terms provide variation in major choice. Moreover, since these
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GPAs are from the first three terms they we can consider these performance measures as indepen-
dent of the effect of the chosen major.
Table 3.6: Estimation results for marriage realizations with taking unobserved factors in the ac-
count
TS-MNL Full-MNL TS-MNP Full-MNP
Est. Std. err Est. Std. err Est. Std. err Est. Std. err
Female 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.09 0.34 0.23
Birth month -0.10 0.03 -0.09 0.02 -0.13 0.04 -0.08 0.08
Hispanic -0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.10 -0.20 0.11 -0.14 0.24
Black -0.63 0.10 -0.46 0.09 -0.70 0.12 -0.60 0.23
West -0.47 0.11 -0.32 0.10 -0.10 0.14 0.01 0.21
South -0.04 0.10 -0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.10 0.06 0.23
North East -0.26 0.10 -0.29 0.09 -0.25 0.12 0.07 0.21
Education 2.05 0.36 2.49 0.14 1.47 0.60 0.77 0.20
Business 0.38 0.88 -0.66 0.22 0.59 0.65 0.24 0.21
Health 1.23 0.51 -0.22 0.58 0.83 0.61 0.58 0.24
Com & Eng 0.91 0.57 1.08 0.66 0.53 0.52 0.20 0.26
Other 1.20 0.21 1.19 0.10 0.69 0.28 0.31 0.24
ρEducation -3.90 3.93 -4.29 1.22 -0.48 0.71 0.04 0.23
ρBusiness -0.49 1.64 -2.71 1.00 -0.10 1.17 -0.10 0.20
ρHealth 0.84 0.72 -0.85 0.76 0.04 0.75 -0.06 0.24
ρCom&Eng 0.74 0.75 0.69 0.88 -0.13 0.55 -0.05 0.27
ρOther 2.73 3.32 7.14 1.56 0.07 2.33 0.04 0.20
This table presents estimation results of that the proposed estimation framework in Section 2. We adopt
4 specifications; two-step estimation with MNL distribution, joint MLE estimation with MNL distribution
two-step estimation with MNP distribution, joint MLE estimation with MNP distribution. For MNP specifi-
cations, we take the number of simulations as 100 for the GHK simulator.
The results in the table 3.6 show that chosen majors have significant impacts on marriage
outcomes of college graduates. In all 4 specifications, college graduates from Education majors
have significantly higher marriage realizations. However, the estimated effects of graduating from
other major on marriage realizations are changing with specifications.
Apart from the effects of the observable characteristics of college graduates on marriage out-
comes, table 3.6 presents also the vector of correlation coefficient parameters, ρ . In our specifica-
tion, ρ represents the correlation coefficient of residuals of marriage outcome equation, (ε), and
the residuals of polychotomous variable, (ξ ), as it defined in the equation 3.7. Even though these
parameters enable us the control potential correlation of unobservable marriage expectations, they
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do not provide a framework to make direct inference from their estimated values.
Comparing the estimates from different specifications cannot be done by estimated coefficients
because there are different scaling factors under different specifications. In order to compare these
estimates we present average treatment effects (ATE) in tables 3.7 and 3.8. ATEs are comparable
because their scaling factors are embedded in the estimation results.
Since college major choice is a multinomial regressor in our specification, there are different
ways to define average treatment effects of chosen majors. We define two types of ATE. In table
3.7, ATE of chosen major j is defined as
AT E j =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
Φ(xiγ+ τ j)−Φ(xiγ)
This definition of ATE is a direct analogy from the binary variable regressors. In addition, we
propose another definition for ATE for multiple treatments. Since a student has to choose one major
in the multinomial regressors case, comparing the probabilities of choosing with not choosing
major j may not represent the real average treatment effect in this model. In order to deal with this
problem, we propose an ATE of chosen major j
AT E j =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
(Φ(xiγ+ τ j)− 1J−1
J
∑
k=1,k 6= j
Φ(xiγ+ τk))
In words, we calculate difference in probabilities of chosen major j with the average probabilities
of choosing other majors.24 The first model in tables 3.7 and 3.8 presents ATE estimates where
the marriage expectations and major choices are assumed to be exogenous. The models (2), (3),
(4), and (5) report ATE estimates under our proposed framework, marriage expectations and major
choices are allowed to be correlated. It is clear from the differences between in the magnitude
of ATE estimates, the exogeneity assumption for the effects of marriage expectations on college
major choice is rejected.
In addition, we estimate ATE of chosen majors for males and females separately to see any
24Heckman et al. (2006) define ATE as the difference between selected choice and the counterfactual outcome.
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differences in terms of major choice. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 present ATE estimates for only female
and male graduates respectively. The differences in ATE estimates between models (1), (2), and
(3) are not as big as in the full sample estimates. For both female and male only ATE estimates
with the marriage expectations are taken into account are slightly bigger in terms of magnitude,
however, they are not statistical significant in most of the cases.
Table 3.9: Average treatment effects (ATE) college majors only for female graduates
(1) (2) (3)
Probit TS-MNL TS-MNP
ATE Std Err ATE Std Err ATE Std Err
Education 0.452 0.061 0.482 0.270 0.517 0.221
Business 0.344 0.055 0.355 0.305 0.335 0.222
Computer & Eng 0.297 0.115 0.082 0.352 -0.117 0.256
Health 0.319 0.055 0.333 0.313 0.241 0.216
Standard errors are calculated with nonparametric bootstrap simulations with 100 replica-
tions
Table 3.10: Average treatment effects (ATE) college majors only for male graduates
(1) (2) (3)
Probit TS-MNL TS-MNP
ATE Std Err ATE Std Err ATE Std Err
Education 0.346 0.120 0.419 0.321 0.474 0.303
Business 0.230 0.057 0.238 0.255 0.263 0.235
Computer & Eng 0.254 0.069 0.290 0.256 0.230 0.250
Health 0.376 0.138 0.292 0.375 0.312 0.339
Standard errors are calculated with nonparametric bootstrap simulations with 100 replica-
tions
Finally, it may not be fair to conclude that the relationship between marriage expectations and
college major choices is the most powerful factor in the major choice. However, differences in
the average treatment effect estimates suggest a significant link. Even after expected earnings
and individual characteristics are controlled in the testing procedure, there may be still other un-
observable factors (e.g., physical characteristics) accounted for these differences in major choice
and marriage realizations. Therefore, applying proposed test to richer data sets provide us more
convincing results about the effects of marriage expectations on college major choice.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine differences in marriage outcomes of college graduates. We quantify
that marriage realizations of college graduates are differentiated according to the majors they are
graduated from. To test the effect of marriage expectations on college majors, we develop a pro-
cedure to test the effects of marriage expectations on college major choices. Our test rejects the
exogeneity of the effects of marriage expectations on college majors choice even after expected
earnings and other observable heterogeneities are controlled for. Moreover, we show that the ef-
fects of marriage expectations are different between the female and male students. These findings
complement to college major choice literature’s findings that non-pecuniary factors are the key
determinants of college-major choices as in Beffy et al. (2012) and Wiswall and Zafar (2015).
Our findings about the effects of marriage expectations and gender differences in the major
bring another dimension into college major choice in college education. From a policy perspec-
tive, major choices have direct influence on the skill distribution in the labor market. Therefore,
it can be said that any marriage and labor market related conditions that would have an effect on
lifestyles could also have significant impacts on college students’ career choices, especially for fe-
male students. Moreover, by considering the college enrollment rates, college graduated women’s
labor market participation rates are much lower than those of men’s. In line with this fact, policy
makers/employers could produce family friendly work environments to attract women to choose
specific career paths, increase college graduate women’s labor force participation, and balance skill
distribution in the labor market.
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APPENDICES
A.1 Mathematical Appendix
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1.2
We want to show first for a given student i with score pi,
Ei[Ωi j(pi,σ)|t−1j ] = 0 if Ei[Ωik(pi,σ)|t−1k ] = 0 and t−1j > t−1k ∀ j ∈C
From Assumption 1.2, we know that subjective assignment probabilities are decreasing with
previous year cutoff scores. Therefore if Ei[Ωik(pi,σ)|t−1k ] = 0 and t−1j > t−1k we know that∫
Ωi j(p˜i,σ ;T )dF(T (t−1j ,ξi)) ≤
∫
Ωik(p˜i,σ ;T )dF(T (t−1k ,ξi). Moreover, Ei[Ωi j(pi,σ)|t−1j ] ≥ 0
because it is probability and cannot be less than 0. Then;
Ei[Ωik(pi,σ)|t−1k ]≥ Ei[Ωi j(pi,σ)|t−1j ]≥ 0
Ei[Ωi j(pi,σ)|t−1j ] = 0

A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
According to theorem 1, L∗i is ranking of the most preferred colleges within student i’s consid-
eration set. Then, we need to show that
uiPr(L∗i )−κ|L∗i | ≥ uiPr(Li)−κ|Li| ∀Li ∈Ri
where R is all possible rank-order lists in the consideration set of student i and Pr(Li) indicates
the probability of assignments of colleges in the list Li. According to the condition in the theorem
1, the number of reported colleges are strictly less than allowed number limit number of colleges
117
in the list i.e., |L|< K. There are 3 ways of deviating from listing most preferred colleges in the Li
within student i’s consideration set.
1. Adding a college j into list L∗i
2. Changing order of list L∗i
3. Listing a college j in L∗i which is not part of the most preferred colleges in the accessible
region.
In order to show that Li consists of most preferred colleges within the considerable set of
student i, we need to show that all these deviations have to be worse off for student i.
Case 1: If student i add a college j in her Li in as a last choice. We know that from the condition
in the theorem 1.1 students have only |Li|< K number of colleges that she drives positive utility in
her consideration set. Therefore, there are two cases that student i can add a college j in her lists
which are either a college that she derives non-positive utility or a college does not belong to her
consideration set. Therefore,
Vi j = Pr(c j ∈ Li)ui j ≤ 0
where ui j ≤ 0 if she does not prefer college j or she believes that Pr(c j ∈ Li) = 0. Either cases
expected utility (Vi j) of college j in Li is equal to zero. According to assumption 1.3 there is a cost
of adding college in list, total gain of adding a college j is negative.
Case 2: Assume that student i prefers college j over college j′ and they are part of the student
i’ consideration set, where ui j,ui j > 0. If student j list c j′ before c j and report a new list L′i
conditioning on everything else remains the same in the list. Then the expected utility of new list
L′i should be higher than expected utility of L∗i so that this change makes student i better off.
Pr(c j′ ∈ L′i)ui j′+Pr(c j ∈ L′i)ui j > Pr(c j′ ∈ L∗i )ui j′+Pr(c j ∈ L∗i )ui j (A.8)
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where Pr(c j′ ∈ L′i) indicates the probability of assignment of college j′ in listed in the L′i. Accord-
ing to DA algorithm, an agent is matched with a college in her reported list if she rejected from all
colleges that are ranked before it in the lists. We know that Pr(c j ∈ L∗i ) = Pr(t j < pi|Li)> Pr(c j ∈
L′i) = (1−Pr(t j′ < pi|Li))×Pr(t j < pi|Li). Also, Pr(c j′ ∈ L′i) = Pr(t ′j < pi|Li) > Pr(c j′ ∈ L∗i ) =
(1−Pr(t j < pi|Li))×Pr(t ′j < pi|Li).
Then, we can rewrite equation A.8 as
Pr(t ′j < pi|Li)ui j′+(1−Pr(t j′ < pi|Li))×Pr(t j < pi|Li)ui j >
Pr(t j < pi|Li)ui j +(1−Pr(t j < pi|Li))×Pr(t ′j < pi|Li)ui j′
−Pr(t j′ < pi|Li)Pr(t j < pi|Li)ui j′ >−Pr(t j′ < pi|Li)Pr(t j < pi|Li)ui j
ui j′ > ui j
which contradicts with ui j′ < ui j. Hence, changing order is not better off for student i.
Case 3: In order to show that case 3, let’s assume that student i choose college j in her consid-
eration list which is not part of her most preferred colleges. This implies that ui j is lower than all
uik such that k ∈ L∗i . Therefore, replacing college j with any college k in list decreases expected
utility.
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A.2 Additional tables and figures for Chapter 1
Table A.11: Correlations of reported colleges’ cutoff scores and students exam scores
Only exam Only Hs GPA Total
First Choice 0.5802 0.4918 0.6199
Median 0.61 0.4867 0.6584
Last Choice 0.601 0.4744 0.6419
Score Range -0.0248 0.0028 -0.03
Other correlations in the list
2 0.5892 0.4817 0.6163
3 0.5891 0.4799 0.6144
4 0.5896 0.4791 0.6138
5 0.5879 0.478 0.6076
6 0.5849 0.4745 0.6034
7 0.5852 0.4745 0.6
8 0.5849 0.4751 0.5997
9 0.5844 0.4738 0.5952
10 0.5833 0.4755 0.5946
11 0.5822 0.4797 0.5932
12 0.5814 0.4779 0.5906
13 0.5806 0.4783 0.5872
14 0.5786 0.4771 0.5861
15 0.5779 0.4751 0.5815
16 0.5777 0.4804 0.5818
17 0.575 0.4798 0.5815
18 0.5727 0.4752 0.5784
19 0.5691 0.4762 0.5744
20 0.5678 0.4759 0.5719
21 0.5654 0.4738 0.572
22 0.5629 0.4697 0.5668
23 0.5563 0.4707 0.5684
24 0.5555 0.4728 0.5705
Notes: Correlation of students’ 3 different scores and reported colleges’ cutoff scores.
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Figure A.1: The fractions of out of track choices in the ROLs
Figure A.2: The fractions of unobtainable choices in the ROLs
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Table A.12: Estimation Results: College Dummies Continue
(ΘT ) (ΘS) (ΘP)
(Truth−Telling) (Stability) (Cons−Sets)
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
Female*Private -0.11 0.09 -0.12 0.11 -0.08 0.10
Female*Distance 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Female*Night 0.13 0.08 0.36 0.10 0.22 0.08
Income*Private 0.31 0.04 0.27 0.05 0.29 0.04
Income*Distance -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.00
Income*Night Education 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.02
City Size*Private 0.04 0.13 -1.34 0.38 -1.42 0.36
City Size*Distance -0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.08 0.01
City Size*Night Education -0.19 0.04 -0.23 0.05 -0.22 0.04
Parent Education*Private -0.33 0.06 -0.44 0.08 -0.38 0.07
Parent Education*Distance -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.00
Parent Education*Night E. 0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.06 -0.03 0.05
Notes: This table reports the remaining estimates of college and students’ characteristics from table 1.3
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Table A.13: Estimation Results: College Dummies
(ΘT ) (ΘS) (ΘP)
(Truth−Telling) (Stability) (Cons−Sets)
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
Adnan Menderes -0.98 0.12 -0.71 0.16 -0.53 0.12
Afyon Kocatepe -0.33 0.09 -0.73 0.11 -0.68 0.09
Akdeniz 0.19 0.08 -0.12 0.13 -0.02 0.10
Anadolu 0.59 0.07 0.42 0.09 0.50 0.07
Ankara 0.16 0.08 -0.08 0.12 -0.01 0.10
Ataturk 0.26 0.09 -0.35 0.11 -0.15 0.09
Balikesir 0.27 0.07 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.07
Bogazici 0.34 0.09 1.70 0.12 1.56 0.10
Celal Bayar -0.25 0.10 -0.63 0.13 -0.53 0.11
Cumhuriyet -0.05 0.09 -0.64 0.11 -0.55 0.09
On sekiz Mart 0.38 0.07 0.37 0.09 0.26 0.07
Cukurova -0.17 0.09 -0.47 0.11 -0.47 0.09
Dicle -0.63 0.11 -1.18 0.14 -1.03 0.12
Dokuz Eylul 0.44 0.08 0.63 0.10 0.63 0.08
Dumlupinar -0.35 0.09 -0.76 0.12 -0.49 0.09
Ege 0.47 0.08 0.56 0.10 0.52 0.09
Erciyes -0.10 0.07 -0.42 0.10 -0.32 0.08
Firat -0.44 0.12 -1.16 0.16 -0.92 0.12
Galatasaray -0.78 0.14 0.81 0.23 0.59 0.17
Gazi 0.07 0.07 -0.26 0.09 -0.19 0.08
Gaziantep -0.68 0.13 -1.29 0.16 -1.15 0.14
Gaziosmanpasa -1.03 0.15 -1.70 0.19 -1.36 0.15
Hacettepe 0.32 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.33 0.08
Harran -1.43 0.16 -1.74 0.25 -1.31 0.17
Inonu -0.40 0.10 -0.98 0.12 -0.89 0.10
Istanbul 0.55 0.08 0.64 0.10 0.61 0.08
ITU 0.62 0.09 1.14 0.11 0.96 0.09
Izmir Yuksek Teknoloji -0.48 0.19 -0.32 0.24 -0.30 0.19
Kafkas -0.39 0.17 -1.39 0.23 -0.95 0.18
Sutcu Imam -0.93 0.16 -1.51 0.20 -1.46 0.16
Karadeniz Teknik 0.08 0.09 -0.10 0.10 -0.07 0.09
Kirikkale -0.44 0.10 -1.16 0.15 -0.87 0.11
Kocaeli 0.35 0.07 0.21 0.09 0.26 0.07
Marmara 0.61 0.08 0.82 0.10 0.78 0.08
Mersin -0.97 0.09 -0.95 0.12 -0.93 0.10
Mimar Sinan 0.27 0.14 0.34 0.19 0.35 0.15
Mugla 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.10 -0.04 0.08
Mustafa Kemal -0.79 0.16 -1.60 0.18 -1.38 0.16
Nigde -0.69 0.11 -0.94 0.14 -0.92 0.11
On Dokuz Mayis 0.26 0.08 -0.19 0.09 -0.08 0.08
ODTU -0.13 0.09 -0.21 0.12 -0.11 0.10
Osmangazi 0.12 0.08 -0.09 0.10 -0.07 0.09
Pamukkale -0.05 0.08 -0.20 0.11 -0.19 0.09
Sakarya -0.05 0.08 -0.32 0.10 -0.15 0.08
Selcuk 0.51 0.06 0.19 0.08 0.22 0.07
Suleyman Demirel -0.20 0.08 -0.31 0.11 -0.31 0.09
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Table A.14: Estimation Results: College Dummies Continue
(ΘT ) (ΘS) (ΘP)
(Truth−Telling) (Stability) (Cons−Sets)
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
Trakya -0.01 0.08 0.03 0.11 -0.13 0.09
Uludag 0.71 0.07 0.64 0.08 0.62 0.07
Yildiz 0.50 0.09 1.05 0.11 1.04 0.09
Yuzuncu Yil -0.48 0.17 -0.96 0.21 -0.84 0.18
Karaelmas -0.35 0.11 -1.07 0.15 -0.90 0.11
Gulhane 0.21 0.47 2.92 0.69 0.58 0.54
Atilim -0.93 0.57 2.04 1.10 0.51 0.95
Bahcesehir 0.45 0.55 3.83 1.08 2.12 0.93
Baskent -0.31 0.55 3.02 1.08 1.52 0.93
Beykent -0.65 0.57 2.28 1.10 0.89 0.94
Bilkent 0.57 0.54 4.63 1.07 2.69 0.93
Cag -1.59 0.65 -1.94 1.08 -2.68 0.77
Cankaya -0.27 0.57 3.02 1.10 1.39 0.94
Dogus -0.64 0.56 2.40 1.09 0.82 0.94
Fatih -0.92 0.56 2.99 1.10 1.26 0.94
Halic -0.51 0.57 2.67 1.09 0.93 0.95
Isik -0.06 0.56 3.26 1.09 1.33 0.94
Bilgi 0.85 0.55 4.51 1.08 2.72 0.93
Kultur 0.04 0.56 3.33 1.08 1.52 0.94
Kadir Has -0.06 0.56 3.37 1.08 1.56 0.94
Koc 0.56 0.55 5.29 1.07 3.14 0.93
Maltepe -0.39 0.56 2.90 1.09 1.04 0.94
Sabanci 0.22 0.55 5.53 1.08 3.47 0.93
Yeditepe 0.32 0.55 3.70 1.07 2.00 0.93
Izmir Ekonomi -0.35 0.56 3.97 1.08 2.01 0.93
Ticaret 0.39 0.55 3.91 1.08 2.13 0.93
Ufuk -1.55 0.61 1.69 1.13 -0.13 0.96
Yasar -1.66 0.72 2.26 1.18 0.00 1.05
Okan -0.23 0.58 2.44 1.10 0.98 0.96
TOBB 0.86 0.53 5.39 1.07 3.23 0.93
Cyprus 2.60 0.64 4.10 0.99 2.44 0.86
Other Abroad -0.04 0.77 0.85 1.08 0.26 0.92
124
Table A.15: Estimation Results with students reports complete lists
(ΘT ) (ΘS) (ΘP) (ΘR)
(Truth−Telling) (Stability) (Cons−Sets) (Only−Report)
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
Same City 0.60 0.04 0.75 0.05 0.67 0.04 -0.05 0.05
Partial Sch. -0.63 0.10 -0.20 0.14 -0.12 0.10 -1.33 0.13
Full Sch. -0.77 0.07 0.95 0.10 0.51 0.08 -0.21 0.18
Distance Education 0.68 0.10 -0.95 0.15 -0.66 0.11 2.79 0.28
Night Education -0.94 0.24 -1.10 0.34 -0.95 0.24 0.35 0.27
Private College -2.80 0.72 -1.60 1.25 -0.06 1.02 -5.33 2.14
Female*Private -0.10 0.09 -0.13 0.10 -0.10 0.09 -0.27 0.12
Female*Distance 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.01
Female*Night 0.18 0.07 0.39 0.09 0.23 0.07 0.03 0.08
Income*Private 0.30 0.03 0.28 0.04 0.28 0.04 0.03 0.03
Income*Distance -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.00
Income*Night 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.02
City Size*Private 0.11 0.11 -0.94 0.37 -1.00 0.33 1.23 0.63
City Size*Distance -0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.00
City Size*Night -0.20 0.03 -0.24 0.04 -0.22 0.03 0.01 0.04
Parent Educ*Private -0.39 0.06 -0.49 0.08 -0.43 0.07 -0.04 0.07
Parent Educ*Distance -0.12 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.13 0.00
Parent Educ*Night 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04
Notes: This table reports the estimates of college and students’ characteristics when the students reported 24
college-majors in their ROLs also taken accounted in the estimation under 4 different methods.
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Table A.16: Estimation Results with students reports complete lists
(ΘT ) (ΘS) (ΘP) (ΘR)
(Truth−Telling) (Stability) (Cons−Sets) (Only−Report)
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
Adnan Menderes -0.80 0.09 -0.58 0.12 -0.44 0.09 0.03 0.16
Afyon Kocatepe -0.22 0.07 -0.61 0.08 -0.58 0.07 0.26 0.12
Akdeniz 0.06 0.07 -0.25 0.11 -0.17 0.08 -0.26 0.12
Anadolu 0.44 0.06 0.28 0.08 0.36 0.06 -0.46 0.09
Ankara -0.07 0.07 -0.29 0.10 -0.29 0.08 -1.17 0.10
Ataturk 0.32 0.07 -0.25 0.09 -0.09 0.08 0.32 0.10
Balikesir 0.26 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.06 -0.42 0.09
Bogazici 0.06 0.08 1.58 0.11 1.29 0.09 -2.43 0.13
Celal Bayar -0.16 0.08 -0.50 0.10 -0.42 0.08 -0.17 0.12
Cumhuriyet 0.04 0.07 -0.60 0.09 -0.49 0.07 0.06 0.12
On sekiz Mart 0.40 0.05 0.38 0.07 0.28 0.06 -0.08 0.10
Cukurova -0.23 0.07 -0.51 0.09 -0.54 0.08 -0.52 0.12
Dicle -0.56 0.10 -1.07 0.11 -0.95 0.10 0.19 0.15
Dokuz Eylul 0.25 0.06 0.56 0.08 0.47 0.07 -1.07 0.09
Dumlupinar -0.26 0.07 -0.58 0.09 -0.43 0.07 0.28 0.14
Ege 0.31 0.07 0.49 0.09 0.36 0.07 -0.91 0.10
Erciyes -0.16 0.06 -0.47 0.08 -0.39 0.07 -0.11 0.10
Firat -0.38 0.10 -1.09 0.13 -0.87 0.10 0.41 0.18
Galatasaray -1.02 0.13 0.74 0.21 0.43 0.15 -2.53 0.25
Gazi -0.06 0.06 -0.29 0.08 -0.31 0.06 -0.87 0.09
Gaziantep -0.75 0.11 -1.30 0.14 -1.21 0.11 0.07 0.15
Gaziosmanpasa -0.89 0.12 -1.44 0.15 -1.26 0.12 0.09 0.24
Hacettepe 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 -1.28 0.10
Harran -1.32 0.12 -1.57 0.20 -1.22 0.13 1.65 0.32
Inonu -0.34 0.08 -0.88 0.10 -0.84 0.09 0.29 0.13
Istanbul 0.31 0.07 0.48 0.09 0.37 0.07 -1.29 0.09
ITU 0.39 0.08 0.99 0.10 0.75 0.08 -1.61 0.11
Izmir yuksek Teknoloji -0.52 0.15 -0.15 0.19 -0.33 0.16 -0.76 0.25
Kafkas -0.06 0.13 -1.05 0.18 -0.65 0.14 0.54 0.25
Sutcu Imam -0.95 0.13 -1.38 0.16 -1.50 0.13 0.29 0.22
Karadeniz Teknik 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.10
Kirikkale -0.50 0.08 -1.14 0.12 -0.96 0.09 0.06 0.16
Kocaeli 0.27 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.16 0.06 -0.29 0.09
Marmara 0.37 0.07 0.70 0.09 0.56 0.07 -1.25 0.09
Mersin -0.93 0.08 -0.93 0.10 -0.89 0.08 0.09 0.12
Mimar Sinan 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.09 0.13 -1.52 0.24
Mugla 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.11
Mustafa Kemal -0.72 0.13 -1.42 0.15 -1.30 0.13 0.16 0.22
Nigde -0.63 0.09 -0.90 0.12 -0.87 0.09 0.07 0.15
On Dokuz Mayis 0.25 0.06 -0.18 0.08 -0.10 0.07 -0.19 0.09
ODTU -0.36 0.07 -0.37 0.11 -0.31 0.09 -1.89 0.12
Osmangazi 0.03 0.07 -0.17 0.09 -0.18 0.07 -0.40 0.11
Pamukkale 0.04 0.06 -0.11 0.09 -0.09 0.07 -0.17 0.11
Sakarya -0.06 0.06 -0.20 0.08 -0.16 0.06 0.01 0.11
Selcuk 0.39 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.06 -0.26 0.08
Suleyman Demirel -0.18 0.06 -0.31 0.08 -0.30 0.07 0.05 0.11
Notes: This table reports the estimates of college and students’ characteristics when the students reported 24
college-majors in their ROLs also taken accounted in the estimation under 4 different methods.
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Table A.17: Estimation Results with students reports complete lists
(ΘT ) (ΘS) (ΘP) (ΘR)
(Truth−Telling) (Stability) (Cons−Sets) (Only−Report)
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
Trakya -0.05 0.07 0.01 0.09 -0.13 0.07 0.13 0.13
Uludag 0.58 0.06 0.54 0.07 0.48 0.06 -0.42 0.09
Yildiz 0.31 0.08 0.95 0.10 0.87 0.08 -1.40 0.11
Yuzuncu Yil -0.20 0.13 -0.69 0.16 -0.58 0.14 0.26 0.20
Karaelmas -0.16 0.08 -0.84 0.11 -0.71 0.08 0.22 0.15
Gulhane -0.20 0.42 1.68 0.65 -0.05 0.47 -0.03 0.77
Atilim -1.46 0.51 0.29 0.99 -0.60 0.84 0.44 1.15
Bahcesehir -0.07 0.50 2.13 0.98 1.07 0.83 0.40 1.12
Baskent -0.86 0.50 1.26 0.98 0.36 0.83 0.27 1.12
Beykent -1.15 0.51 0.70 0.99 -0.16 0.84 0.70 1.16
Bilkent -0.03 0.49 2.78 0.97 1.49 0.83 -0.74 1.12
Cag -1.61 0.56 -2.11 0.93 -2.55 0.66 3.94 1.36
Cankaya -0.76 0.51 1.29 0.99 0.35 0.84 0.65 1.14
Dogus -1.10 0.51 0.78 0.98 -0.18 0.84 0.99 1.13
Fatih -1.47 0.51 1.26 0.99 0.18 0.84 0.32 1.16
Halic -1.02 0.51 0.97 0.99 -0.12 0.85 1.24 1.14
Isik -0.53 0.51 1.56 0.99 0.31 0.84 0.93 1.13
Bilgi 0.28 0.50 2.74 0.97 1.60 0.83 -0.01 1.12
Kultur -0.48 0.50 1.58 0.98 0.45 0.84 1.07 1.12
Kadir Has -0.58 0.50 1.67 0.98 0.50 0.84 0.54 1.13
Koc -0.03 0.50 3.49 0.97 1.95 0.83 -1.52 1.12
Maltepe -0.87 0.51 1.20 0.98 0.01 0.84 1.14 1.13
Sabanci -0.35 0.50 3.75 0.97 2.28 0.83 -2.60 1.12
Yeditepe -0.24 0.50 1.93 0.97 0.86 0.83 0.01 1.12
Izmir Ekonomi -1.00 0.51 2.03 0.98 0.75 0.83 0.46 1.13
Ticaret -0.18 0.50 2.08 0.98 0.97 0.83 0.34 1.12
Ufuk -2.04 0.55 0.00 1.02 -1.19 0.86 0.62 1.19
Yasar -2.24 0.65 0.34 1.09 -1.15 0.94 0.76 1.27
Okan -0.73 0.53 0.71 1.00 -0.07 0.85 1.25 1.18
TOBB 0.34 0.48 3.56 0.97 2.04 0.83 -0.32 1.12
Cyprus 1.83 0.58 2.42 0.91 1.40 0.75 4.21 1.08
Other Abroad -0.79 0.69 -1.02 1.00 -0.83 0.81 36.14 5497
Notes: This table reports the estimates of college and students’ characteristics when the students reported 24
college-majors in their ROLs also taken accounted in the estimation under 4 different methods.
Table A.18: Correlation table of cutoff scores across years
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2000 1.00
2001 0.92 1.00
2002 0.92 0.95 1.00
2003 0.80 0.84 0.88 1.00
2004 0.72 0.76 0.80 0.94 1.00
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Figure A.3: First 100 ranked students’ first choices in ROL by education track
Notes: Each bar-plot shows the first 100 ranked students’ first choices according to their education tracks. Quantita-
tive, Verbal, and Equal-weight tracks are ordered from top to bottom.
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Figure A.4: Students’ first choices
Notes: Bar-plot shows the first, median, and last 100 ranked students’ first college choices.
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Figure A.5: The percentage of choices in the reported lists
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Figure A.6: The density of demeaned cutoff percentiles
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A.3 College admission mechanism history in Turkey
A national level college admission started in 1974 after the foundation of the selection and
placement center (CSSP). Before the national level admissions, each college accepted students
according to application orders, high school field of studies and high school GPAs. With the
increase in the number of high school graduates, colleges started to prepare their own entrance
exams for sorting the applicants.
The national admission center’s mission is to prepare national level test in order to determine
applicants’ sorting in the college admissions system and by collecting applicants choices match
students with the colleges. The center gave two exams for selection and placement. Selection
exam chooses student to be placement contest and placement exam is the main determinant for the
placement score. From its foundation, there has been several changes in the implementation of the
admissions system. In chronological order;
• In 1982, high school GPA’s was started to be effective in the college applicants sorting crite-
rion.
• In 1987, college entrance exam scores are differentiated according to field of studies.
• In 1999, the number of college entrance exams reduce to one. Applicants preference lists
were started to be submitted after the announcement of college entrance exam scores.
• In 2006, college entrance exam questions started to cover high school education curriculum.
• In 2010, the number of college entrance exams increased to two. The first exam is for
selection and qualification exam that selects students to enter placement period and allow
successful students to apply two-year degrees. Second exam is the main student sorting
determinant for placement.
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A.4 Major and location choice in college admissions in Turkey
In this section, I focus major choice in Turkey college admission data in year 2005. Table A.19
presents selected major indicator from rank order lists as fractional responses. In order to present
heterogeneity in the major selection, I control many socioeconomic factors of students including
parent education levels, income categories, parent occupation categories, and family accumulated
wealth. With the exogenous score assumption, in order to control students’ strategic effects I
include college exam score and scaled high school GPA in the control variables. Estimation results
show that there are significant differences in terms of socioeconomic indicators in college major
choice apart from exam scores.
Table A.20 presents estimation results from selected location indicator variables obtained from
separate OLS regressions. The first model uses fraction of the colleges from three big cities of
Turkey as dependent variable. Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir are not only crowded cities, but also they
are the big hubs of the commerce and public services of their regions. These cities are includes the
prestigious colleges of the country and the number of the colleges are considerably more than the
other cities. In addition, since they are the center of commerce and industrial productions, labor
markets are bigger in these locations and differentiated from the other smaller cities. Consequently,
the cost of living in these big cities are considerably higher than small cities. The results from the
first model shows that income and wealth are significant factors in the selection of the colleges in
the three big cities of Turkey even the college admissions criteria are controlled.
The second model in Table A.20 shows the estimation results the choice of colleges from the
students’ cities. In order to eliminate the bigger city effects on choices, I restricted the sample
with the students from small cities. Again, my dependent variable is the fraction of colleges from
the student’s city. Estimation results show that female are inclined more to choose from their own
cities and income, wealth are losing their significance in comparison with the bigger cities choices.
Table A.21 presents summary statistics separated by gender. The most interesting differences
are the GPA and college exam scores between male and female students. Even though there is
substantial differences in favor female students in GPA, college entrance exam score averages
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Table A.19: QMLE result for major choice without endogenous college entrance exam score from
the survey sample
Teacher Majors Medical School Engineering Natural Science Architecture Math
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
College Exam 0.0001 0.0002 0.0030 0.0002 0.0031 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0008 0.0001
HS GPA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Mother Education
Higher Educ. -0.0905 0.0385 -0.0867 0.0349 0.1002 0.0402 0.0058 0.0219 0.0019 0.0098 0.0050 0.0133
High School -0.1045 0.0362 -0.0824 0.0326 0.1087 0.0348 0.0239 0.0202 0.0003 0.0084 0.0250 0.0115
Middle School -0.0366 0.0406 -0.0720 0.0335 0.0614 0.0374 0.0094 0.0214 0.0063 0.0102 0.0330 0.0133
Elementary -0.0618 0.0349 -0.0614 0.0301 0.0690 0.0309 0.0052 0.0183 -0.0038 0.0065 0.0401 0.0102
Father Education
Higher Educ. -0.1100 0.0786 0.0792 0.0450 0.0676 0.0500 -0.0880 0.0577 0.0151 0.0092 -0.0302 0.0174
High School -0.0916 0.0784 0.0468 0.0447 0.0821 0.0488 -0.0700 0.0578 0.0161 0.0083 -0.0223 0.0170
Middle School -0.0651 0.0803 0.0438 0.0451 0.0373 0.0502 -0.0675 0.0584 0.0091 0.0088 -0.0211 0.0191
Elementary -0.0619 0.0780 0.0352 0.0437 0.0302 0.0469 -0.0548 0.0584 0.0032 0.0083 -0.0156 0.0165
Mother Occupation
Worker -0.0675 0.0477 0.0160 0.0384 -0.0243 0.0660 0.1048 0.0445 -0.0220 0.0139 -0.0205 0.0235
Official -0.0215 0.0376 0.0330 0.0263 -0.0343 0.0467 0.0290 0.0213 0.0048 0.0168 0.0150 0.0198
Expert -0.0519 0.0367 0.0457 0.0261 -0.0337 0.0471 0.0377 0.0232 -0.0123 0.0156 0.0038 0.0188
Small Bus Owner 0.0600 0.0649 0.0420 0.0433 -0.0698 0.0677 -0.0070 0.0229 -0.0067 0.0162 0.0069 0.0305
Big Bus Owner -0.0154 0.0408 0.0353 0.0496 -0.0694 0.1188 -0.0038 0.0426 -0.0498 0.0221 0.0372 0.0262
Manager High -0.0110 0.0554 -0.0175 0.0395 -0.0863 0.0934 0.0384 0.0538 0.0373 0.0697 0.0151 0.0207
Manager Middle -0.0321 0.0722 0.0205 0.0521 -0.0016 0.0961 -0.0154 0.0221 0.0324 0.0365 -0.0263 0.0184
Sport Art -0.0376 0.0473 -0.0488 0.0369 0.1598 0.0623 -0.0964 0.0326 -0.0463 0.0211 -0.0406 0.0215
Agriculture -0.0708 0.0786 0.0167 0.0622 -0.1089 0.0774 0.0102 0.0339 0.0032 0.0207 0.0545 0.0601
Retired -0.0141 0.0383 0.0237 0.0266 -0.0415 0.0479 0.0327 0.0217 -0.0005 0.0177 -0.0096 0.0168
Searching Job -0.0464 0.1026 -0.0296 0.0368 0.0706 0.1222 0.1584 0.0816 -0.0079 0.0204 0.0006 0.0303
Non wage Income 0.0986 0.0972 0.0912 0.0844 -0.1118 0.0869 -0.0504 0.0224 0.0059 0.0306 -0.0372 0.0188
Housewife -0.0285 0.0357 0.0346 0.0209 -0.0333 0.0420 0.0153 0.0195 -0.0028 0.0140 0.0023 0.0163
Father Occupation
Worker 0.0078 0.0294 -0.0047 0.0216 -0.0025 0.0345 -0.0143 0.0206 -0.0075 0.0093 0.0083 0.0170
Official 0.0429 0.0249 0.0116 0.0198 -0.0402 0.0302 -0.0159 0.0167 -0.0128 0.0099 -0.0010 0.0145
Expert -0.0059 0.0239 0.0074 0.0232 -0.0105 0.0354 0.0155 0.0192 0.0057 0.0133 -0.0031 0.0141
Small Bus Owner -0.0447 0.0244 0.0258 0.0202 0.0280 0.0326 -0.0073 0.0184 -0.0026 0.0105 -0.0164 0.0138
Big Bus Owner -0.0320 0.0266 0.0094 0.0251 0.0348 0.0413 0.0045 0.0236 0.0152 0.0164 -0.0237 0.0132
Manager High 0.0007 0.0280 -0.0493 0.0249 -0.0067 0.0417 -0.0002 0.0204 0.0098 0.0191 -0.0114 0.0157
Manager Middle 0.0124 0.0342 -0.0082 0.0302 -0.0434 0.0418 -0.0298 0.0179 0.0085 0.0179 0.0157 0.0200
Sport Art -0.0412 0.0320 -0.0646 0.0385 -0.0917 0.1232 0.0171 0.0561 0.0167 0.0377 -0.0275 0.0161
Agriculture 0.0592 0.0457 0.0327 0.0320 -0.0052 0.0428 -0.0395 0.0206 -0.0030 0.0126 -0.0401 0.0181
Retired -0.0016 0.0272 0.0168 0.0221 -0.0034 0.0334 0.0031 0.0194 -0.0043 0.0107 -0.0050 0.0145
Searching Job 0.0246 0.0548 -0.0070 0.0510 0.0138 0.0606 -0.0987 0.0305 -0.0006 0.0129 -0.0072 0.0277
Non wage Income 0.0158 0.0673 -0.0636 0.0348 0.1846 0.1109 -0.0433 0.0353 0.0054 0.0304 0.0468 0.0555
Income Categories
2 -0.0143 0.0874 -0.0465 0.0702 0.0222 0.0734 -0.0426 0.0357 -0.0080 0.0110 0.0248 0.0358
3 -0.0345 0.0812 -0.0629 0.0620 0.0150 0.0716 0.0548 0.0536 -0.0020 0.0137 0.0091 0.0329
4 -0.0555 0.0733 -0.0338 0.0642 0.0119 0.0652 -0.0173 0.0419 -0.0025 0.0120 -0.0099 0.0255
5 -0.0358 0.0680 -0.0677 0.0596 -0.0098 0.0613 -0.0067 0.0400 -0.0048 0.0105 0.0175 0.0266
6 -0.0411 0.0638 -0.0377 0.0582 -0.0065 0.0571 -0.0109 0.0355 0.0090 0.0122 0.0166 0.0240
7 -0.0243 0.0620 -0.0961 0.0571 0.0335 0.0551 -0.0051 0.0343 0.0044 0.0103 0.0039 0.0218
8 -0.0531 0.0622 -0.0625 0.0577 0.0669 0.0562 -0.0257 0.0344 0.0010 0.0104 0.0166 0.0224
9 -0.0951 0.0626 -0.0689 0.0582 0.0833 0.0574 -0.0094 0.0346 0.0110 0.0118 0.0128 0.0225
10 -0.1312 0.0622 -0.0847 0.0586 0.1696 0.0598 -0.0038 0.0358 0.0130 0.0132 0.0048 0.0225
11 -0.1350 0.0627 -0.0770 0.0595 0.1658 0.0610 -0.0256 0.0366 0.0222 0.0138 -0.0056 0.0220
12 -0.1509 0.0622 -0.0901 0.0587 0.2023 0.0607 -0.0489 0.0354 0.0278 0.0152 -0.0081 0.0219
Wealth 0.0077 0.0054 -0.0067 0.0053 0.0112 0.0074 -0.0068 0.0037 -0.0018 0.0023 0.0041 0.0033
Constant 0.2149 0.1013 -0.7568 0.0791 -0.2023 0.0930 0.4163 0.0769 0.0327 0.0219 -0.0295 0.0319
Notes: Estimation results are obtained from the questionnaire sample.
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Table A.20: College choice preliminary estimation results
1 2
Big Cities Same city
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err
College Entrance Exam Score 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000
Scaled High School GPA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Female 0.010 0.011 0.022 0.013
Father Education Level
Elementary School -0.004 0.016 -0.035 0.019
Middle School -0.009 0.022 -0.046 0.025
High School -0.023 0.018 -0.025 0.024
Higher Education 0.102 0.044 0.043 0.066
Income categories
2 0.092 0.044 -0.028 0.054
3 0.030 0.035 -0.038 0.049
4 0.005 0.032 0.037 0.058
5 0.053 0.034 -0.020 0.048
6 0.021 0.030 -0.007 0.047
7 0.038 0.030 -0.008 0.046
8 0.042 0.031 -0.004 0.046
9 0.042 0.034 0.009 0.050
10 0.092 0.040 0.049 0.052
11 0.169 0.049 0.045 0.058
12 0.198 0.052 0.069 0.056
Wealth categories
1 0.068 0.059 0.114 0.068
2 0.036 0.054 0.107 0.042
3 0.054 0.053 0.084 0.036
4 0.053 0.053 0.065 0.036
5 0.074 0.053 0.076 0.038
6 0.078 0.054 0.068 0.039
Mother’s Occupation categories Yes Yes
Father’s Occupation categories Yes Yes
Constant -0.720 0.091 -0.143 0.099
Obs 1491 1491
Notes: Estimation results are obtained from the questionnaire sample and students who are away from
big cities. This table presents preliminary estimation results obtained by two separate OLS regressions.
Students’ choice indicators are regressed on socioeconomic characteristics.
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are opposite. Also there are considerable differences between same city and distance preferences
between male and female students.
Table A.21: Summary statistics by gender
Male
Mean SD Min Max Obs
College Exam 0.77 0.09 0.62 1 106086
HS Exam 0.70 0.10 0.39 1 65535
HS GPA 70.97 23.77 0 100 30919
Medical 0.04 0.17 0 1 106086
Engineering 0.32 0.35 0 1 106086
Math 0.05 0.16 0 1 106086
Private College 0.08 0.22 0 1 104174
Same city 0.17 0.27 0 1 106086
Distance 513.55 362.85 0 2500 105961
Female
Mean SD Min Max Obs
College Exam 0.76 0.09 0.62 1 66865
HS Exam 0.70 0.10 0.40 1 46520
HS GPA 81.61 18.30 0 100 22122
Medical 0.04 0.17 0 1 66865
Engineering 0.14 0.23 0 1 66865
Math 0.05 0.16 0 1 66865
Private College 0.06 0.20 0 1 66028
Same city 0.21 0.30 0 1 66865
Distance 413.20 285.19 0 2500 66753
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A.5 The effects of preference submission time on cutoffs
Lien et al. (2016), Lien et al. (2017), Wu and Zhong (2014) analyze preference submission
time effect on college-student matching outcomes and they show that before exam submission with
Boston mechanism produce ex-ante fair allocation compare to submission after score announce-
ment. Inspiring from these papers, I control submission timing effect on college cutoff scores in
Turkey’s college-student matching.
Table A.22: Cutoff scores
Cutoff 1998 Cutoff 1999 Cutoff 2000
Variables Coef Std Err Variables Coef Std Err Variables Coef Std Err
Cutoff 97 0.94 0.01 Cutoff 98 0.95 0.01 Cutoff 99 0.91 0.01
Quota 98 0.05 0.02 Quota 98 0.00 0.00 Quota 2000 0.00 0.00
Quota 97 -0.04 0.01 Quota 99 0.00 0.00 Quota 99 0.00 0.00
Bogazici 1.98 1.10 Bogazici 0.02 0.01 Bogazici 0.02 0.00
Itu 6.58 0.77 Itu 0.07 0.00 Itu 0.00 0.00
Odtu 4.39 0.95 Odtu 0.04 0.01 Odtu 0.01 0.00
Koc -2.59 1.96 Koc -0.02 0.01 Koc 0.00 0.01
Bilkent 4.42 3.10 Bilkent -0.05 0.02 Bilkent 0.03 0.02
Ytu 8.58 0.79 Ytu 0.05 0.02 Ytu 0.00 0.00
Hacettepe 5.37 1.39 Hacettepe -0.01 0.01 Hacettepe -0.01 0.00
Marmara 0.78 0.69 Marmara 0.02 0.01 Marmara 0.01 0.01
Kultur Kultur 0.05 0.02 Kultur -0.01 0.01
Fatih 6.20 2.90 Fatih -0.10 0.03 Fatih 0.00 0.02
Yeditepe 11.57 2.85 Yeditepe -0.03 0.02 Yeditepe 0.01 0.01
Bilgi 20.50 4.31 Bilgi -0.03 0.01 Bilgi -0.02 0.01
Yuzuncuyil -0.79 1.47 Yuzuncuyil 0.00 0.02 Yuzuncuyil 0.02 0.01
Ataturk -1.55 1.10 Ataturk -0.03 0.01 Ataturk 0.01 0.00
Constant 19.03 2.60 Constant -0.05 0.01 Constant 0.05 0.00
Table A.22 shows regression results of cutoff scores of 1998, 1999, 2000 on one lagged year’s
cutoff scores, quotas and selected college dummies. The policy change in the preference submis-
sion time occurred in 1999, therefore 1999 cutoff scores are the result of new submission policy.
It is expected to see high correlation between these cutoff scores across years but change in the
college fixed effects show either change in the preference in society or change in the submission
strategies. The result table shows that private colleges cutoff scores are negatively affected from
submission time policies.
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A.6 Econometric framework for Chapter 2
Following Wooldridge (2014) section 4, I construct joint QMLE setting. The setup for the
fractional response variable f , endogeneity of covariate as an omitted variable problem and start
by assuming p has a linear reduced form with the substantive restrictions:
E( f |p,z,η) = E( f |p,z1,η) =Φ(x1β +η) (A.9)
p = zγ+ ε (A.10)
where x1 is a general function of p,z1 and η is an omitted factor thought to be correlated with p.
The first equality imposes at least one exclusion restriction, where a strict subset z1 of z appears in
E( f |p,z,η). I can take p to be the function of endogenous explanatory variable(EEV) so that an
additive, independent error ε . In the second equality which is in additive form, I assume that (η ,ε)
independent of z and jointly normal.
The fractional response with EEV leads the same log likelihood as the probit model speci-
fication of f , even though f is a fractional response. In order to see this, consider the average
structural function under normality assumption, Φ(x˜1β/(1+σ2η)1/2) where x˜1 = (x1, p˜) and Φ
denotes standard normal CDF, and I hope to estimate βη ≡ β/(1+σ2η)1/2. Note that, I can obtain
E( f |x, p˜,η) as E( f |x, p˜,η) = E{1[x˜1β +η + r ≥ 0]|x, p˜,η} where distribution of r given x, p˜,η ,
D(r|x, p˜,η) = Normal(0,1). By iterated expectations,
E( f |x, p˜) =E{1[x˜1β +η+ r ≥ 0]|x, p˜} (A.11)
=E{1[x˜1βη + e≥ 0]|x, p˜} (A.12)
where e = (η + r)/(1+σ2η)1/2 is independent of z with standard normal distribution. In order to
identify this specification, I assume joint normality of (e,ε) variables which are independent of
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x. Let ρ =Corr(e,ε). From the equation A.12, E( f |x, p˜) has exactly the form of P(w = 1|x, p˜),
where w = 1[x˜1βη + e ≥ 0]. In this framework, even though f is not binary, its expected value
given x, p˜ is the same as the response probability implied by the bivariate probit model. Under
the distributional assumption, I can estimate college entrance exam score formation and choice
equations using joint QMLE methods with log-likelihood function
max
θ1,θ2
N
∑
i=1
[q1( fi, p˜i,zi,θ1,θ2)+q2(p˜i,zi,θ2)]
where θ1 = (αη ,β ′1η ,β2η ,ρ)
′ and θ2 = (δ ,γ ′,τ2)′ 25
q1( f , p,x,θ1,θ2) = f
{
log Φ[
αη + x1β1η + p˜β2η +(ρ/τ)(p˜−δ − zγ)
(1−ρ2)1/2 ]
}
+(1− f ) log {1−Φ[αη + x1β1η + p˜β2η +(ρ/τ)(p˜−δ − xγ)
(1−ρ2)1/2 ]
}
q2(p,x,θ2) =− log(τ2)/2− (p˜−δ − xγ)2/(2τ2)
A.6.1 Construction fractional response variables
Tables A.23 and A.24 present 3 different ROLs and their transformations according to a specific
college character. For this example, I choose private college is the college type to construct college
contest variable. The colleges are in the ROLs divided into private and public colleges. We use
this information in ROLs transforming them binary variables such that it takes 1 if the college in
ROLs is private. According to this transformations, the constructed contest variables become 0.43,
1, 0 respectively.
25The parameters in the fractional response variable equations are identified up to scale. αη ,β ′1η ,β2η represents
scaled versions of α,β ′1,β2. I refer the reader to Wooldridge (2014) for detailed identification and estimation under
these conditions.
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Table A.23: Example ROLs
ROL1 ROL2 ROL3
1 Boun Bilgi Odtu
2 Boun Bilgi Odtu
3 Boun Yeditepe Gazi
4 Koc Hacettepe
5 Sabanci Hacettepe
6 Bilkent Ankara
7 Odtu Ankara
8 Odtu Ankara
9 Sabanci
10 Koc
11 Itu
12 Itu
13 Itu
14 itu
15 Bilgi
16 Bilgi
17 Bilgi
18 Ytu
19 Ytu
20 Yeditepe
21 Yeditepe
22 Marmara
23 Marmara
24 Istanbul
Table A.24: Transformed ROLs
ROL1 ROL2 ROL3
1 0 1 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 1 0
4 1 0
5 1 0
6 1 0
7 0 0
8 0 0
9 1
10 1
11 0
12 0
13 0
14 0
15 1
16 1
17 1
18 0
19 0
20 1
21 1
22 0
23 0
24 0
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A.6.2 Additional summary and estimation results tables
Table A.25: Summary statistics for students that are in the college admission process
Variables Mean SD Obs
Panel A: Student Characteristics
Female 0.43 0.50 1851618
Without Exam 0.10 0.30 1851618
Without Score 0.13 0.33 1851618
Panel B: Choice Variables
Submission 0.48 0.50 1852076
# Choice 6.20 8.65 1851618
Matched 0.33 0.47 1852076
Panel C: Education tracks
Quantitative 0.37 0.48 1844714
Verbal 0.21 0.41 1844714
Composite 0.39 0.49 1844714
Foreign Language 0.02 0.15 1844714
Table A.26: Summary statistics for college applicants from survey sample
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Panel A: Student Characteristics
Female 0.48 0.50 0 1 4516
Father Educ. 2.12 1.19 1 5 4442
Mother Educ. 2.80 1.28 1 5 4467
Income 7.82 2.50 1 12 4195
Wealth 4.84 1.28 0 6 4147
Panel B: College Exam Scores
Quantitative 0.72 0.15 0 1.00 4516
Verbal 0.77 0.10 0 0.98 4516
Composite 0.77 0.10 0 0.99 4516
Panel C: High school Scores
Quantitative 0.74 0.10 0.45 1.00 4075
Verbal 0.76 0.10 0.48 1.00 4075
Scaled GPA 0.74 0.09 0.42 1.00 4515
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Table A.27: QMLE result for private college choice without endogenous score
Variables Coef St Err
Panel A. Covariates
College Entrance Score -2.33 0.06
Female -0.21 0.01
Constant 0.65 0.15
Panel B. High school type fixed effects
Anatolian (S) -0.03 0.14
Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.79 0.15
Anatolian Teacher (S) -0.35 0.15
Regional (N) -0.80 0.15
Science (S) 0.53 0.14
Vocational (N) -1.05 0.15
Private Science (S) 0.68 0.14
Private (N) 0.74 0.14
Regional (N) -0.50 0.14
Regional (S) -0.40 0.14
City Dummies Yes
Obs 110,807
Table A.28: QMLE result for private college choice with endogenous college entrance exam score
Private College Choice College Entrance Exam Score
Variables Coef St Err Variables Coef St Err
Covariates Covariates
College Exam Score 1.63 0.20 High School Exam Score 0.48 0.00
Female -0.12 0.02 Female -0.01 0.00
Constant -2.54 0.32 Constant 0.47 0.01
High school type fixed effects High school type fixed effects
Anatolian (S) -0.24 0.28 Anatolian (S) 0.02 0.01
Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.45 0.29 Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.06 0.01
Anatolian Teacher (S) -0.50 0.28 Anatolian Teacher (S) 0.00 0.01
Regional (N) -0.55 0.28 Regional (N) -0.02 0.01
Science (S) 0.00 0.28 Science (S) 0.03 0.01
Vocational (N) -0.64 0.29 Vocational (N) -0.04 0.01
Private Science (S) 0.67 0.28 Private Science (S) -0.02 0.01
Private (N) 0.58 0.28 Private (N) 0.00 0.01
Regional (N) -0.30 0.28 Regional (N) -0.02 0.01
Regional (S) -0.38 0.28 Regional (S) 0.01 0.01
City Dummies Yes City Dummies Yes
ρ -0.34 0.03 Obs 110,807
τ 0.07 0.00
Notes: Standard errors are calculated from bootstrap simulations with 100 replications.
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Table A.29: QMLE result for private college choice with endogenous high school GPA
Private College Choice Scaled high school GPA formation
Variables Coef St Err Variables Coef St Err
Scaled high school GPA 1.36 0.10 High school exam score 0.70 0.01
Female -0.29 0.02 Female 0.11 0.00
Constant -1.29 0.20 Constant -0.06 0.02
High school type fixed effects High school type fixed effects
Anatolian (S) -0.56 0.19 Anatolian (S) 0.14 0.02
Anatolian Vocational (S) -1.02 0.20 Anatolian Vocational (S) 0.22 0.02
Anatolian Teacher (S) -0.98 0.19 Anatolian Teacher (S) 0.14 0.02
Regional (N) -1.28 0.22 Regional (N) 0.25 0.02
Science (S) -0.38 0.19 Science (S) 0.06 0.02
Vocational (N) -1.24 0.21 Vocational (N) 0.25 0.03
Private Science (S) 0.30 0.19 Private Science (S) 0.13 0.02
Private (N) 0.41 0.19 Private (N) 0.02 0.02
Regional (N) -0.63 0.19 Regional (N) 0.17 0.02
Regional (S) -0.70 0.19 Regional (S) 0.18 0.02
ρ -0.45 0.02 Obs 45,722
exp(τ) -1.59 0.00
Notes: Standard errors are calculated from bootstrap simulations with 100 replications.
Table A.30: QMLE result for major choice without endogenous college entrance exam score
Medical School Engineering Math
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
College Exam Score 14.31 0.22 1.39 0.04 4.17 0.05
Female 0.23 0.01 -0.70 0.01 0.10 0.01
Constant -14.91 0.27 -0.97 0.10 -5.26 0.11
High school type fixed effects
Anatolian (S) 0.64 0.18 0.36 0.10 0.02 0.11
Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.19 0.29 -0.78 0.10 -0.99 0.16
Anatolian Teacher (S) 0.72 0.19 -0.48 0.10 -0.65 0.11
Regional (N) 1.01 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.37 0.11
Science (S) 0.75 0.19 0.17 0.10 -0.63 0.11
Vocational (N) 0.58 0.25 -1.04 0.10 -0.66 0.16
Private Science (S) 0.82 0.19 0.47 0.10 0.06 0.11
Private (N) 0.51 0.19 0.52 0.10 -0.22 0.11
Regional (N) 0.74 0.19 0.16 0.10 0.37 0.11
Regional (S) 0.61 0.19 0.29 0.10 0.34 0.11
Notes: Standard errors are calculated from bootstrap simulations with 100 replications.
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Table A.31: QMLE results for major choice with endogenous college entrance exam score
Medical School Engineering Math
Variables Coef St Err Coef St Err Coef St Err
College Exam Score 13.21 0.24 3.26 0.09 0.09 0.14
Female 0.18 0.01 -0.65 0.01 0.02 0.01
Constant -14.10 0.30 -2.45 0.11 -1.88 0.16
High school type fixed effects
Anatolian (S) 0.83 0.20 0.19 0.08 0.26 0.13
Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.11 0.31 -0.67 0.10 -1.28 0.20
Anatolian Teacher (S) 0.89 0.20 -0.60 0.08 -0.38 0.14
Regional (N) 1.01 0.21 0.05 0.09 0.24 0.13
Science (S) 1.03 0.20 -0.14 0.09 -0.08 0.14
Vocational (N) 0.57 0.27 -0.89 0.08 -0.94 0.17
Private Science (S) 0.91 0.20 0.44 0.09 0.08 0.13
Private (N) 0.76 0.22 0.38 0.09 -0.03 0.13
Regional (N) 0.78 0.20 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.13
Regional (S) 0.76 0.20 0.23 0.08 0.34 0.13
ρ 0.11 0.01 -0.17 0.01 0.35 0.01
exp(τ) -2.61 0.00 -2.61 0.00 -2.61 0.00
Notes: Standard errors are calculated from bootstrap simulations with 100 replications.
Table A.32: Cutoff percentiles summaries by public/private colleges and engineering majors
Public College
No Yes
Engineering
No 44.56 (33.89) 65.47 (24.98)
Yes 54.91 (30.38) 86.41 (12.10)
Notes: Table presents mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) of percentiles according
to private/public and engineering major or not partitions.
Table A.33: Variance decomposition in the ROLs
Selected Choice Variables R2
Fraction of private colleges 18%
Fraction of engineering major 20%
Fraction of medical schools 22%
Fraction of colleges from the same city 36%
Mean distance 27%
Notes: This table show the explained variation by admissions
scores, gender, high school type, and city dummies for the se-
lected choice variables.
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Table A.34: QMLE result for same city choice with endogenous college entrance exam score
Private College Choice College Entrance Exam Score
Variables Coef St Err Variables Coef St Err
College Entrance Score 1.06 0.38 High School Exam Score 0.44 0.01
Female 0.17 0.02 Female -0.02 0.00
Constant -1.37 0.43 Constant 0.50 0.01
High school type fixed effects High school type fixed effects
Anatolian (S) -0.89 0.31 Anatolian (S) 0.02 0.01
Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.64 0.32 Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.07 0.01
Anatolian Teacher (S) -0.96 0.32 Anatolian Teacher (S) 0.00 0.01
Regional (N) -0.72 0.32 Regional (N) -0.02 0.01
Science (S) -1.09 0.32 Science (S) 0.04 0.01
Vocational (N) -0.72 0.33 Vocational (N) -0.05 0.01
Private Science (S) -0.54 0.31 Private Science (S) -0.01 0.01
Private (N) -0.55 0.34 Private (N) -0.01 0.01
Regional (N) -0.50 0.31 Regional (N) -0.01 0.01
Regional (S) -0.62 0.31 Regional (S) 0.01 0.01
ρ -0.15 0.03 Obs 37150
exp(τ) -2.62 0.00
Notes: Standard errors are calculated from bootstrap simulations with 100 replications.
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Table A.35: QMLE result for private college choice with endogenous college entrance exam score
from the survey sample
Private College Choice College Entrance Exam Score
Variables Coef St Err Variables Coef St Err
Constant -4.82 0.52 Constant 0.20 0.05
College Exam Score -0.67 0.36 High School Exam Score 0.93 0.02
Female -0.14 0.05 Female -0.03 0.00
Father Education Father Education
Elementary School -0.04 0.07 Elementary School -0.01 0.00
Middle School -0.16 0.08 Middle School 0.00 0.01
High School -0.02 0.09 High School -0.01 0.01
Higher Education 0.19 0.21 Higher Education -0.03 0.02
Mother Education Mother Education
Elementary School 0.02 0.06 Elementary School 0.00 0.00
Middle School -0.09 0.10 Middle School 0.00 0.01
High School -0.18 0.07 High School 0.02 0.01
Higher Education -0.29 0.18 Higher Education 0.03 0.01
Income Categories Income Categories
2 -0.36 0.82 2 0.02 0.02
3 -0.11 0.33 3 0.01 0.02
4 -0.19 0.26 4 0.02 0.02
5 -0.24 0.26 5 0.01 0.02
6 -0.13 0.22 6 0.03 0.02
7 -0.13 0.22 7 0.03 0.02
8 -0.17 0.21 8 0.04 0.01
9 -0.04 0.21 9 0.04 0.01
10 0.26 0.23 10 0.04 0.02
11 0.40 0.23 11 0.01 0.02
12 0.66 0.21 12 0.01 0.02
Wealth Categories Wealth Categories
1 4.21 0.39 1 -0.12 0.05
2 4.05 0.32 2 -0.12 0.04
3 3.96 0.30 3 -0.14 0.04
4 3.97 0.32 4 -0.14 0.04
5 4.13 0.31 5 -0.14 0.04
6 4.40 0.32 6 -0.15 0.04
High School Dummies Yes High School Dummies Yes
ρ -0.10 0.04 Obs 3,507
exp(τ) -2.27 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are calculated from bootstrap simulations with 100 replications.
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Table A.36: QMLE result for evening college choice with endogenous college entrance exam score
under homogenous ability assumption
Private College Choice College Entrance Exam Score
Variables Coef St Err Variables Coef St Err
College Entrance Score -12.13 0.070 Distance Ind -0.081 0.002
Female -0.285 0.009 Female -0.021 0.001
Constant 9.301 0.147 Constant 0.830 0.007
High school type fixed effects High school type fixed effects
Anatolian (S) 0.648 0.127 Anatolian (S) 0.059 0.007
Anatolian Vocational (S) -1.174 0.134 Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.073 0.008
Anatolian Teacher (S) 0.450 0.131 Anatolian Teacher (S) 0.054 0.007
Regional (N) -0.906 0.133 Regional (N) -0.047 0.007
Science (S) 1.779 0.130 Science (S) 0.140 0.008
Vocational (N) -1.431 0.138 Vocational (N) -0.085 0.008
Private Science (S) 0.297 0.128 Private Science (S) 0.002 0.007
Private (N) 0.742 0.130 Private (N) 0.039 0.007
Regional (N) -0.706 0.127 Regional (N) -0.040 0.007
Regional (S) -0.133 0.127 Regional (S) 0.005 0.007
City Dummies Yes City Dummies Yes
ρ 0.913 0.006 Obs 110,807
exp(τ) -2.531 0.003
Table A.37: Linear regression of college entrance exam score
Variables Coef. St Err.
Panel A. Covariates
High School Entrance Score 0.48 0.00
Female -0.01 0.00
Constant 0.47 0.01
Panel B. High school type fixed effects
Anatolian (S) 0.02 0.01
Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.06 0.01
Anatolian Teacher (S) 0.00 0.01
Regional (N) -0.02 0.01
Science (S) 0.03 0.01
Vocational (N) -0.04 0.01
Private Science (S) -0.02 0.01
Private (N) 0.00 0.01
Regional (N) -0.02 0.01
Regional (S) 0.01 0.01
City Dummies Yes
147
Table A.38: QMLE result for evening college choice with endogenous college entrance exam score
Evening Education Choice College Entrance Exam Score
Variables Coef St Err Variables Coef St Err
College Entrance Score 1.63 0.20 High School Exam Score 0.48 0.00
Female -0.12 0.02 Female -0.01 0.00
Constant -2.54 0.32 Constant 0.47 0.01
High school type fixed effects High school type fixed effects
Anatolian (S) -0.24 0.28 Anatolian (S) 0.02 0.01
Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.45 0.29 Anatolian Vocational (S) -0.06 0.01
Anatolian Teacher (S) -0.50 0.28 Anatolian Teacher (S) 0.00 0.01
Regional (N) -0.55 0.28 Regional (N) -0.02 0.01
Science (S) 0.00 0.28 Science (S) 0.03 0.01
Vocational (N) -0.64 0.29 Vocational (N) -0.04 0.01
Private Science (S) 0.67 0.28 Private Science (S) -0.02 0.01
Private (N) 0.58 0.28 Private (N) 0.00 0.01
Regional (N) -0.30 0.28 Regional (N) -0.02 0.01
Regional (S) -0.38 0.28 Regional (S) 0.01 0.01
City Dummies Yes City Dummies Yes
ρ -0.34 0.07 Obs 110,807
exp(τ) -2.62 0.00
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A.7 Additional tables and figures for Chapter 3
Table A.39: Regression results for Earnings
Dependent Earnings
Coef Std Err
Female -0.27 0.07
Birth Year -0.14 0.02
Working hours 0.10 0.01
Hispanic 0.04 0.10
Black -0.08 0.09
Two Year -0.16 0.10
Grad School -0.49 0.31
Rural 0.11 0.07
West 0.18 0.11
South 0.24 0.09
North East 0.42 0.10
Overall GPA 0.33 0.04
Education -0.16 0.14
Business 0.22 0.10
Health 0.29 0.13
Computer& Eng 0.62 0.14
Other 0.04 0.09
Notes: OLS regressions result from college graduates’ earnings
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Table A.40: Distribution of college-majors in the NLYS97 sample
Female Male Total
Majors Nr (%) Nr (%) Nr (%)
Agriculture, Agriculture Operations 3 0.37 4 0.57 7 0.46
Natural Resources and Conservation 2 0.25 7 1 9 0.6
Architecture and Related Services 3 0.37 5 0.72 8 0.53
Area, Ethnic, Cultural, Gender 5 0.61 3 0.43 8 0.53
Communication, Journalism 28 3.44 23 3.3 51 3.38
Communications Technologies 1 0.12 6 0.86 7 0.46
Computer and Information Sciences 14 1.72 55 7.89 69 4.57
Personal and Culinary Services 8 0.98 6 0.86 14 0.93
Education 81 9.95 21 3.01 102 6.75
Engineering 12 1.47 42 6.03 54 3.57
Engineering Technologies 6 0.74 41 5.88 47 3.11
Foreign Languages, Literatures 12 1.47 4 0.57 16 1.06
Family and Consumer Sciences 13 1.6 . . 13 0.86
Legal Professions and Studies 3 0.37 1 0.14 4 0.26
English Language and
Literature/Letters 16 1.97 6 0.86 22 1.46
Liberal Arts and Sciences, Humanities 89 10.93 60 8.61 149 9.86
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 25 3.07 15 2.15 40 2.65
Mathematics and Statistics 3 0.37 11 1.58 14 0.93
Military Science, Leadership 1 0.12 1 0.14 2 0.13
Military Technologies and Applied
Sciences . . 1 0.14 1 0.07
Multi/Interdisciplinary Studies 8 0.98 14 2.01 22 1.46
Parks, Recreation and Leisure Studies 9 1.11 11 1.58 20 1.32
Leisure and Recreational Activities 1 0.12 . . 1 0.07
Philosophy and Religious Studies 2 0.25 7 1 9 0.6
Theology and Religious Vocations 5 0.61 9 1.29 14 0.93
Physical Sciences 7 0.86 7 1 14 0.93
Science and Technologies/Technicians 1 0.12 . . 1 0.07
Psychology 56 6.88 15 2.15 71 4.7
Homeland Security, Law Enforcement 27 3.32 32 4.59 59 3.9
Public Administration and Social
Service 23 2.83 4 0.57 27 1.79
Social Sciences 47 5.77 37 5.31 84 5.56
Construction Trades . . 7 1 7 0.46
Mechanic and Repair Technologies . . 16 2.3 16 1.06
Precision Production . . 3 0.43 3 0.2
Transportation and Materials Moving 2 0.25 6 0.86 8 0.53
Visual and Performing Arts 40 4.91 36 5.16 76 5.03
Health Professions 112 13.76 26 3.73 138 9.13
Business, Management, Marketing 133 16.34 141 20.23 274 18.13
History 13 1.6 13 1.87 26 1.72
Other 3 0.37 1 0.14 4 0.26
Total 814 100 697 100 1511 100
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Table A.41: Marital status and marriage time by college-major
Marriage Dummy Marriage Time
Majors Female Male Total Female Male Total
Agriculture, Agriculture Operations 1.00 0.75 0.86 200.33 172.50 184.43
Natural Resources and Conservation 0.00 0.29 0.22 234.00 217.14 220.89
Architecture and Related Services 0.67 0.80 0.75 177.67 190.40 185.63
Area, Ethnic, Cultural, Gender, and Group Studies 0.60 0.33 0.50 168.00 216.33 186.13
Communication, Journalism 0.57 0.52 0.55 198.46 205.39 201.59
Communications Technologies/Technicians 0.00 0.50 0.43 234.00 199.33 204.29
Computer and Information Sciences 0.43 0.47 0.46 192.00 196.02 195.20
Personal and Culinary Services 0.63 0.17 0.43 178.50 212.83 193.21
Education 0.73 0.62 0.71 173.23 191.67 177.03
Engineering 0.58 0.57 0.57 186.17 190.57 189.59
Engineering Technologies 0.50 0.56 0.55 200.33 185.56 187.45
Foreign Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics 0.67 0.75 0.69 175.50 209.00 183.88
Family and Consumer Sciences/Human Sciences 0.85 . 0.85 154.15 . 154.15
Legal Professions and Studies 1.00 0.00 0.75 162.00 234.00 180.00
English Language and Literature/Letters 0.50 0.67 0.55 204.88 188.83 200.50
Liberal Arts and Sciences, Humanities 0.69 0.63 0.66 170.87 184.72 176.44
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 0.48 0.67 0.55 196.60 195.67 196.25
Mathematics and Statistics 1.00 0.64 0.71 152.00 183.18 176.50
Military Science, Leadership and Operational Art. 1.00 1.00 1.00 98.00 153.00 125.50
Military Technologies and Applied Sciences . 1.00 1.00 . 72.00 72.00
Multi/Interdisciplinary Studies 0.50 0.57 0.55 178.25 192.79 187.50
Parks, Recreation and Leisure Studies 0.78 0.55 0.65 165.22 192.55 180.25
Leisure and Recreational Activities 1.00 . 1.00 140.00 . 140.00
Philosophy and Religious Studies 0.00 0.57 0.44 234.00 205.14 211.56
Theology and Religious Vocations 0.60 0.56 0.57 184.80 182.56 183.36
Physical Sciences 0.86 1.00 0.93 200.71 138.00 169.36
Science and Technologies/Technicians 0.00 . 0.00 234.00 . 234.00
Psychology 0.55 0.53 0.55 190.36 202.07 192.83
Homeland Security, Law Enforcement, Firefighting 0.63 0.50 0.56 172.52 188.00 180.92
Public Administration and Social Service Professions 0.39 0.75 0.44 193.04 205.75 194.93
Social Sciences 0.49 0.49 0.49 198.23 206.11 201.70
Construction Trades . 0.57 0.57 . 193.57 193.57
Mechanic and Repair Technologies/Technicians . 0.56 0.56 . 188.19 188.19
Precision Production . 0.33 0.33 . 206.00 206.00
Transportation and Materials Moving 1.00 0.67 0.75 213.50 177.83 186.75
Visual and Performing Arts 0.50 0.56 0.53 185.30 194.42 189.62
Health Professions and Related Programs 0.56 0.58 0.57 187.02 195.88 188.69
Business, Management, Marketing 0.63 0.50 0.56 176.80 195.79 186.57
History 0.31 0.38 0.35 213.85 205.38 209.62
Other 0.00 1.00 0.25 234.00 118.00 205.00
Total 0.60 0.55 0.57 183.42 193.38 188.01
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Table A.43: Summary statistics for entire sample
Female(49%) Male(51%) Total
Mean Sd Obs Mean Sd Obs Mean Sd Obs Min Max
Birth month 30.55 17.18 4385 30.80 17.01 4599 30.68 17.09 8984 1 60
Marital Status 0.49 0.50 4385 0.40 0.49 4599 0.45 0.50 8984 0 1
First Marriage Month 185.98 59.21 4385 199.42 50.24 4599 192.86 55.21 8984 7 234
Two Year Ins 0.07 0.26 4385 0.05 0.21 4599 0.06 0.23 8984 0 1
Four Year Ins 0.16 0.37 4385 0.12 0.32 4599 0.14 0.35 8984 0 1
Graduate School 0.01 0.07 4385 0.00 0.07 4599 0.00 0.07 8984 0 1
Sec. Degree 0.02 0.14 4385 0.02 0.12 4599 0.02 0.13 8984 0 1
Sec. College 0.08 0.27 4385 0.05 0.21 4599 0.06 0.24 8984 0 1
North East 0.17 0.38 4385 0.18 0.39 4599 0.18 0.38 8984 0 1
North Central 0.23 0.42 4385 0.23 0.42 4599 0.23 0.42 8984 0 1
South 0.38 0.49 4385 0.37 0.48 4599 0.37 0.48 8984 0 1
West 0.22 0.42 4385 0.22 0.41 4599 0.22 0.42 8984 0 1
Black 0.27 0.44 4385 0.25 0.44 4599 0.26 0.44 8984 0 1
Hispanic 0.21 0.41 4385 0.21 0.41 4599 0.21 0.41 8984 0 1
White 0.51 0.50 4385 0.52 0.50 4599 0.52 0.50 8984 0 1
Average Earning 1.69 1.13 4111 2.21 1.53 4341 1.96 1.38 8452 0 18.03
Average working hours 12.24 5.93 4305 14.16 7.08 4508 13.22 6.61 8813 0 45.41
Gpa term1 2.47 1.31 1885 2.37 1.28 1593 2.42 1.29 3478 0 4
Gpa term2 2.44 1.29 1762 2.35 1.24 1460 2.40 1.27 3222 0 4
Gpa term3 2.53 1.25 1636 2.45 1.20 1309 2.50 1.23 2945 0 4
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Figure A.8: College graduates in US across gender and majors
Source: National College Education Survey NCES (2012).The left graph shows the share graduating with a four year
degree for both males and females. The right graph presents the proportion of degrees awarded to female students for the
selected majors from 1970 to 2010.
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